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Restorative justice is regarded in modern criminal justice systems as one approach to address 
some of the shortcomings of conventional justice models. Many governments have begun to 
legislate for restorative policy and practice, and to take a more direct role in the development of 
restorative justice programs. Given this reality, this thesis asks how the introduction of 
restorative justice legislation affects the operation of restorative justice programs. The answer to 
that question is guided both by academic considerations of restorative justice practice and by 
policy design scholarship. I apply the resulting theoretical framework to three jurisdictions—
New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont—in which restorative justice is comprehensively 
integrated via legislative acts into the criminal justice system. 
I use a textual analysis of the mandating statute and an evaluation of the restorative 
justice mechanism to build an understanding of how legislative decisions can shape the 
restorative landscape within a criminal justice system. The textual analysis is driven by the work 
of restorative justice researchers who consider how legislative provisions for restorative practices 
may be incorporated into existing justice institutions and what restorative justice components 
should be included in legislative mandates. The analysis also relies on an understanding, fueled 
by policy design scholars, of how various policy tools can affect policy implementation. In this 
thesis, one notable area of policy design is the level of discretion that is granted to local 
implementors; I apply the statute typology created by Ingram and Schneider (1990) that 
categorizes legislative acts according to that discretion. 
The evaluation of each jurisdiction’s restorative justice program is based on metrics for 
restorative success from Bazemore and Schiff (2005) and Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) 
designation of programmatic, process, and political policy success. I employ a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data, collecting longitudinal statistics from each jurisdiction’s criminal 
justice system and conducting interviews with restorative justice practitioners in each location.  
Overall, this analysis reveals that the design of restorative justice policy requires 
extensive negotiation. It is difficult to balance all the dimensions of a restorative justice process 
and meet the needs of all involved parties. When integrating restorative programs into modern 
criminal justice, the challenge becomes amplified, and jurisdictions must navigate occasionally 
conflicting priorities and account for procedural tradeoffs. 
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Restorative justice is a method of conflict resolution by which parties work together to address 
the source of contention and attend to harm caused by the dispute, therein restoring the 
relationships and well-being of the people involved. This approach has manifested in criminal 
justice systems as a potential response to criminal offences. Because modern criminal justice 
operates as an interconnected series of state institutions, the intersection between restorative 
justice and criminal justice has become an area of state regulation. This thesis explores aspects of 
the state’s interest in restorative justice by examining the way three different jurisdictions have 
implemented restorative justice programs into their criminal justice systems.  Investigating 
restorative justice practices in New Zealand, New South Wales (Australia), and Vermont (USA), 
the thesis will explore varying approaches, identify areas where state policies differ, and evaluate 
the comparative effectiveness of the different approaches.   
My central research question asks how a mandating statute—one that compels the justice 
sector to employ restorative processes—affects the practice of restorative justice. I answer that 
question through an analysis of six pieces of restorative justice legislation that have been passed 
in New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont, as well as an evaluation of the restorative 
justice practices used in those jurisdictions. I select these jurisdictions because, in each location, 
the enacted statutes established a “comprehensive legislative framework” for the practice of 
restorative justice. As discussed more extensively in Chapter 1, a comprehensive legislative 
framework is a categorization used to describe the level of statutory support allocated to the 
restorative justice mechanism; it refers to the highest level of support that a statute can provide. 
I focus on instances of the most extensive support because it creates a direct relationship 
between the legislation and corresponding restorative practice, offering more opportunities to 
probe the nature of that relationship. 
The legislative analysis and evaluation in this thesis employ two criteria: 1) to what extent 
the legislation meets the requirements of restorative justice, and 2) how effectively it designs and 
implements the desired justice policy. In evaluating a statutory mechanism’s restorative capacity, 
the thesis will draw on leading scholarly treatments of the regulation and operationalization of 
restorative justice. In discussing a statute’s potential efficacy, the thesis borrows the language and 
theories of policy design research. After completing an assessment of the statutory provisions, 
the thesis evaluates the restorative justice mechanisms, using both restorative expectations and 
x 
 
policy design expectations as metrics for success. In measuring the success of the programs, I 
rely on three sources of data: existing reviews of the restorative justice mechanisms, a 
longitudinal appraisal of the jurisdictions’ specific restorative justice statistics and general 
criminal justice indicators, and qualitative findings from interviews with local restorative justice 
practitioners. This evaluation provides insights into how well restorative justice programs 
achieve their goals as part of modern criminal justice systems, and how legislation can shape 
restorative justice mechanisms. 
The research methodology adopted here builds on an understanding of restorative 
justice put forward by Kathleen Daly (2016). She contends that restorative justice should be 
perceived as one potential justice mechanism—a “response, process, activity, measure, or 
practice”—under the umbrella of “innovative justice” (Daly 2016:14, 18). Therefore, all justice 
mechanisms can be placed somewhere on a spectrum from “conventional to innovative,” (Daly 
2016:18). Daly (2016:21) concludes by describing restorative justice as “a contemporary justice 
mechanism to address crime, disputes, and bounded community conflict.” The mechanism is 
designed to engage the individuals who were affected by the crime and “can take place at all 
phases of the criminal process…as well as for offending or conflicts not reported to the police” 
(Daly 2016:21) She also adds some procedural parameters, offering that “specific practices will 
vary, depending on context, but are guided by rules and procedures that align with what is 
appropriate in the context of the crime, dispute, or bounded conflict” (Daly 2016:21). This 
characterization is rather limited in scope, but Daly (2016) maintains that this limitation is the 
only way to introduce accuracy and empirical vigour to the field of restorative justice; further, it 
aligns with how restorative justice is being implemented at present.  
In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the relevant literature and introduce the 
theoretical frameworks that will guide my own research methodology. This discussion informs 
how I develop the above-mentioned metrics of both restorative and policy success. For 
restorative metrics, I look to researchers who explore how restorative justice can be integrated 
into existing justice systems, what features of restorative justice processes need to be regulated, 
and how restorative values interact with procedural standardization. Additionally, I borrow 
extensively from Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) descriptions of expected restorative outcomes 
and how those translate into measurable restorative results. For policy metrics, I turn to an area 
of political science that focuses on how states design their policy mandates through legislative 
activity, including the way policy tools and rules can affect implementation. I also introduce 
xi 
 
Ingram and Schneider’s (1990) categorization of statutes, which characterizes policy-informing 
statutes according to the level of discretion they allocate to local implementers. Further, I rely on 
Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) consideration of policy success, which attempts to tackle the 
subjectivity of success by breaking it into multiple types.  
In Chapter 2, I give context for how restorative justice operates in New Zealand, New 
South Wales, and Vermont. I do this by providing information about the demographic 
information, the socio-political realities, and the operation of the criminal justice institutions in 
each jurisdiction. I also introduce the legislative acts that established restorative justice practices, 
and the basic function of the restorative justice mechanisms. Finally, I discuss hypothetical 
criminal cases and examine how those cases might progress through the justice mechanisms in 
each jurisdiction. In Chapter 3, I perform a textual analysis of the six statutes in my case 
study.  Drawing on the scholarly literature previewed earlier, Chapter 3 offers preliminary 
thoughts on the quality of the restorative design reflected in the chosen statutes. This includes an 
overture to the implications of the following statutory features: the precision with which the 
restorative procedure is designed; the role that the restorative justice mechanism plays in the 
wider system; and the amount of authority granted to local implementers. In Chapter 4, I survey 
the existing reviews of the restorative justice mechanisms in each jurisdiction. This survey paints 
an initial picture of each mechanism’s relative success and introduces the ways in which 
restorative goals and policy goals can sometimes reinforce each other and sometimes conflict 
with each other. The findings presented in this chapter also help to fill some of the gaps in my 
own data. And finally, in Chapter 5, I conduct my own evaluation of the efficacy of the three 
statutory schemes and reflect critically about the relationship between restorative justice and 
legislation. This reflection reveals that the institutionalization of restorative justice is a site of 
ongoing compromise, and that jurisdictions have significant decisions to make about which 
elements of restorative justice to prioritize and how to integrate those priorities into existing 
criminal justice procedures. 
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1. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, I review the literature that influenced the direction of my research. After a brief 
overview of the history of restorative justice, I will discuss the practical ways in which restorative 
justice programs have been thought by scholars to achieve their goals. Then, because my 
research question demands a way to measure the success of restorative justice, I propose a set of 
tools to test, both quantitatively and quantitatively, whether the programs accomplish their goals. 
Given my focus on legislative regulation and implementation of restorative justice, I next 
explore the potential advantages and disadvantages associated with top-down restorative justice 
directives and identify some of the likely features to be included in restorative justice legislation.  
Finally, the chapter will broaden the scholarly discussion by examining the relationship 
between law and social change, and current policy design research. This broadened account is 
meant to bridge the gap between what is known about restorative justice legislation and what is 
known about restorative justice practices. In understanding what some other areas of political 
science have to say about the connection between a policy mandate and actual policy 
implementation, I attempt to provide some additional tools for the evaluation of statutorily 
designed restorative justice practices. 
History of Restorative Justice  
The goals of restorative justice did not figure in the growth and development of modern 
criminal justice systems. Instead, criminal justice systems—comprised of institutions aimed at 
law enforcement, criminal adjudication, and the management of criminal offenders—have relied 
on a conventional justice approach that perceives crime as a violation against the state, deserving 
of punishment, and therefore gives the state substantial control of the system’s institutions (Zehr 
2005, Daly 2016). In the book Restoring Justice, Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heertderks Strong 
(2011) chart the rise of this state-centric model in Europe, as efforts to consolidate power led 
rulers to seize control of the legal process. This tool allowed the state to dictate social norms, 
establish supremacy over individuals, and supplant previous institutions of dispute resolution 
such as the church (Van Ness and Strong 2011:7). As the state further institutionalized its role in 
the justice system, criminal behaviour was framed as a defiance of state authority. And in search 
of a method to both regain authority and deter future defiance, the state turned to retribution as 
the primary consequence for guilty offenders (Van Ness and Strong 2011:8). This model of 
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criminal justice and its capacity for far-reaching social control will appear familiar to many 
Westernized countries, and remains, in many ways, the modern response to crime: a series of 
state-controlled instruments (arrest, prosecution, adjudication and trial, and sentencing) which 
are meant to determine culpability and deliver appropriate punishment typically through fines 
and imprisonment (Bazemore and Umbreit 1995:302, Daly 2016:15).  
Restorative justice is often framed as an alternative to this conventional approach (Zehr 
2005, Bazemore and Umbreit 1995:302, Lemley 2001:45, Bazemore and Schiff 2005:28, Daly 
2016:15). Restorative justice centres the focus of the legal process on the violations against the 
individual victims and the community involved, rather than the state. Through a restorative lens, 
criminal behaviour is viewed as doing harm, and restorative justice seeks to repair the harm. 
Therefore, in a justice system informed by restorative practices, the response to crime becomes 
an effort to understand the relationship between all relevant stakeholders (victims, offenders, 
and the community), to define the harm inflicted, and to determine how best to repair this harm 
(Zehr 2004:306, Van Ness and Strong 2015:44, Umbreit and Armour 2011:3). 
Many restorative justice advocates trace a repair-focused, community-based crime 
response back to traditional, indigenous populations, from Māori iwi in New Zealand to First 
Nations in Canada (Van Ness and Strong 2015:7). From there, it’s difficult to track the 
movement and development of restorative values and the use of restorative justice in criminal 
justice settings. Restorative justice, for the bulk of its history, has been a micro-level practice, 
dependent on local communities and bottom-up social movements calling for more healing 
responses to crime. However, in more recent years, criminal justice systems have attempted to 
harness restorative mechanisms for their potentially reformative power. This is in response to 
growing discontent with conventional justice, which is blamed for high incarceration rates, 
skyrocketing prison costs, and the disenfranchisement of both victims and offenders who 
encounter the system. Restorative justice practices have, as a result, proliferated throughout the 
world. Many of these restorative programs are coordinated by the state’s criminal justice system, 
or at the very least, cooperate with state-controlled justice institutions (Zehr 2004). By some 
estimates, around 100 countries use restorative elements in their criminal justice systems, and 
while those efforts may be experimental and localized, they speak to the growing role that 
restorative justice is playing internationally in the way countries address crime (Van Ness 2005).  
During this period of growth, four procedures have risen to the top as the most 
common, modern practices of restorative justice. First, victim-offender mediation (VOM) 
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features a meeting between an offender who has already accepted responsibility for the crime, 
and a victim who has agreed to a facilitated discussion (Bazemore and Umbreit 2001:2). In some 
instances, victims and offenders pass messages through a third-party in what is known as a 
“shuttle” mediation. Alternatively, a face-to-face meeting is designed to take place in a “safe, 
structured setting” and often includes the presence of additional support persons for both the 
victim and the offender, such as friends and family (Umbreit and Armour 2011:19, Bazemore 
and Umbreit 2001:2).  
Second, group conferences are similar to VOMs, but are explicitly designed to include 
support persons, as well as other representatives from the effected community (Umbreit and 
Armour 2011:19). In both models, proceedings are intended to give the victim an opportunity to 
describe the physical, emotional, and financial impact of the crime, to allow offenders to explain 
their own circumstances, and to answer any lingering questions that might exist about the 
incident (Bazemore and Umbreit 2001:2). Both mediation and conferencing attempt to create a 
plan for reparation that all involved parties find amenable and that directly addresses the 
concerns of the victim while protecting the rights of the offender (Bazemore and Umbreit 
2001:5).  
Third, circle sentencing is a “holistic reintegrative strategy” that takes place post-
conviction and gathers the victims, offenders, their families and friends, community members, 
and the involved criminal justice actors like police officers, lawyers, social workers, and judges 
(Bazemore and Umbreit 2001:6). The participants work together to reach agreement on a 
sentencing plan, often with a great deal of specificity in outlining how all circle members—not 
just the offender—will commit to the successful completion of the plan. The explicit goal is to 
engage the entire community in conflict resolution and build accountable networks of support for 
both victims and offenders.  
Fourth, community reparative boards feature well-trained community members who 
meet with convicted offenders in a public proceeding during which they develop a sentencing 
proposal; once the offender agrees to certain sanctions, they will document their progress with 
the board. Though not required, victims are encouraged to attend these public meetings and 
lend their voice to a constructive confrontation of the offender (Bazemore and Umbreit 2001:4-
6). 
Given this knowledge of what constitutes modern restorative justice mechanisms, there 
remain theoretical questions about how scholars expect restorative justice to respond effectively 
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to crime. Accordingly, the following section details the academic discussion of what social and 
criminological processes take place during a restorative justice procedure, and what outcomes 
those procedures should produce. Based on this vision of restorative outcomes, it becomes 
possible to formulate evaluative measures for gauging the success of various restorative 
programs. Having probative success measures will be of use in later chapters as I appraise the 
restorative efforts of the jurisdictions that I am investigating.  
Measuring and Evaluating Restorative Justice  
Many experts have explained why we might anticipate restorative processes to produce certain 
outcomes and, based on those expectations, have suggested metrics with which we might 
evaluate restorative justice. Perhaps the most comprehensive effort at connecting restorative 
values, practices and outcomes comes from Bazemore and Schiff (2005). They start by 
borrowing Van Ness and Strong’s (2015) three guiding principles of restorative justice: repairing 
harm, stakeholder involvement, and community/government role transformation (Bazemore 
and Schiff 2005:89; citing an earlier edition of Restoring Justice). From there, they identify the 
common goals or process outcomes that are associated with each principle, and then specify 
restorative practices that facilitate those outcomes (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:45-46).  
The first principle of repairing harm manifests in practices that focus on amends-making, 
which include outcomes like the creation of reparative agreements, the acceptance of 
responsibility by an offender, and the opportunity for victims to describe their experiences and 
voice their needs (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:53). Harm can also be repaired through outcomes 
that build relationships, such as the provision of support opportunities for both the victim and 
the offender, and specifications that give participants the responsibility of following up and 
assisting with the completion of the reparative agreement (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:56).  
The second principle of stakeholder involvement concerns the restorative opportunities 
for victim-offender exchange and reintegrative shaming (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:89). Victim-
offender exchange engages the two parties closest to a criminal offence in a dialogue and 
produces outcomes such as reducing the fear experienced by a victim, fostering a sense of relief, 
vindicating a victim’s experience, encouraging an offender’s sense of remorse, and inducing 
empathy in both parties (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:60). Reintegrative shaming is a practice 
strategy advanced by John Braithwaite that further explains and contributes to the 
transformative power of restoration (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:61). The strategy is meant to 
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promote feelings of shame as potentially powerful motivators for behavioural change among 
offenders. When shame is harnessed in a restorative practice setting and used to foster 
constructive disapproval from the other participants, it can effectively convince offenders to 
denounce criminal behaviour and to fear the disgrace and disappointment that reoffending 
would engender (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:61). Reintegrative shaming also challenges 
participants to use empathetic response and positive reinforcement as methods for reintegrating 
the offender into the community (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:64). The presumed outcome is 
long-term impact on crime risk factors, and therefore reduced recidivism. 
Community role transformation, the third restorative principle, is embodied in the 
processes of professional role change, norm affirmation, and skill building (Bazemore and Schiff 
2005:89). Professional role change requires that justice system professionals and restorative 
justice facilitators shift their focus from the provision of “expert” justice services to the 
maximization of community involvement, resulting in a restorative outcome of increased 
community participation (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:73). Norm affirmation is an opportunity for 
community members to educate offenders regarding community values and to reclaim 
community order from the disturbance often caused by crime, which allows for the outcome of 
increased sense of safety and relief among participants (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:80). Finally, 
skill building occurs when restorative mechanisms provide participants with lessons in 
restoration and conflict resolution. As community members gain more experience with 
restorative justice and the associated skillset, the assumed outcome is the increased use of 
restorative justice (Bazemore and Schiff 2005:88).    
Armed with a better understanding of possible restorative justice outcomes, it becomes 
easier to contextualize the choices that scholars make when selecting measurable process 
outputs. Several meta-analyses of restorative justice program evaluations offer assemblies of 
both qualitative and quantitative variables that have been used to measure restorative success, all 
of which can be grouped by the three guiding principles above. Variables that have been used as 
indicators for repairing harms include: rates of restitution and outcome plan compliance (Presser 
and Van Voorhis 2002, Latimer, Dowden, and Muse 2005); the rates at which apologies are 
included in outcome plans (Poulson 2003); and the perceived fairness and adequacy of outcome 
plans (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 2003). Indicators for stakeholder involvement are 
also based on perceptions of the program participants and include opinions related to 
satisfaction levels with various aspects of the process and whether participants felt as though 
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their stories were heard (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 2003, Latimer, et al. 2005). The 
aspirational outcome of long-term changes in an offender’s behaviour also lead most evaluations 
to measure the recidivism levels of participating offenders (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, 
Latimer, et al. 2005, Strang, Sherman, Mayo-Wilson, Woods, and Ariel 2013). Finally, indicators 
for community role transformation include: measures of community well-being such as amount 
of volunteerism and crime levels (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002); feelings of safety and concern 
levels regarding revictimization among participants (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 
2003); and robustness of the restorative justice mechanism, measured by the number of 
participants and the frequency with which people use the restorative service (Bazemore and 
Schiff 2005).  
Many of these measures rely on the collection of participant perceptions, which is 
typically done through a survey administered after the restorative process (Poulson 2003, 
Latimer, et al. 2005). This type of qualitative data requires that a researcher analyse a program’s 
own recording of follow-up with participants, or commission their own survey to collect the 
opinions of past and present participants (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 2003, 
Latimer, et al. 2005). Researchers also commonly evaluate programs by conducting interviews 
with participants and practitioners, which have the capacity to provide further information on 
the restorative quality of a program (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 2003, Latimer, et 
al. 2005). Finally, scholars frequently measure the impact of restorative justice interventions on 
reoffending behaviour (Latimer, et al. 2005, Strang, et al. 2013). 
Most of these efforts to measure restorative justice’s success have been applied to 
individual restorative service providers, rather than taking the broader view of how well 
restorative justice is practiced across a particular jurisdiction. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in 
the literature. This broader approach seems important given the increasing integration of 
restorative justice into modern criminal justice systems, and the associated need to measure the 
effectiveness of restorative justice at the level of government that exercises the relevant criminal 
justice authority. As jurisdictions grapple with the best way to standardize their restorative 
practices and implement their restorative justice mechanisms, there is opportunity for restorative 
justice scholars to produce some helpful answers. Indeed, as the next section reveals, some 
scholars have begun to evaluate the potential pros and cons of these jurisdiction-wide 
standardization efforts.  
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Legislating for Restorative Justice 
The possible standardization of restorative justice mechanisms highlights important questions 
about how those mechanisms are introduced into and regulated by a jurisdiction’s criminal 
justice system. Statutory mandate is not the only way to develop restorative justice practices, but 
several jurisdictions have relied on their legislatures to craft restorative procedures. This has led 
researchers to consider, in three primary ways, how legislation may affect restorative justice. 
First, there is a debate about whether restorative justice practices are best-served by legislative 
regulation or whether overly restrictive mandates may harm the grassroots, innovative, and 
community-oriented culture of past restorative developments. Second, scholars have explored 
what, exactly, in restorative justice processes requires statutory consideration and what the 
“ideal” statutes might contain. Third, there have been some attempts at surveying the current 
legislative landscape and analysing the content of existing restorative justice statutes.  
 Scholars disagree as to whether restorative justice benefits from legislative mandate. 
Although they cannot easily be identified as “for” and “against” restorative justice legislation, 
many experts have expressed anxieties about what could be lost if restorative justice is 
formalized inappropriately (Braithwaite 2002:565, Aertsen, Daems, and Robert 2006, Hudson 
2007:62). For example, Barbara Hudson (2007:62) draws a distinction between two types of 
institutionalization: “universalization” in which restorative justice becomes the primary frame 
through which policies and processes are designed, and “incorporation” where restorative justice 
is merely co-opted by the existing penal system and moulded to fit the needs of conventional 
justice. While universalization is a laudable goal, Hudson (2007) argues that it’s more likely that 
the institutionalization of restorative efforts will happen somewhere on a spectrum between 
universality and total co-optation. Hudson’s (2007) argument concurs with my understanding 
that restorative justice is one justice mechanism rather than a coherent system, meaning that 
restoration is positioned to become one component of criminal justice rather than a dominant 
policy frame. 
 So, what are the threats associated with restorative justice being integrated into 
conventional criminal justice practices? Put in the broadest terms, most apprehensions stem 
from the fear that restorative justice processes will be implemented without restorative justice 
values, and that attempts at legislating and standardizing restorative practices will not properly 
account for the true intention and reformative impulses behind the restorative justice movement 
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(Braithwaite 2002, Roche 2003, Reimund 2005:691, Hudson 2007, Leverton 2008:527, Van Ness 
and Strong 2015:48). This concern grows out of the perception that restorative justice arose 
from an organic, bottom-up social movement, and gains both legitimacy and efficacy from some 
of the informal, ad hoc approaches that have arisen in the absence of mandated top-down 
processes (Roche 2003). Restorative processes are intentionally decentralized to provide space 
for all voices to participate in the conversation, and it is often considered best practice to avoid 
scripted interactions or preordained outcomes because restoration is meant to be responsive in 
real-time to the exchanges between victims and offenders (Braithwaite 2002:565-566, Hudson 
2007:60-61). These aspirations produce a method of justice that is indirect and potentially 
unpredictable, and with the pressures on legal systems to be efficient and cost-effective, some 
advocates are concerned that those systems will demand more “wieldy” restorative instruments 
(Reimund 2005:691, Hudson 2007, Leverton 2008:526). Standardizing all restorative justice 
mechanisms into a “meeting,” an “apology,” a “compensatory measure,” and some degree of 
“sanction” hinders the mechanism’s ability to comply with restorative justice’s expectation of 
discursiveness (Hudson 2007:63). Furthermore, it curbs the possibility of future innovation and 
disincentivizes creativity in the search for reparative outcomes (Braithwaite 2002:565, Leverton 
2008:525). Recognizing the legitimacy of the concern that restorative justice may become over-
routinized, my own research will examine how various legislative approaches may impose or 
alleviate such a problem. This will be more fully discussed in my own evaluations. 
Institutionalization of the practice may also lead to demands for accredited restorative 
justice training. If a jurisdiction develops extensive training schemes meant to teach mediators 
and facilitators how to run restorative justice programs, licensure or certification practices may 
inadvertently disqualify some of the local innovators who have spearheaded restorative initiatives 
but may not have access to, or interest in, these Westernized accreditation requirements 
(Braithwaite 2002:565). This problem looms large in the thinking of those restorative justice 
experts who view indigenous practitioners as the original sources of restorative thought 
(Braithwaite 2002:565). My own research further considers the potential manifestation of this 
concern in Chapter 5. 
 However, the same authors who caution against the dangers of institutionalization have 
also acknowledged the need for some level of oversight; standardization may provide guidance 
and resources for the successful implementation of restorative justice (Van Ness and Nolan 
1998, Groenhuijsen 2000, Braithwaite 2002, Leverton 2008, Lee 2011). In a well-publicized 
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incident in Canberra, the participants in a group conference agreed that the offender—a young 
man who had admitted to shoplifting—should be required to stand outside the store wearing a t-
shirt that said, “I am a thief.”  Many commentators have decried the humiliating, stigmatizing 
outcome and declared it antithetical to restorative goals (Braithwaite 2002:567, Leverton 
2008:505). This “rogue” restorative outcome, among other examples of bad practice, highlights 
the need for oversight and regulation (Braithwaite 2002:565, Leverton 2008:507).  
 Not all scholars who join the call for formalized standards believe that those standards 
should be set forth in a legislative directive. Instead, some scholars have argued for the 
promulgation of best-practice guidelines.  Others urge the dissemination of universal and 
fundamental values designed to demarcate the sphere of acceptable restorative practices. These 
guidelines and values, per scholarly suggestions, could be enforced by non-mandatory state and 
international declarations such as a United Nations Resolution or by the rules of private 
associations (Braithwaite 2002:571, Leverton 2008:507-508).    
Despite the support for these alternative regulatory mechanisms, plenty of experts are 
willing to reflect on the opportunities offered by regulation that is sourced in 
legislation.  Building on the assumption that legislation serves as the primary governing tool for 
conventional criminal justice systems, these scholars believe that the institutionalization of 
restorative justice will likely come through the adoption of statutes (Van Ness and Nolan 
1998:55, Lee 2011:537). Christopher Lee (2011:537) attempts to use a handful of existing 
statutes to bolster the implication that legislation can be central to the effective implementation 
of restorative justice. He points to the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 in 
New Zealand, which specified the practice of family group conferences, as an indication that 
legislation can effectively help to initiate and prioritize restorative justice. Lee also cites the 
United Nations Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes, which asserts that statutory requirements 
allow restorative justice to be more authoritatively introduced into existing systems and to be 
more frequently used, as evidence that legal authority avoids the “marginalization” and 
“underutilization” of restorative justice (Lee 2011:537). Further, Lee (2011:537) indicates that 
legislation can empower those attempting to implement restorative programs. He uses the 
Minnesota Community Correctional Services Act as an example that facilitates restorative 
practices. The Act requires that all county prosecutors establish a pretrial diversion program for 
offenders and includes restorative justice as an approved procedure for fulfilling this 
requirement. Finally, Lee claims, relying on the United Nations Handbook, that legislation is 
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essential for the creation of the appropriate safeguards that protect both victims’ and offenders’ 
rights (Lee 2011:537).  
Marc Groenhuijsen (2000:5-6) urges the importance of legislation from a different 
perspective, arguing that legislation prevents restorative practices from lying “dormant”; 
legislation can obligate legal decisionmakers to “give a reasoned opinion” on why they’ve 
bypassed restorative justice options in certain cases, lending even more viability to restorative 
justice. Groenhuijsen (2000:7) also argues that well-written legislation creates certainty and 
uniformity in restorative practices, explaining that we need to be able to guarantee equal 
protection and equal treatment under the law. He promotes statutory authority that is designed 
to reduce “territorial differentiations and discrepancies” and provide clarity through the 
restorative process (Groenhuijsen 2000:7).  
 Granting the potential power of legislation, scholars have wrestled with the question of 
what elements to include in the proposed statute, or what I will sometimes call, the “ideal 
statute.” Most scholars agree that statutes need to address facilitator selection, training, and 
certification, the rules surrounding participation, participant safety and confidentiality, and legal 
safeguards such as right to counsel and a defined scope for what role restorative justice 
processes and outcomes can play in further criminal proceedings (Groenhuijsen 2000, Leverton 
2008, Lee 2011). On top of that, it is generally accepted that statutes should set out the basic 
parameters for the restorative justice mechanism that will be in use: selecting the preferred 
practice; defining the entities that will make referrals and those that will execute referrals; 
specifying at what stage in the criminal justice process restorative justice can be implemented; 
defining the role that restorative agreements will play in the legal process; and identifying the 
party responsible for oversight of successful completion of any agreements (Van Ness and 
Nolan 1998, Groenhuijsen 2000, Lee 2011). 
The path taken at each of these decision points will produce an assortment of restorative 
justice mechanisms, operating with the conventional justice system in distinct ways. Many 
scholars offer various analytic models meant to distinguish between the types of restorative 
justice that develop based on these implementation decisions. For the most part, these models 
embody three options for how restorative justice can be integrated into conventional justice 
systems (Groenhuijsen 2000:3-4, Lee 2011:558). In the first option, restorative justice operates 
“as part of” or as a “supplementary modification to” conventional justice (Groenhuijsen 2000:3, 
Lee 2011:558). This model sees restorative justice becoming one component of the conventional 
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justice process; for example, a remorseful offender who’s case is eligible will still go through the 
typical stages of arrest, charging, conviction, sentencing, and sanctioning, but at some point, they 
will also engage in a restorative program designed to accrue the cited benefits of reparative 
interactions and, depending on the outcome, to potentially influence the ultimate court-ordered 
consequence (Groenhuijsen 2000:3, Lee 2011:558). In the second option, restorative justice 
replaces the conventional justice system or operates as a fully autonomous alternative 
(Groenhuijsen 2000:4, Lee 2011:558). Here, restorative justice would function as a coherent 
response to crime, either displacing conventional criminal procedures or leaving such procedures 
intact and diverting some cases for full adjudication by restorative justice processes 
(Groenhuijsen 2000:3, Lee 2011:558). In the third option, restorative justice runs parallel to the 
conventional justice system (Groenhuijsen 2000:4, Lee 2011:558). This approach would allow 
the conventional justice system to run its existing course and would introduce restorative justice 
as a “complementary device” used to repair harms that arise during the conventional 
adjudication of the case; complementary designers assume that many restorative initiatives would 
occur after the conclusion of all criminal proceedings (Groenhuijsen 2000:3, Lee 2011:558). This 
method of sorting and analysing restorative justice implementation will be useful as I go on to 
assess the legislative context of my case study jurisdictions. 
 Another useful consideration of the legislative design of restorative justice comes from 
the handful of authors who have begun reviewing the contents of statutes and evaluating how 
legislatures are currently contending with restorative values. Umbreit, et al. (2005:291-294) divide 
levels of statutory support into five, distinct types: a comprehensive legislative framework, which 
addresses specific requirements for programs, including their oversight, facilitator training, 
funding, costs, confidentiality, eligibility, and liability; a specific statutory provision, which 
provides clear authority for restorative justice programs but offers fewer detailed requirements; a 
basic statutory provision, which presents restorative justice as an option without specifying any 
portion of the programmatic details; a statute that includes elements of restorative justice, which 
reflects restorative justice principles such as balance and reparation but does not offer any 
known restorative justice practice; and no existing restorative justice statute. For reasons that I 
explain in the next chapter, I have limited my case studies to focus on statutes that provide a 
comprehensive legislative framework, although there is certainly a need for further exploration at 
all levels of statutory support.  
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 These efforts at categorizing and understanding statutory provisions for restorative 
justice are undoubtedly important. However, it is unclear how much of this research on 
restorative justice legislation is grounded in an understanding of actual legislative processes and 
the relationship between laws, policy design, and program implementation. Moving forward, I 
will examine some of these broader, theoretical domains and then conclude the chapter by 
explaining how I will incorporate the restorative justice conversation into these frameworks.  
Contemplating Law, Social Change, and Policy Design  
Restorative justice will continue to receive statutory consideration. The sphere of modern 
criminal justice system is highly regulated, and the institutions that manage criminal justice 
functions are largely defined by legislation; the incorporation of restorative justice naturally 
undergoes a similar treatment. However, despite the arguments in favour of restorative 
legislation that were introduced in the previous section, a full accounting of restorative justice 
componentry in the criminal justice process does not intrinsically produce more effective and 
consistent restorative outcomes. That conclusion relies on an overly strong association between 
enacted law and resultant justice practices. There are several reasons to question the efficacy of a 
legislative mandate as a vehicle for introducing widespread changes into existing criminal justice 
systems.  
For starters, the passage of laws can be a messy process characterized by compromise 
and occasional inefficiency. This constrains legislatures and limits their ability to draft fully 
specific statutory programs, despite what scholars might have recommended for inclusion in 
well-crafted restorative justice legislation. Furthermore, very few authors have explained why 
they believe that legislation might have an effective impact on the implementation of restorative 
justice. There is limited evidence to justify the assumption that, once a legislature ratifies a 
statute, all elements of that statute are swiftly, successfully put into practice according to the 
precise letter of the law. Thus, we must filter our expectations about the legislation of restorative 
justice through a working knowledge of how policy design and policy implementation work.  
The literature regarding law and social change is primarily concerned with the question 
of which comes first: can law change the way a society functions, or can law only supply the 
enforcement authority to reinforce social changes that have already taken place (Evan 1966, 
Dror 1968, Vago 2009)? In the first instance, law takes on an active modification role and in the 
second instance, law serves a passive codification function (Evan 1966). It follows from this 
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conceptualization that a law’s ultimate role is largely dependent on the level of resistance that the 
law meets (Evan 1966). Accordingly, as I consider how effective a law might be at imposing 
restorative justice values and practices on a conventional justice system, it will be important to 
assess whether such directives are met with resistance, and if the legislative mandate is being 
used to initiate restorative justice or to ratify existing practices.  
The question of resistance is particularly salient when we consider the specific challenges 
associated with criminal justice reform. “Workgroup theory” describes the patterned behaviour 
in criminal justice institutions, involving repeat actors like judges, prosecutors, and defence 
attorneys, as well as recurring procedures like plea bargaining and trial practices (Casper 1984). 
The engrained culture makes justice workgroups particularly resistant to reformative efforts 
imposed by third parties (Casper 1984, Miller and Hefner 2015). Attempts at modifying 
conventional justice with restorative practices via legislative mandate will, I expect, be more 
effective if those efforts have buy-in from the existing workgroup or find ways to bypass the 
workgroup’s potential reticence. I will examine this hypothesis through interviews with current 
restorative justice practitioners and their experiences trying to navigate and leverage workgroup 
support.  
  There are also many lessons from the policy design literature to apply to this question of 
legislative efficacy. Policy design scholars investigate the relationship between the selection of 
policy instruments and the resulting success of implementation efforts. In truth, legislation is just 
one component or “sub-process” of policy design (Hogwood and Gunn 1984:24). And policy 
design is only one step in an extensive, multi-staged effort by the government and various 
adjacent actors to enact portions of their agendas (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Restorative 
justice would undoubtedly benefit from an analysis that encompassed more than the single sub-
process of legislation and stretched both before and after the policy design phase. In this thesis, 
however, I will establish a framework that uses policy design theories to connect legislative 
decisions regarding restorative justice to the actions and practices that characterize a 
jurisdiction’s restorative efforts.  
 Policy design research is largely concerned with identifying and categorizing the policy 
instruments available to designers and connecting those possible choices to various dimensions 
of policy success (Ingram and Schneider 1990, May 1993, Marsh and McConnell 2012, van der 
Heijden 2013). Looking specifically at scholars who have used statutes as their primary unit of 
analysis, there are a few proposed ways to classify the elements of statutory design. Jeroen van 
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der Heijden (2013) suggests a typology of policy programs that distinguishes between their 
content characteristics (the actual programmatic proposal) and their process characteristics (the 
constellation of actors and legislative procedures used to create, ratify, and operate the program). 
Ingram and Schneider (1990) also discuss statutes in terms of the tools, rules, assumptions, and 
theories that connect policy agents with a target population for the purpose of set policy 
objectives. Tools are the motivators of implementation and include legislative efforts to create 
incentives, to build capacity, and to grant authority; rules are the procedural determinations of a 
piece of legislation and include considerations like timing, evaluation requirements, and 
conditions for participation (Ingram and Schneider 1990).  
 Ingram and Schneider (1990) go on to create a catalogue of statute type that is based on 
the level of discretion afforded to policy designers and implementers. Strong statutes are those 
where discretion is almost entirely retained by statutory designers, such that resource allocation, 
tools, rules, and objectives are fully delineated by the statute, decision points are minimized, and 
implementers have no power to add values. Wilsonian statutes are ones where the discretion 
over goal specificity remains in the hands of designers, but administrative agencies are granted 
control of the organizational structures, rules, and tools used to achieve the statutorily-defined 
objectives. Grass roots statutes yield all discretion regarding policy logic to local implementers 
and are essentially authority-granting vehicles that give these local agents the power to act. And 
finally, support building statutes are designed to promote conflict resolution and policy 
negotiation, meaning that implementers have most of the control over goals and rules while 
designers use the statute to influence organizational assignments and patterns of participation to 
maximize coalition-building (Ingram and Schneider 1990).  
 The policy design literature also offers methods for measuring policy success and 
connecting that success to design elements. As David Marsh and Allan McConnell (2012) 
explain, there are three types of policy success: programmatic success, process success, and 
political success. Programmatic success can be measured against operational baselines 
(“implemented as per objectives”), outcome baselines (achieved the intended objectives), 
resource efficiency baselines, and public interest baselines (existence of a public benefit) (Marsh 
and McConnell 2012:571). Process success is indicated by the legitimacy of the policy design 
process, by the legislation’s ratification and amendment history, and by the legislation’s 
sustainability and level of coalition support (Marsh and McConnell 2012:571). Finally, political 
success is most often measured by the level of policy popularity and ability of the government in 
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power to wield a legislative victory as a policy success (Marsh and McConnell 2012:571). 
However, Marsh and McConnell (2012) also caution that success is a contested notion: 
competing constituencies will experience success differently, changes in cultural and political 
factors will alter perceptions of success, and it can be difficult to quantify where the threshold 
for adequate achievement exists on the spectrum from total failure to perfect success. Therefore, 
discussions of policy success must acknowledge the subjectivity of the findings and place 
declarations of achievement on an appropriately gradated scale. 
 One way through the muddy waters of success measurements is to substitute the 
subjective assessment of “success” for a potentially more objective output indicator, such as the 
level of implementation effort. Instead of trying to ascertain the efficacy of policy work, experts 
who use this method attempt to understand the relationship between statutory characteristics 
and the corresponding extent of policy work. Peter May (1993) identifies three areas of statute 
features that can affect levels of implementation effort. The first are features that are aimed 
explicitly at endorsing implementation; this include commitment-building provisions such as 
sanctions that disincentivize non-participation, as well as capacity-building provisions like 
technical assistance, funding, education, and training (May 1993). Second, there are statutory 
controls aimed at increasing goal adherence, which can range in levels of coerciveness and use 
both carrots and sticks to encourage agency behaviour (May 1993). Third, statutes can display 
varying levels of coherence; increased goal clarity is often seen as making the path to 
implementation easier (May 1993). Finally, May (1993) explains that pre-existing bureaucratic 
and political factors will have a bearing on administrative agencies’ organization, commitment 
levels, and capacity, which creates conditions beyond the control of legislation that can still have 
an impact on implementation efforts. Concerns about these exogenous factors permeate the 
policy design literature, and researchers caution against inference errors and the over-attribution 
of various policy outcomes to certain policy design aspects (May 1993, Marsh and McConnell 
2012).  
Conclusion 
The broadest principles of restorative justice are largely recognized in the literature as the 
reparation of harm through relational interactions between those closest to the crime, namely 
the offender, the victim, and the community. In the application of those principles to modern 
justice practices, I conceive of restorative justice as one innovative mechanism being introduced 
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into criminal justice systems. I borrow my expectations for possible restorative justice outcomes 
from Bazemore and Schiff (2005) who create a list of potential process results, including amends 
making, relationship building, victim-offender exchange, reintegrative shaming, professional role 
change, norm affirmation, and skill building. In contemplating how the restorative justice 
mechanisms and their outcomes are affected by legislation, I am primarily concerned with where 
restorative justice is being incorporated into the criminal justice system and what elements of 
restorative justice practices need to be accounted for in the relevant legislation. Additionally, I 
consider some of the mitigating factors that might limit the efficacy of restorative justice 
legislation, such as the complex componentry of the criminal justice system and the reticence of 
the criminal justice “workgroup.” And finally, I incorporate into the conversation about 
restorative justice legislation a more generalized catalogue of policy design tools and statutory 
types. 
Taken together, I will use the methods of policy design analysis that I have presented to 
investigate and classify restorative justice legislation. This approach weighs restorative statutory 
features against typical implementation indicators and against the above-mentioned expectations 
regarding restorative outcomes and measures for restorative success. I will supplement these 
lessons with evaluative methodologies, gathering relevant data for a substantial time period both 
before and after a restorative justice statute is passed, so as to determine the extent to which that 
passage is an inflection point for change. The theories about social change and policy design 
discussed above, along with the attempt at long-term policy evaluation, lend a more robust 
answer to the question of how legislative consideration may affect restorative justice. In the next 
chapter, I introduce the three jurisdictions at the centre of my research, and explore the 
contextual details that may have an impact on the policy design process that I am positing as 




2. CONTEXT FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN 
NEW ZEALAND, NEW SOUTH WALES, AND VERMONT 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the three case studies that comprise the basis of my research. I start 
by explaining what, precisely, the cases are and why and how I selected them. Then, I provide an 
overview of the relevant characteristics governing each case, looking at the political systems, law-
making bodies, and criminal justice systems that shape the legislative and restorative context. I 
also briefly describe the restorative justice mechanism at work, such as what type of interaction 
the mechanism facilitates. This contextual information provides important cues when, in later 
chapters, I analyse the passage of restorative justice legislation and the development of 
restorative justice practices in New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont. Finally, I 
introduce two, hypothetical criminal cases—one of a juvenile offender and one of an adult 
offender—that will provide real world examples of how such cases might progress through the 
justice system and through the pertinent restorative justice practice in each jurisdiction. 
Methodology   
I propose to answer the question of how restorative justice legislation affects restorative justice 
practice by investigating three case studies of restorative justice implementation. These three 
cases are New Zealand, the Australian territory of New South Wales, and the American state of 
Vermont. Within each jurisdiction, I’ve looked at two statutes pertaining to their restorative 
practices. In New Zealand, I examined the creation of Family Group Conferences by the 
Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 and pre-sentencing restorative justice conferences for adult offenders 
mandated by the Sentencing Act 2002. In New South Wales, I examined the Young Offenders 
Act 1997 and the development of Youth Justice Conferences, as well as the Forum Sentencing 
Intervention Program instituted through Regulations to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. 
Finally, in Vermont, I examined General Assembly Acts 148 and 115, which codified 
Community Reparative Boards and Community Justice Centres, respectively.  
I selected these jurisdictions because they afforded examples of what Umbreit, et al. 
(2005) call a comprehensive legislative framework, meaning that statutory support for restorative 
justice addresses specific programmatic requirements including oversight, funding, costs, 
confidentiality, eligibility, and liability. These three instances of extensive statutory content 
provide a rich tapestry for analysis, and because the restorative practices are explicitly accounted 
for, the legislation provides a restorative vision that can serve as a comparison point for the 
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ultimate, restorative reality. These jurisdictions also have relatively well-maintained justice sector 
records, longer established restorative statutes which aided in longitudinal evaluation, and 
extensive supplementary information from both academic and government sources regarding 
their restorative justice processes. 
 Once I had selected New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont as the jurisdictions 
for my case study, I looked to find the statutes that contributed most significantly to the 
legislative framework for restorative practices. All three jurisdictions have several statutes that 
could be considered restorative in nature, such as acts that concern victims’ rights or offender 
rehabilitation. However, I wanted to find the supporting mandate for the jurisdiction’s primary 
restorative programs. There is a fair amount of academic agreement that the statutes I’ve chosen 
are of central importance to the associated practices.i  
It is worth noting other legislative considerations of restorative justice in both New 
Zealand and New South Wales. First, New Zealand’s restorative commitment in its criminal 
justice system is further bolstered by elements of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002, the Parole Act 
2002, and the Corrections Act 2004. ii All of these statutes include specific mentions of 
restorative justice, and the last two incorporate restorative justice as a guiding principle for the 
parole and the corrections systems. However, I do not incorporate these Acts into my case study 
because they do not explicitly contribute to New Zealand’s legislative consideration of an 
offender’s entry point into a restorative justice process.  
Second, there is another regulation amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 in 
New South Wales that establishes a circle sentencing program (Criminal Procedure Amendment 
(Circle Sentencing Intervention Program) Regulation 2003). However, the circle sentencing 
intervention is a restorative mechanism designed to specifically target the overrepresentation of 
the Aboriginal population in the justice system; as such, only Aboriginal offenders are eligible for 
this program. While this certainly makes circle sentencing an interesting program, evaluation of 
the program would call for the consideration of unique social and political factors.  The requisite 
detailed understanding—both theoretical and factual—of Australian race relations and 
Aboriginal communities would have considerably broadened the scope of this research, thereby 
making the circle sentencing statute a poor choice for inclusion.   
Having made my selections, I next offer a more complete picture of the cultural and 
political conditions that govern each jurisdiction. First, I provide an overview of the 
jurisdiction’s political system and population demographics. Then, I explain the sources of 
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legislative authority and the process of law-making, distinguishing between parliamentary and 
presidential systems, and between bicameral and unicameral legislatures, among other 
jurisdictional details. These clarifications regarding aspects of the legislative milieu speak to the 
systemic components that may facilitate or obstruct the passage of legislation. For example, it is 
a truism that parliamentary systems have an easier time making laws than their presidential 
system counterparts, and that within parliamentarism, dominant or single party governments will 
also walk a simpler legislative road than multiparty coalitions. Political science correlates this 
difference to the number of “veto players”; more veto players create more decision points and 
require the assembly of more sources of policy support, thereby impeding the legislative process 
(Tsebelis 1995). This information regarding the relative ease of legislative action provides 
important context for later considerations of policy design decisions and statutory instruments. 
As explained above, I will be using Ingram and Schneider’s (1990) typology of statutes and 
policy componentry to categorize the scrutinized legislation, such as whether the statute is 
strong, Wilsonian, grass roots, or support building. Accordingly, the limitations surrounding the 
kind of statute that each jurisdiction can enact is relevant to any conclusions regarding ultimate 
statutory content.  
I also summarize the institutions and processes that define each jurisdiction’s criminal 
justice system and youth justice system. But, because Vermont limits its restorative justice 
mechanism to adult offenders, and because Vermont’s youth justice system is dictated in 
substantive ways by nationwide policy rather than the state’s restorative justice legislation, I do 
not explore the youth justice processes in that jurisdiction. In all three cases, the criminal justice 
system divides the three, central tasks of criminal justice—law enforcement, criminal 
adjudication, and the management of criminal offenders—between distinct organizations. This 
division of responsibilities and the expectation of interagency cooperation are common features 
of modern criminal justice systems. All three jurisdictions also have a separate justice stream for 
juvenile offenders but allow for more serious juvenile cases to be transferred from the juvenile 
justice system to the criminal justice system. Because of this multiorganizational approach and 
the frequent overlap in criminal justice duties, one cannot always precisely define the roles of the 
relevant agencies. For example, police are typically tasked with the investigation of crimes, but 
imagine a case in which they require equipment that is maintained and operated by other 
organizations like the Coast Guard, or request situational assistance from experts such as 
providers of youth and family services; further, prosecutors and defence lawyers will often 
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conduct their own investigation once a criminal incident has progressed to the litigation phase. 
These are just a handful of illustrations of the ways in which criminal justice tasks can be 
distributed among several agencies. Because various sector agents often share overlapping 
criminal justice responsibilities, the classification of their duties that follow may be somewhat 
oversimplified.  
Finally, I outline the restorative justice mechanisms that have been employed in each 
jurisdiction. This, coupled with the description of how two hypothetical cases might interact 
with the justice system and progress through the restorative justice mechanism, provides a good 
sense of how restorative justice practices are being incorporated into the existing criminal 
procedures. Overall, this collection of information allows for a comparison of the cultural 
factors, the legislative parameters, and the justice institutions that affect the way restorative 
justice is designed and implemented in each jurisdiction. 
New Zealand 
New Zealand is a country in Oceania with a population of about 4.8 million, made up of a 
majority of white Europeans, with an indigenous Māori population representing the largest 
minority group and comprising just under 15% of the country (World Population Review 
2018a). Legislative powers rest with a democratically elected, unicameral Parliament. 
Parliamentary general elections must be called at least every three years, and since 1996, have 
operated under a mixed-member proportional system of voting. Laws in New Zealand come 
from English common law, some statutes enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament before 
1947, and the statutes of the Parliament of New Zealand. New Zealand does not have a 
codified, entrenched constitution and Parliament is supreme, exercising almost unfettered 
sovereignty (New Zealand Government 2017a).  
 New Zealand’s restorative justice legislation is sourced by the third avenue of legal 
authority: Acts of Parliament. The law-making process in New Zealand begins when a bill is 
introduced, either as part of the residing Government’s legislative program, as a policy effort 
from an individual member of Parliament, or as an issue put forward by local authorities or 
private groups/individuals and taken to Parliament by an MP (the restorative justice acts were a 
part of the legislative program) (New Zealand Parliament 2016). Once a bill has been made 
public, it goes through an initial debate, followed by a vote regarding whether the bill should be 
read a first time (New Zealand Parliament 2016). If the bill does not receive majority support in 
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Parliament, then the bill makes no further legislative progress; if Parliament assents to the first 
reading, then the bill is referred to select committee (New Zealand Parliament 2016). Select 
committees typically call for public submissions and use this collected information to 
recommend amendments to the bill and make a report to Parliament (New Zealand Parliament 
2016). After the committee’s report, the bill proceeds to its second reading, during which 
members stage their main debate of the bill’s principles (New Zealand Parliament 2016). Again, 
Parliament votes about whether to halt the progress of the bill, and if they assent to a second 
reading, the bill moves to the committee of the whole House of Parliament where further 
amending occurs (New Zealand Parliament 2016). The final parliamentary stage is the third 
reading and one last debate, after which a majority vote in the House means the bill has been 
passed by Parliament (New Zealand Parliament 2016). The bill is signed into law and becomes 
an Act of Parliament once it is given royal assent (New Zealand Parliament 2016).  
 Another notable aspect of New Zealand’s parliamentary-made law is born of the 
country’s use of the Westminster model (New Zealand Government 2017a). Because New 
Zealand’s parliamentary system has cultural practices that prevent the regular use of an executive 
veto and that favour party discipline and the party vote over conscience voting, there are fewer 
veto players who can halt the legislative progress of a policy that has support from the majority 
party (Tsebelis 1995). The potential for additional veto players was introduced with the adoption 
of MMP in 1996, given that, since the institutional change, New Zealand Parliament has largely 
governed through coalitions and minority governments rather than outright majorities (Atkinson 
2015). But prior to that, when New Zealand still relied on first past the post voting, it was 
essentially a two-party system and the winning party would have an absolute majority in the 
House, making the Government’s legislative programs easier to enact (Atkinson 2015).  
New Zealand’s criminal code is largely delineated by the Crimes Act 1961 and the 
Summary Offences Act 1981 (District Court of New Zealand n.d.). These acts describe the 
behaviours that New Zealand considers criminal or summary offences. For the purposes of 
monitoring and enforcing these definitions of criminality, New Zealand Police operates as the 
country’s primary law enforcement agency and manages several offices focused on the 
prevention and investigation of crime. When a crime is committed, police officers are 
responsible for collecting evidence, compiling a summary of facts, identifying the alleged 
offender, and then working in consultation with other justice sector agencies to determine 
whether to proceed with an arrest and what charges should be laid. Both young and adult 
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offenders are subject to this criminal code, and to investigation by police; however, the age of 
criminal responsibility in New Zealand is ten, and the country distinguishes between children, 
aged 10-13, and young people, aged 14-17, in determining appropriate justice sector responses 
(New Zealand Government 2017b). 
New Zealand citizens and residents who progress through the criminal justice process 
enjoy the rights specified in the Bill of Rights Act 1990. These rights appropriately restrict the 
behaviours of the police, the Crown Solicitors, and the courts with regards to the investigation, 
arrest, charging, and prosecution of individuals. In accordance with these rights, alleged 
offenders—both juvenile and adult—are entitled to their own lawyers for the purposes of 
mounting a legal defence (Useful Criminal Legislation n.d.). In the criminal justice system, 
defence lawyers can be privately contracted or be appointed from the Public Defence Service. 
The Ministry of Justice houses the Public Defence Service and provides additional support 
services to the country’s criminal courts. In the juvenile justice system, young offenders can 
select their own defence lawyer or can have the Youth Court appoint a Youth Advocate; the list 
of lawyers who are suitable Youth Advocate appointees is maintained by the court (New 
Zealand Ministry of Justice 2018).  
Once criminal charges are in effect, the process for administering those charges within 
the criminal justice system is designated by the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, which divides 
alleged criminal behaviour into four offence categories (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017b).  
These categorizations distinguish between the seriousness of the offence and the appropriate 
sentencing options, and determine which courts and which trial procedures are suitable (New 
Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017b). The available courts for initiating trial procedures are the 
District Court and the High Court, while the available trial options are judge-alone trials and jury 
trials (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017b). Those seeking review of decisions made by the 
lower courts may appeal first to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court, the last 
stop in a hierarchical system for adjudicating the appellate process. The prosecution of all 
‘category 4’ criminal offences and any case that proceeds to jury trial is handled by the Crown 
Law Office. This office relies both on in-house criminal teams that represent the Crown in the 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and on a Crown Solicitor Network that contracts with 
private legal practitioners who are appointed as Crown Solicitors for individual court districts 
(New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2018). Meanwhile, for offences that fall in categories 1 through 
3, prosecution on behalf of the government is administrated by the Police Prosecution Service.  
23 
 
If an alleged offender pleads guilty or is found guilty, they are sentenced in accordance 
with the Sentencing Act 2002 and the imposed sentence is supervised and managed by the 
Department of Corrections. The available criminal sentences in New Zealand are hierarchical 
and judges are instructed to impose the least restrictive outcome, as deemed appropriate by the 
circumstances of the case. The hierarchy of sentences is as follows: discharging an offender with 
or without conviction; fine or reparation; community-based sentences of community work and 
supervision; community-based sentences of intensive supervision and community detention; 
home detention; and imprisonment (Sentencing Act 2002).  
In cases with a guilty offender, and where there is a direct, identified victim, New 
Zealand’s restorative justice mechanism may be an option. The Sentencing Act 2002 is partially 
responsible for the inclusion of restorative justice within the criminal justice system and 
although the precise mechanism is not outlined within the Act, New Zealand relies most 
extensively on pre-sentence restorative justice conferencing. These conferences are targeted at 
perpetrators of serious crime who do not contest the relevant statement of facts regarding the 
offence (Bowen and Boyack 2003, New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). For a conference to 
proceed, victims must be willing to attend (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). The 
Sentencing Act 2002 provides guidelines to determine whether a case is eligible for restorative 
justice; once eligibility is confirmed, the judge must adjourn trial proceedings prior to sentencing 
and make a referral to a restorative justice provider (Sentencing Act 2002). This mandated 
referral comes not from the Act as passed in 2002, but from an amendment in 2014, a legislative 
change that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Following a referral, the restorative justice coordinator will ensure that both the victim 
and the offender are willing to participate, and then will assign a facilitator to the case (New 
Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). Facilitators arrange pre-conference meetings with both the 
victim and the offender. At the conference, participants discuss the relevant offence and attempt 
to produce a restorative outcome plan. After the conference, facilitators report the conference 
proceedings to the court, along with an update of an offender’s progress regarding the agreed 
outcome plan (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). These restorative justice conferencing 
results are then considered by judges once the case returns to court for sentencing.  
The process for the juvenile justice system, established in the Oranga Tamariki Act 2017 
(previously the Children, Youth, and their Families Act 1989), is quite distinct from the one just 
described for adult offenders. Children are very rarely prosecuted in New Zealand, and all 
24 
 
efforts are made to divert this age group of offenders from formal legal procedures. 
Diversionary options are largely operated by the police and include written warnings, formal 
cautions, among other discretionary responses like restitution, curfew, an apology to the victim, 
and school-related requirements (Youth Court of New Zealand n.d.). Meanwhile, young people 
see their criminal cases referred to the Youth Court, although the use of diversionary options 
remains one of the governing principles for this age range as well. Youth Court prosecutions are 
conducted by the Police Prosecution Service and there are specially trained officials embedded in 
all relevant justice agencies for managing the particularities of the juvenile justice procedures, 
such as Youth Aid officers on the police force, Youth Advocates in the Youth Court, and social 
workers who work for Oranga Tamariki (the Ministry for Children) (Youth Court of New 
Zealand n.d.). Furthermore, Oranga Tamariki is tasked with several oversight roles and 
administrative responsibilities, including the management and supervision of Youth Court 
sentences.     
The Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 also requires that youth justice professionals activate the 
system’s restorative justice mechanism as soon as it becomes viable and appropriate. This 
mechanism is called a Family Group Conference (FGC) and is a meeting between a young 
offender who has admitted to or does not deny the commission of a crime, their advocate, their 
family members, relevant justice system professionals such as the investigating police officer, 
and/or a probation officer, and other prominent community members, as well as the victim and 
their support persons should the victim elect to participate (Maxwell and Morris 2006). 
Conferences can occur at any stage of the youth justice process, including prior to arrest, prior 
to trial, and prior to sentencing. At all stages, it is meant to be an information-gathering process 
that helps the young offender, their family group, and other conference participants make 
decisions about how best to proceed. For example, once police make the decision to arrest a 
young offender, they are instructed to refer any offender who admits guilt to an FGC (Oranga 
Tamariki Act 1989). Such a referral results in an intention-to-charge conference, which tasks 
participants with determining whether the young person should be prosecuted (McElrea 1998). 
Such a determination comes with a presumption in favour of diversion from court and formal 
justice proceedings, and in cases where it is agreed to, the outcome plan becomes a fully 
diversionary program (McElrea 1998). 
The conversation that takes place during an FGC is focused in part on empowering the 
young offender to understand and accept responsibility for the harm caused by their actions, and 
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participants work together to develop an outcome plan that enforces that accountability and 
allows the young offender to repair the identified harm. Conferences are assigned to Youth 
Justice Coordinators who facilitate the dialogue and report any final plans, recommendations, 
and decisions to the Youth Court (Maxwell and Morris 1993, Maxwell, et al. 2004). There are no 
actions that conference participants are required to include in outcome plans, but common 
options are apologies, restitution, community service, and mandated treatment, counselling, or 
training (Maxwell and Morris 1993).  
New South Wales 
New South Wales is a territory in Australia with a population of almost 7.5 million, a majority of 
whom come from a white European background. Sydney, Australia’s most populous city, is 
located in New South Wales and accounts for almost two-thirds of the territory’s inhabitants 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018). New South Wales operates within Australia’s federal 
system of parliamentary government, but also retains territorial governmental responsibilities 
wherein legislative powers are vested with two houses of Parliament, the upper house called the 
Legislative Council and the lower house called the Legislative Assembly (Parliament of New 
South Wales n.d.). The Government of New South Wales is formed from the Legislative 
Assembly. Members of the Legislative Assembly serve terms of up to four years and are chosen 
in general elections from single-member districts using optional preferential voting while 
Council members are elected for two terms, serving up to eight years in state-wide, at-large 
elections (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.). Laws are sourced from Australian common law 
(largely similar to English common law), from the Australian Constitution, and from statute law 
passed by both the Commonwealth and the New South Wales Parliament (Parliament of New 
South Wales n.d.).   
 New South Wales’ restorative justice legislation was enacted through Acts of the New 
South Wales Parliament. The vocabulary of the law-making process in New South Wales will 
resemble that of New Zealand as it is also a Westminster model, but there are a few substantive 
differences. First, there are two Houses, which means that bills can originate in both houses and 
must pass both houses before they can become law (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.). 
Additionally, bills are introduced at their first reading, debated at their second reading, and, if 
assented to, moved into the amending phase within the originating House (called being 
“considered in detail” in the Legislative Assembly while the Committee of the Whole deals with 
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the bill’s details in the Legislative Council) (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.). Bills that are 
assented to at their third and final reading are passed by that House and move to consideration 
by the other House where they will go through the same stages of three readings and an 
amending period. Once approved, bills return to the House of origin, which must agree to 
amendments before sending the bills to the Governor for assent. If the House of origin fails to 
agree to the amendments, bills can at times be subjected to a joint sitting of the two Houses, 
and/or a public referendum (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.).  
 New South Wales operates in a political system slightly more populated with veto players 
than New Zealand; its bicameral legislature adds the most obvious procedural cog. Not only 
does the existence of a second House add steps to the legislative process, but the Legislative 
Council has also been a locus of minority party rule since it became subjected to direct elections 
in 1978. Neither the government nor the largest opposition party has tended to hold a majority 
in the Legislative Council, making it a site of coalition-building and shifting allegiances (Page 
1990). Although this may add institutional friction to the process of making Acts of Parliament, 
New South Wales works around some of these constraints through a reliance on subordinate 
legislation. These are statutory rules that do not have to be passed by Parliament but can operate 
as laws made under the authority of an existing Act. All statutory rules are published and then 
tabled in both Houses where either the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council can 
disallow them but where neither body subjects them to the scrutiny of three readings and an 
amendment process (Parliament of New South Wales n.d.). The use of subordinate legislation is 
significant in this case because the forum sentencing intervention program was established 
through a regulation to an Act of Parliament rather than through an Act itself. 
 The criminal code in New South Wales is established by the Crimes Act 1900, the 
Summary Offences Act 1988, and the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985. The territory is 
also subject to the federal criminal code, set out by the Crimes Act 1914 and the Criminal Code 
Act 1995 (Hoyles, et al. 2018). However, except for a few unique offences that feature contested 
borders such as aviation crime, cybercrime, terrorism, human trafficking, among others, 
breaches of both the federal code and the territory code are managed by the New South Wales 
criminal and juvenile justice systems. The New South Wales Police Force is the primary law 
enforcement agency, and they are, once again, the first point of contact with the justice system, 
monitoring crime and reported offences, investigating criminal incidents, and initiating justice 
proceedings through arrests and applications for charges. New South Wales established ten as 
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the age of criminal responsibility and distinguishes between young offenders aged 10 to 13 years 
who are presumed incapable of crime unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt to understand 
the moral implications of their behaviour, and young offenders aged 14 to 17 years who are 
more freely subjected to proceedings in the juvenile justice system (Australian Institute of 
Criminology 2005).   
 Once criminal charges are in effect, the prosecution and adjudication of cases take place 
in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. For summary offences, which are more 
minor and can only carry a maximum prison sentence of two years, the criminal process is 
confined to the territory’s local courts, overseen by magistrates, prosecuted by police 
prosecutors, and jury trials are not available (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 1987). 
Meanwhile, for serious, indictable offences, the process begins with a committal hearing in 
which local court magistrates determine whether there is sufficient evidence to progress a 
criminal charge to trial. At this point, the case can be dismissed, plead straight to the sentencing 
phase, or committed for a jury trial in the District or Supreme Courts (Bureau of Crime Statistics 
and Research 1987). For jury trials, crown prosecutors conduct the proceedings on behalf of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), an independent government agency that has, at present, 
eighty-four barristers appointed to this prosecutorial role (Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research 1987). On the other side, offenders have the right to be represented by their own 
defence lawyer; for offenders who cannot afford their own representation, they can get a lawyer 
from Legal Aid New South Wales for less serious criminal charges or from the Public Defenders 
Service for offenders appearing before a jury trial (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
1987). Legal Aid is an independent network of lawyers with a board and an organizational 
structure designed by the Attorney General in the Department of Justice (DOJ), while the Public 
Defenders Services is fully housed within the DOJ.  
Offenders found guilty have the option to appeal the verdict or their imposed 
sentence.  Those whose cases were adjudicated by a local court appeal the outcome to the 
District Court, while offenders who faced jury trials in the higher courts appeal those decisions 
to the Court of Criminal Appeal, a special division of the Supreme Court (Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research 2017). When it comes to the available sentencing options in New South 
Wales, the courts distinguish between custodial and non-custodial sentences, both of which are 
managed by Corrective Services NSW. The custodial options include imprisonment, intensive 
correction order, and home detention; meanwhile, non-custodial alternatives include a referral to 
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attend education or rehabilitation, a community service order, a good behaviour bond, a driving 
disqualification, or a fine or monetary order (Hoyle, et al. 2018).  
Restorative justice options come into play when an offender has been found guilty or 
admitted guilt and is likely going to serve a sentence of imprisonment for the offence. In those 
instances, an offender might receive a court order for a forum sentencing suitability assessment. 
The Forum Sentencing Intervention program was introduced through a 2005 regulation to the 
Criminal Procedures Act 1986. The resulting mechanism is a conferencing process wherein the 
offender, the offender’s support persons, the victim, the victim’s support persons, and other 
relevant parties have a facilitated dialogue regarding the offence and attempt to formulate a plan 
of action for the offender that addresses the criminal incident at hand. Operations team 
employees within the Department of Justice review and manage referrals from the court while 
facilitators are expected to carry out the pre-conference suitability assessments, contact all 
participants, and mediate the interactions. As in the case of adult pre-sentence conferencing in 
New Zealand, victims must be willing to participate in order for a forum sentencing conference 
to proceed. The primary objective of the conference is to produce a draft intervention plan to 
present to the referring court (Criminal Procedure Amendment (Community Conference 
Intervention Program) Regulation 2005). Draft intervention plans, once approved by the 
presiding court, are implemented and monitored, and satisfactory completion of that plan results 
in an adjournment of proceedings for the offence in question (Criminal Procedure Amendment 
(Community Conference Intervention Program) Regulation 2005). 
The parallel system designed for juvenile offenders features distinct procedures. The 
Young Offenders Act 1997 delineates the bulk of these, which centre most prominently around 
a diversionary scheme operated by the NSW Police Force. The primary police official making 
determinations about the trajectory of youth cases is the Specialist Youth Officer (SYO), a role 
created by the Young Offenders Act and tasked with advising police, making determinations, 
and verifying juvenile charges (Young Offenders Act 1997). If police officers opt out of either 
formal or informal diversion, juvenile cases are referred by SYOs to the DPP for adjudication in 
the Children’s Court. The court process at this stage resembles the hearings taking place in the 
local courts, with a magistrate presiding, a police prosecutor litigating the proceedings on behalf 
of the government, and the young offender exercising a right to representation (Children’s Court 
of NSW 2016). If the alleged young offender pleads guilty or is found guilty, their resulting 
sentence is managed by Juvenile Justice, a sub-division of the Department of Justice. Juvenile 
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Justice operates six Juvenile Justice centres to accommodate young offenders with custodial 
sentences, and thirty-five Juvenile Justice community offices which administrate community-
based interventions (NSW Justice 2018).  
One of the diversionary options in New South Wales is the jurisdiction’s restorative 
justice mechanism, Youth Justice Conferences (YJC). New South Wales arrays its diversion tools 
into a hierarchy with warnings as the least formal response, cautions as a middle ground, and 
conferencing as the most serious. One notable aspect of the YJC is that it is dependent on a 
much more restricted set of eligibility criteria when compared with the New Zealand model. 
YJCs are designed for offenders who committed summary offences, or indictable offences that 
can be dealt with summarily, meaning that conferencing referrals are confined to cases of less 
serious offending and are not widely and mandatorily employed throughout the juvenile justice 
system as they are in New Zealand (Young Offenders Act 1997). This restricted eligibility creates 
several, additional decision points prior to the convening of a conference, and requires extensive 
coordination between various justice system agents. 
YJCs are overseen by conference conveners and are built around a facilitated meeting 
between the young offender, their family, relevant justice sector agents, and affected parties. The 
primary objective of a conference is to reach agreement on an outcome plan which can include 
but is not limited to an oral or written apology, reparations to the victim or the community, 
participation in an appropriate training, counselling, or treatment program, and actions directed 
towards the offender’s reintegration (Young Offenders Act 1997). After the conference, a 
conference administrator is tasked with monitoring the devised outcome plan (Young Offenders 
Act 1997). These administrators are expected to provide written notice to the referring agency 
regarding the satisfactory completion of an outcome plan, as well as to report any failures or 
shortcomings in the offender’s compliance with the plan (Young Offenders Act 1997). Upon 
successful completion of an outcome plan, no further proceedings can be instituted against the 
young offender for the offence(s) in question; meanwhile, reported failures result in the case 
being returned to the referring agency who then assumes responsibility for decisions about 
further interventions (Young Offenders Act 1997).       
Vermont 
Vermont, the third case study, is a state in New England, a region in the north-eastern United 
States of America. The state’s population is just over 600,000 and about 95% of the population 
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is white (World Population Review 2018b). Vermont is a part of the federal government of the 
United States, and has a bicameral state legislature made up of a lower house called the Vermont 
House of Representatives and an upper house called the Vermont Senate. Representatives and 
senators both serve two-year terms; representatives are elected from both single and two-
member districts while Senators are elected using thirteen multi-member districts (State of 
Vermont 2018c). Vermont’s use of multi-member districts is unique in the United States and 
makes it one of the few American states to have more than two-party representation in their 
General Assembly (State of Vermont 2018c). Vermont is subject to the U.S. Constitution and 
the federal laws and regulations that govern the entire country, but because of dual sovereignty, 
Vermont, like all states, maintains the vast control of crime committed within its borders (State 
of Vermont 2018). The Constitution of Vermont is the supreme law of the state, followed by 
Vermont Statutes enacted by the state legislature, assuming that there are no contradictions with 
their federal counterparts (State of Vermont 2018c).  
  Laws are made in the Vermont General Assembly in much the same way as they are in 
New South Wales. Due to the bicameral nature of the legislature, bills can originate in either 
House where they will go through an introduction at the first reading, an in-committee 
amending process, debate at the second reading, and passage at the third reading (State of 
Vermont 2018c). Bills are then considered by the other chamber where they undergo the same 
reading and amending process. The originating house must agree to any changes made and if 
that happens, the final version of the bill will be signed into law by the Vermont Governor (State 
of Vermont 2018c). The Governor’s role is somewhat dissimilar in that she has actual signing 
power and can veto bills, rather than in New Zealand and New South Wales where the 
Governor’s power of legislative assent is largely symbolic. The Vermont Statutes—an official 
codification of the laws enacted by the General Assembly—are another source of differentiation. 
Rather than an ever-growing body of ratified Acts, the state maintains a list of 33 statutes that 
comprise the active law (State of Vermont 2018c). Therefore, bills that are intended to amend or 
add to Vermont law do so through amending one of those statutes.  
 Among these statutes is Title 13: Crimes and Criminal Procedure which clarifies 
Vermont’s criminal code and process of criminal adjudication (Vermont General Assembly 
2018). The criminal code distinguishes between misdemeanours—less serious offences for 
which the maximum term of imprisonment is two years—and felonies, which include any 
offence more serious than that and warranting more than two years of imprisonment (Vermont 
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General Assembly 2018). For the purposes of enforcing adherence to the criminal code, 
Vermont relies on the overlapping jurisdictions of several police forces, namely the Vermont 
State Police, fourteen county Sheriff’s departments, and over fifty localized, municipal police 
departments (Reaves 2011). These police agencies work together, but maintain distinct 
administrative structures and spheres of control, further emphasizing a multiorganizational 
approach to criminal justice. Ultimately, like those in other jurisdictions, law enforcement 
officials in Vermont investigate criminal incidents and initiate criminal proceedings against 
alleged offenders (Town of Essex n.d.).  
 Once there is an identified offender facing a charge, the case is passed to the prosecuting 
office of the Vermont State’s Attorney who decides whether to dismiss the charges, to divert the 
offender to a correctional program that is not premised on the adjudication of the prosecutorial 
process, or to prosecute the charges (Town of Essex n.d.). Police also share this gate-keeping 
role with the State’s Attorneys and can make choices about whether to divert a case before it 
even lands on the State’s Attorneys desks. If the State’s Attorney decides to proceed with the 
prosecution, the next step will be an arraignment hearing at the district court, during which the 
alleged offender is informed of the charges and enters a plea of guilty or not guilty (Town of 
Essex n.d.). At this stage, there is not much difference in the progression of felonies and 
misdemeanours. Misdemeanours must be brought back to court approximately six weeks after 
the arraignment hearing for a status conference; if the charge is not adjudicated or a plea 
agreement reached at this point, the case is set for jury selection. Felonies are not required to run 
on such a tight timeline, particularly given the potential for a much more complicated evidence-
gathering process, and as such status conferences and further court dates are scheduled on a 
case-by-case basis (Town of Essex n.d.).   
 Alleged offenders can request a judge-alone trial but the default, if a case is proceeding to 
trial, is a jury trial. Jury trials take place in the district court and are litigated by the State’s 
Attorneys (Town of Essex n.d.). The defendant has a right to an attorney, and Vermont operates 
the Office of the Defender General for the provision of state-wide legal defence services to 
defendants who cannot afford their own lawyer (Office of the Defender General 2018). If a jury 
finds an alleged offender guilty, then the judge will schedule a sentencing hearing (Town of 
Essex n.d.). All convicted persons have the right to appeal their verdict to the Vermont Supreme 
Court and, if the verdict is reversed, the case is typically set for a new trial back in the district 
courts. Vermont deviates from the American norm by not having felony classes or mandatory 
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sentences when it comes to sentencing convicted offenders, and judges are granted the 
discretion to make case-by-case decisions (Vermont General Assembly 2018). Criminal 
sentences are administrated by the Vermont Department of Corrections and include: 
imprisonment; probation; and intermediate sanctions such as supervised community sentences, 
community-based treatment programs, and other rehabilitation programs (State of Vermont 
2018b).  
 Vermont has sprinkled restorative justice throughout its criminal justice processes and 
has a Director of Community and Restorative Justice housed within its Department of 
Corrections to oversee the growth of innovative justice approaches. The primary restorative 
justice mechanism that I’m investigating is the restorative justice panel, most commonly 
operated within the state’s probation program and added to the Vermont Statutes by Act No. 
148. Panels are a different kind of restorative justice mechanism than what has been discussed 
previously. An offender convicted of a minor offence is sentenced by a judge to reparative 
probation, which entails meeting with a board of community volunteers (Karp 2001). The board 
and the offender discuss the offence and negotiate a reparative agreement that will address the 
harms of the crime (Karp 2001). The tasks delineated by the agreement must be completed 
during the probationary period, and offenders often meet with the board for a mid-term review 
and for a final meeting to assess their progress (Karp 2001). An offender who refuses to accept 
the terms of a reparative agreement or who fails to comply with all portions of the plan will be 
returned to the court for further proceedings; an offender who successfully completes the 
program will have their case adjourned (Karp 2001).  
The use of restorative justice in Vermont features an added component—the 
Community Justice Centre (CJC)—which lends a unique supplement to the reparative board 
mechanism. These CJCs originated as locally operating, non-profit organizations focused on 
providing restorative justice programming and meeting their community’s mediation, conflict 
resolution, and crime prevention needs. CJCs were codified in the Vermont Statutes by Act No. 
115. Now, the majority of the state’s restorative justice panels are housed within these CJCs, 
relying on the centres for administrative support, facilities, and volunteer recruitment and 
training. The Act specified that any municipality may establish a CJC in its jurisdiction “to 
resolve civil disputes and address the wrongdoings of individuals who have committed 
municipal, juvenile, or criminal offences,” using any number of restorative justice tools, 
including reparative boards, group conferencing, and mediation (Act No. 115 2008). CJCs are 
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granted the latitudinal freedom to address other “quality of life issues in the community” as the 
centre sees fit and so they often pursue additional funding, beyond the budgets they receive 
from the Department of Corrections, to experiment with rehabilitative and restorative practices 
(Act No. 115 2008). This creates locally confined service alternatives such as job training, 
housing assistance, trainings for managing conflict, workshops to create a “human face” for 
larger businesses, which helps address and deter retail theft, and treatment diversion, wherein 
addicts can have certain, drug-related convictions cleared from their records if they complete a 
drug treatment program and a restorative justice panel, among other, innovative justice 
solutions.  
Criminal Case Examples 
For the purposes of better understanding the way an actual case might proceed through each of 
these jurisdictions, and the way that restorative justice might apply, I now present two 
hypothetical offences and explain how these would initially be handled in each jurisdiction. 
These narratives involve both a youth and adult offender and, while invented for this thesis, they 
resemble in some respects the narratives I encountered during my research. (Recall that I am not 
examining a restorative justice mechanism related to the juvenile justice system in Vermont, and 
do not describe the juvenile justice processes there.  As a result, I will not explore the 
implications of a youth offence in that jurisdiction.) 
Young Offender 
In the first case, a fifteen-year old boy named Lucas is caught “tagging” with spray-painted 
symbols the back wall of a house that had been converted into a two-flat apartment. The most 
direct victim of the offence is the property owner who acts as the landlord to the two renters. 
The landlord estimates that she is going to have to spend about $7,000 to repair the graffiti 
damage. However, the two renters also express their concern about the incident to the police. 
One of them, mistaking the imagery for gang iconography, asks if there is growing gang activity 
in the neighbourhood and suggests that he might move to a new area. Lucas is caught because a 
security camera captures a video of him and the police investigating the incident quickly identify 
him because he’s been involved in another vandalism offence. In New Zealand and New South 
Wales, the first offence would likely garner an informal warning or a caution from investigating 
police. A warning would not have any attached conditions or sanctions, but Lucas’ parents 
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would be notified, and the investigating official would make a record of the intervention. 
Cautions are a more formal affair and would require the investigating official to bring Lucas to 
the station and issue the warning in front of his parent, guardian, or other adult that he 
nominated.  
New Zealand 
In New Zealand, because the current incident is now Lucas’ second offence, the investigating 
officers and the assigned Youth Aid officer are concerned about the developing pattern of 
behaviour that may require a more extensive intervention. This concern activates the restorative 
justice mechanism. They have Lucas come down to the station with his mother where they ask 
him about the incident and he makes a legal confession to his role in the crime in the presence 
of his mother and in full awareness of his rights. The case is referred to Oranga Tamariki and 
the local Youth Justice Coordinators begin the process of scheduling an intention-to-charge 
FGC. The assigned coordinator contacts Lucas and his family, determines who will attend the 
conference, educates Lucas about his legal rights, and prepares participants for what to expect 
about the process. The coordinator also reaches out to the three victims—the landlord and the 
two tenants—and lets them know about the conference and enquires as to whether they are 
interested in participating. The landlord is very interested in participating and expresses her 
desire to confront Lucas with the human cost of vandalism; as a result, the coordinator meets 
with her and similarly instructs her about the conference procedure and her right to have a 
support person in attendance. The renter who has growing concerns about gang activity 
indicates to the coordinator that he finds the concept of a direct confrontation with the offender 
a bit intimidating, so the coordinator offers him the opportunity to submit an impact statement 
and to remain abreast of the action taken with regards to Lucas.  
The conference is held at the local Oranga Tamariki offices. Participants include Lucas, 
his mother, his father, and his 20-year old cousin who handles a lot of Lucas’ after-school and 
evening care because Lucas’ mother works a night shift at a local factory and his father is a truck 
driver who is away from home most of the time. The Youth Aid officer who was assigned 
Lucas’ case and is familiar with both of his offences also attends, as well as the landlord of the 
building who brings her sister as her support person. The conference begins with introductions, 
and then proceeds as a confidential information-sharing meeting. The order of who speaks is 
flexible based on the details of the case and the wishes of the participants, and in this instance, 
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Lucas has been asked to speak first and describe his understanding of what happened and his 
motivations leading up to the incident. The landlord asks to respond and describes the financial 
burden that the graffiti placed on her and her renters. The coordinator emphasizes this point by 
introducing the impact statement from the renter intimidated by the symbols spray-painted onto 
his home. Other participants are invited to join the conversation, and Lucas’ mother discusses 
her concerns regarding the poor influence of some of Lucas’ friends while the Youth Aid officer 
gives context for what the escalation in offending behaviour might mean for Lucas. The 
conference continues in this way, providing an opportunity for the parties to discuss the 
incident, how to address it, and how to discourage Lucas from engaging in similar behaviour 
down the road.    
Lucas and his family then have time alone to discuss the best plan forward and present it 
to the rest of the group. Ultimately, this includes: apologizing to the landlord; writing letters of 
apology to the two renters and explaining that the graffiti was in no way related to actual gang 
activity; paying the landlord $400 that he’s saved from his summer job; helping with the graffiti 
removal; and joining the local schoolboy’s rugby league and an afterschool tutoring program to 
provide him with access to a different group of friends and a new approach to what he does 
during his free time. The conference participants agree with the proposal, except the landlord 
who has already scheduled the graffiti removal. Instead, she asks if Lucas would help with a 
series of property maintenance tasks such as cleaning and repainting the front porch. Lucas and 
his family approve of this change and this outcome plan is finalized. Lucas’ mother is tasked 
with signing him up for rugby and for the tutoring program, while Lucas’ cousin assents to 
keeping an eye on Lucas and ensuring he’s attending his new activities. Lucas and the landlord 
agree to a date for the property clean-up, at which point he will bring the $400 and the letters of 
apology for the tenants. Lucas then provides an in-person, verbal apology for the landlord, 
which the landlord accepts. The Youth Aid officer says that she will follow-up with Lucas in 
thirty days to confirm that he’s completed the tasks required of him and has enrolled in the 
agreed upon programs. The conference participants agree that if, at this point, Lucas has 
complied with the components of the outcome plan, there will be no need to progress the case 
to the Youth Court for charging and the incident can be considered fully adjudicated. The 
coordinator writes a report that records this conference outcome and submits it to the police 
and the Youth Court.  
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New South Wales 
Meanwhile, New South Wales has determined that graffiti offences are not eligible for police-
initiated diversion through the Young Offenders Act, which means that Lucas’ case is 
immediately referred to the DPP and the Children’s Court. This is already very different from 
the trajectory of Lucas’ case in New Zealand where he never set foot in the Youth Court. From 
there, only the magistrate can make the recommendation to initiate the restorative justice process, 
which can happen at any stage in the Children Court’s proceedings once guilt has been 
established; neither the investigating officer, nor the SYO, nor the DPP would even be allowed 
to consider whether Lucas’ case was eligible for adjudication through a YJC. Instead, the DPP 
files formal charges against Lucas and Lucas is appointed a lawyer who encourages him to plead 
guilty, which he does at his first court hearing. In this case, because graffiti is a non-violent 
offence, because Lucas has already admitted to committing the offence, and because he has only 
had one other interaction with the justice system, the magistrate chooses to halt further 
proceedings and refer Lucas to the YJC process. A conference administrator then reviews Lucas’ 
case, reconsiders the appropriateness of restorative justice in this instance, and, once in 
agreement with the magistrate, appoints a conference convener. 
The convener goes through the pre-conference steps that should now feel familiar: 
contacting Lucas and his family; informing them of the conference process and Lucas’ legal 
rights; contacting the victims and inviting them to attend with a support person in tow; 
preparing participating victims for the conference; inviting any additional parties; selecting a date 
and time. Once again, Lucas attends with his parents and his cousin. And, since he’s already had 
to retain a lawyer, she opts to attend as well. In New South Wales, victims can send 
representatives; in this instance, the landlord chooses to send her sister in her stead. Finally, the 
convener invites the Specialist Youth Officer who’s familiar with Lucas’ case and his previous 
offending. The convener decides to hold the conference at the local Juvenile Justice Community 
Centre.  
During the conference, the convener follows a very strict format. The conversation is 
guided by a script that is issued by the Juvenile Justice office of the Department of Justice. The 
convener asks Lucas to explain what happened, to think about who has been affected and how 
they were affected, and then turns to the victim or victim representative (in this case, the 
landlord’s sister) to have them describe the experience and the impact in their own words. The 
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landlord’s sister is then given the opportunity to ask Lucas questions. Finally, Lucas’ parents and 
cousins are invited to speak and to explain their concerns regarding Lucas’ behaviour. The SYO 
may also be consulted, but Lucas’ lawyer will be discouraged from participating fully in the 
conference. The convener then directs the conference participants to start drafting an outcome 
plan that will “make things right.” Because graffiti offences are subject to tighter restrictions, 
these outcome plans must include at least one of the following: the making of reparation; the 
performance of graffiti removal work; and participation in a personal development or 
educational program (Young Offenders Amendment (Graffiti Offenders) Regulation 2009). The 
convener encourages the participants to consider these options in their discussion of what Lucas 
should be asked to do.  
When Lucas and his family come up with their own proposal for an outcome plan, they 
follow the suggestions of the Graffiti Offender Regulation to a tee; Lucas offers to pay the 
landlord $400, to write letters of apology to the tenants and the landlord, to engage in graffiti 
removal work, and to attend a one-day workshop on building healthy friendships operated by 
local service providers with a contract from Juvenile Justice. The conference participants agree 
to these terms, but the landlord has already arranged for Lucas’ graffiti to be removed, leading 
the convener to recommend that Lucas attend a local day of service wherein participants will 
remove graffiti from a school in the area. With this amendment, the conference participants 
agree to the plan. The conference administrator checks in thirty days after the end of Lucas’ 
conference to make sure that he’s completed all components. Once it’s confirmed that he’s 
complied with his outcome plan, his case is considered fully adjudicated and no other criminal 
proceedings may take place against him for this offence. The convener submits a report of the 
conference to the local Police Area Command and to the referring magistrate who dismisses 
Lucas’ charges in the Children’s Court (Young Offenders Act 1997). 
Adult Offender 
In the second case, a thirty-two-year old man named Eric is driving through town and falls 
asleep at the wheel, jumping the curb and crashing his car into the display lot of a used car seller, 
damaging several of the automobiles for sale. The damage to the car salesman’s merchandise 
adds up to about $45,000. In all three jurisdictions, police officials respond to this accident and 
arrest Eric. In New Zealand, Eric is charged with reckless driving, a category 2 offence, and 
quickly released from jail on bail under the stipulation that he not drive until his trial. In New 
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South Wales, Eric is charged with the summary offence of reckless driving and allowed out on 
bail after surrendering his passport. Finally, in Vermont, Eric is charged with the misdemeanour 
of negligent operation and permitted to leave jail if he can post a monetary bail, which he does. 
In all three jurisdictions, while awaiting trial, Eric enlists the assistance of privately-contracted 
defence lawyers, all of whom encourage him to plead guilty.  
New Zealand 
He makes his first appearance in a New Zealand district court and enters his plea. Before 
proceeding the case to the sentencing phase, the eligibility requirements in the Sentencing Act 
2002 determine whether restorative justice is an option for Eric. Given the identifiable victim 
and Eric’s admission of guilt, the judge is required to delay sentencing to refer the case to the 
local restorative justice provider. An assigned facilitator contacts the parties and confirms their 
interest in participating. Once it’s confirmed that both the victim and the offender will 
contribute to a safe, productive conversation, the facilitator commences the pre-conference 
process. This includes meeting with both the victim and the offender, instructing them about 
how the conference will work, answering their questions, and preparing them to have 
appropriate expectations.  
At the conference, the dialogue is very flexible and designed primarily to meet the needs 
of the victim. In this case, Eric is invited to speak first and to explain what happened. He 
therefore has an opportunity that he has not had before: giving context to the event. He tells the 
conference participants that he’d had a series of late nights trying to meet a deadline at work and 
was exhausted. He was driving home after one of these nights, just after two a.m. and nodded 
off. The car salesman responds and tells Eric about the amount of damage that he caused and 
the pressure that the accident has put on his business. After encouraging further discussion of 
the impact of the crime, the facilitator has the group begin designing an outcome plan. The car 
salesman says that all he wants is a restitution payment that will cover the damage caused. Eric 
explains that he does not have that kind of money and the facilitator encourages the salesman to 
think of other ways that Eric might repair the harm. Eventually, the salesman and Eric come up 
with a unique solution: Eric had been thinking about buying a lightly used pick-up truck from 
his brother-in-law and decides that instead of buying it for himself, he will buy it and give it to 
the salesman to help replace some of the lost inventory. In addition, Eric offers to apologize to 
the salesman, and to write a written apology to the other two employees at the car lot who had 
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to work overtime to clean up the wreckage from the accident. Finally, Eric agrees to sign up for 
a safe driving class, and promises to pay for a taxi cab from work on the nights that he works 
later than ten p.m. The conference participants agree to this proposed outcome plan and 
conference process concludes.  
The facilitator writes up a report detailing the outcomes of the conference and submits it 
to the district court, and forwards copies to Eric and the salesman as well. When Eric returns to 
court for sentencing, the magistrate will account for the conference report, as well as how much 
progress Eric has made on the outcome plan, using the relative success of the restorative process 
as one mitigating factor when planning Eric’s sentence. By the time the sentencing hearing is 
happening, Eric has completed his assigned tasks by issuing his apologies, delivering the car, and 
attending the driving course. However, the results of the restorative conference are only one 
consideration for the court; the magistrate will also look at Eric’s previous criminal record, 
several of the offence’s details, the vulnerability of the victim, levels of premeditation, the 
offender’s intellectual capacity, evidence of good character, among several other aggravating and 
mitigating factors that are listed in the Sentencing Act 2002. In Eric’s case, because he did not 
have a previous criminal record, cooperated with his lawyer, showed remorse, and had a 
successful conference coupled with satisfactory completion of his outcome plan, the magistrate 
is inclined to be very lenient. She reinstates Eric’s driving privileges, which were suspended while 
he was on bail, convicts him of reckless driving, and issues an order for him to come up for 
sentence if he commits further driving-related offences in the next six months.  
New South Wales 
Eric’s experience as he progresses through the New South Wales criminal justice system will, at 
the outset, resemble his experience in New Zealand. He will have to retain a lawyer, appear in 
the local court, and plead guilty to be considered for forum sentencing. Again, on the advice of 
his lawyer, he enters his guilty plea at his committal hearing and the magistrate makes a 
suitability assessment order, which means that the operations team will begin the process of 
determining whether Eric’s case is appropriate for the forum sentencing program. His eligibility 
for a conference will be dependent on the willingness of the car salesman to participate. The car 
salesman is, once again, interested in attending, and so the operations team reports back to the 
magistrate that Eric’s case is indeed suitable. The magistrate then issues a forum participation 
order and an assigned facilitator begins the pre-conference process. Participants are contacted 
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and educated about the components of the program and the facilitator sets a time and date for 
the conference.  
Once the conference is under way, it will begin to look more like the YJC that was 
described above. The facilitator will follow a script that generates dialogue between Eric and the 
car salesman and is designed to probe at the ways in which the salesman was affected by the 
incident. Then, the participants will be tasked with drafting an intervention plan. The car 
salesman is adamant that he wants to be fully compensated for the damage caused but Eric is 
insistent that he does not have that kind of money available. Eric and the salesman agree to a 
restitution payment of $10,000, paid over the course of six months. Eric will also issue a written 
apology to the salesman and his two employees and will attend a safe driving course. This draft 
intervention plan is submitted to the local magistrate who approves it and issues an intervention 
plan order, which will function as Eric’s final sentence if successfully completed. A program 
manager monitors Eric in his completion of the plan and in sixty days, after he’s written the 
apology, attended the course, and made one-third of the reparative payment, it is reported to the 
court that he’s satisfactorily complied with the bulk of the intervention plan. The magistrate 
therefore terminates proceedings and considers Eric’s case fully adjudicated.  
Vermont 
Lastly, in Vermont, Eric appears at his arraignment hearing and enters his guilty plea. Based on 
that plea, Eric’s lack of a criminal record, and the circumstances of the offence, the judge 
sentences Eric to reparative probation and refers the case to the local CJC. Various CJCs 
structure their administrative staff differently, but there will often be a program manager or 
coordinator to receive case referrals and to assemble a panel to handle the matter. Pre-panel 
steps are inconsistent throughout the state, but often include a meeting with the offender and 
initial contact with the victim to let them know about the case and to invite them to participate if 
they are so inclined. Eric meets with the restorative justice coordinator and is given information 
about the process, his legal rights, and the ramifications of his failure to comply with the panel 
procedure and complete the conditions of his reparative probation sentence. The coordinator 
also gets in touch with the car salesman and informs him of the progression in Eric’s case. This 
time, the salesman indicates that he is uninterested in participating, but this does not impede 
Eric’s restorative case in Vermont.  
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 The next step is to inform the assigned panel members—community volunteers—who 
serve on the reparative boards. They receive basic facts about the offence, about Eric, and about 
potential areas for focus during the meeting. A date for a panel is set and Eric appears before the 
three panel members while the coordinator sits in to take notes, monitor the progress, and act as 
a form of quality control if the meeting veers from approved procedures. The panel invites Eric 
to describe the incident in his own words and recount the factors that led to the offence. 
Without the salesman present and without the need to ascertain his remorse as a prerequisite for 
the restorative meeting, Eric’s initial statements gloss over his own accountability. He blames the 
salesman for not having a guard rail up around the parking lot in what is a highly trafficked area. 
This refusal to take responsibility might have disqualified Eric from further participation in New 
Zealand or New South Wales, but in Vermont, the panel sees it as an opportunity to transform 
Eric’s understanding of the crime and to challenge him to accept his culpability. Panel members 
therefore ask Eric further questions about the crime and about his own life, pushing him to 
comprehend the harm that he caused. The way Eric talks about the crime starts to shift, and by 
the end of the meeting, the panel members are satisfied that he has been held accountable. He 
even offers to build a guard rail for the car salesman. Taking this idea and running with it, the 
panel confer separately from Eric and return with a plan for his reparative agreement. If Eric 
agrees to build the guardrail, attend a safe driving course, and issue a written apology to the 
salesman and his two employees, the panel will record the plan and Eric will have sixty days to 
complete it. Eric agrees, and the panel concludes. 
 Eric checks back in with the panel after thirty days to give them an update on his 
progress. He reports that he has issued the apology and taken the driving course, and that he will 
be finishing the guardrail in the next two weeks. When Eric reports back at the end of the sixty-
day period, he has completed the components of his reparative agreement and the panel 
considers his case satisfactorily adjudicated. The CJC reports the outcome to the court and Eric 
will walk away from the incident with a misdemeanour on his criminal record.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the law-making institutions of New Zealand, New South Wales, and 
Vermont, which are important to bear in mind for subsequent discussion. Notably, New 
Zealand is a unicameral, parliamentary system with relatively few veto players—a situation which 
would appear to grant the country a more expansive capacity for legislative action. New South 
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Wales features a similar parliamentary system, but its bicameral legislature and unique coalitional 
organizing in the upper house make for less robust legislative output. This is somewhat 
tempered by the jurisdictional practice of relying on legislative regulations to amend many 
statutes, a process which requires fewer of the parliamentary formalities. Finally, Vermont is the 
smallest and most homogenous state, but it also has a bicameral legislature, an absence of 
parliamentary coalitions, and an executive with substantive veto power. Accordingly, 
Vermonters must navigate more veto players when it comes to enacting legislation. 
 Furthermore, all three jurisdictions administer their criminal justice programs through a 
standard, though intricate, system of interconnected agencies. Restorative justice mechanisms are 
inserted into those systems in distinct ways. In New Zealand, Family Group Conferences 
operate as a mandated youth justice procedure that can be initiated at several stages of the justice 
process. FGCs can, therefore, serve varying functions for each young offender’s case, ranging 
from a diversionary, intention-to-charge conference or a mitigating, pre-sentencing option for 
offenders facing more serious punitive measures. In the criminal justice system, adult offenders 
interact with a more limited restorative justice mechanism wherein, prior to sentencing, 
offenders have an opportunity to attend a conference with the victim of the crime and attempt 
to repair the harm before they return to conventional procedures.  
 In New South Wales, Youth Justice Conferences are designed to resemble FGCs in 
terms of the conferencing process, but the mechanism can only be used as a diversionary tool 
meant to fully adjudicate the charges against the young offender. Similarly, forum sentencing 
conferences are an endpoint in an adult offender’s criminal justice journey, given that successful 
completion of a conference and an outcome plan serve to terminate proceedings against an 
offender. However, the mechanism is even more constrained than the YJC; referrals can only 
come from the local court and victims must agree to participate before a forum sentencing 
conference can be deemed suitable.  
 In Vermont, restorative justice can take on regionally unique approaches as the state’s 
Community Justice Centres advocate for and experiment with innovative justice procedures. The 
most common restorative justice mechanism is the restorative justice panel, which is frequently 
used for adult offenders who have been sentenced to reparative probation. As a discrete 
sentencing option, reparative probation is activated by state court judges and provides an 
opportunity for adult offenders facing lower level charges to discuss the criminal incident with 
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community volunteers. These offenders then use their probationary period to address the harm 
of the crime and reintegrate with their community. 
The hypothetical criminal cases that were illustrated in this chapter lend a more realistic, 
narrative-driven lens to a description of how individuals experience the various restorative 
justice mechanisms. In the next chapter, I provide further clarification regarding the legislative 
acts that created these mechanisms, and how the policy design decisions made during the 
passage of those acts have influenced the development of restorative practices in each 
jurisdiction. 
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3. ANALYZING THE STATUTORY CONTENT OF  
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE LEGISLATION 
This chapter conducts a content analysis of the restorative justice statutes of New Zealand, New 
South Wales, and Vermont. The analysis affords a more complete understanding of the 
restorative justice mandates that are at work in each jurisdiction. It asks: how were these 
programs designed and how does the law envision their operation? This will be a powerful 
reference point in my subsequent investigation in Chapters 4 and 5 of how these practices 
have actually been implemented. During this content analysis, I will use the theories of restorative 
justice and policy design set out in Chapter 1 to construct a framework for evaluation.  By 
highlighting restorative justice considerations and policy design tools, I will seek to clarify the 
relationship between the legislative choices that were made, and the way the restorative justice 
programs operate on the ground. I begin by more fully describing my analytical framework, and 
then applying that to New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont. 
Methodology   
In the sections below, I will review the six restorative justice statutes associated with the three, 
selected jurisdictions. I begin by using Groenhuijsen’s (2000) and Lee’s (2011) models of 
restorative justice integration to categorize the role each mechanism plays in the criminal justice 
system: as a supplement to conventional justice; a fully formed alternative to conventional 
justice; or a parallel set of justice processes. Then, I synthesize the typologies employed by 
researchers of policy design to categorize the statutory features and anticipate their importance 
in ultimate restorative outcomes. 
  This synthesis of research typologies begins with a rundown of the content 
characteristics: the tools, rules, and theories that undergird the restorative practices being 
implemented (Ingram and Schneider 1990). Within these tools and rules, I look for elements of 
the “ideal” restorative statute as prescribed by Groenhuijsen (2000), Leverton (2008), and Lee 
(2011). As we saw in Chapter 1, an ideal statute features consideration of facilitator selection, 
training, and certification and set forth rules governing participation, participant safety and 
confidentiality, legal safeguards, and other process particulars. Turning away from the 
particulars, I next consider the overall statute type using the model designed by Ingram and 
Schneider (1990). Their model relies on cataloguing the levels of discretion distributed to policy 
designers and policy implementers and accordingly categorizing statutes as strong, Wilsonian, 
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grassroots, or coalition-building. Finally, I shift to an examination of the process characteristics 
described by May (1993) and van der Heijden (2013), looking at how the statute made its way 
through the political system.  
By bringing these distinctive theoretical perspectives to bear, this content analysis 
assesses whether the statutes under review would be expected to produce adequately restorative 
mechanisms. It also provides insight into what policy design research would say more generally 
about the policy instruments that were used when crafting this legislation and how those 
instruments might contribute to restorative justice’s implementation. This provides two 
platforms for comparison that I will use when evaluating the restorative justice mechanisms in 
Chapter 4 and 5: 1) how successfully restorative are the mechanisms and 2) how effectively 
designed and implemented was the legislation. Based on the analysis in this chapter, I begin the 
process of sorting the restorative justice mechanisms in this case study according to these two 
measures. My assessments are in the conclusion to this chapter.  
New Zealand 
The Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 and Family Group Conferences 
New Zealand is widely considered to be a leading innovator in the implementation of legislated, 
regulated, and country-wide restorative processes (Maxwell and Morris 1993, Watt 2003, 
Maxwell and Morris 2006, Carruthers 2012, Fox 2015). This reputation grows out of the passage 
of the Children, Youth Persons, and their Families Act 1989 (now known as the Oranga 
Tamariki Act), which overhauled the juvenile justice system and institutionalized the restorative 
Family Group Conference (FGC) (Watt 2003).  
Procedurally, the FGC operates as a supplement to conventional justice. Recall from the 
previous chapter that conferences can be initiated at several stages of the justice process and can 
have different outcomes in terms of requirements for further justice proceedings. Of course, 
diversionary, intention-to-charge conferences can operate as an autonomous alternative that pre-
empts an offender having to interact further with conventional justice procedures. However, 
FGCs are typically couched in the terms of conventional justice. For example, the Youth Court 
is another source of FGC referrals and the associated procedure is clearly a part of the 
conventional justice system. Courts are required to consider adjourning proceedings for the sake 
of a conference referral at any stage (pre-hearing, pre-sentencing, post-sentencing) once the 
46 
 
offender has admitted guilt or is found guilty, assuming that a conference had not already been 
held. Then, depending on the outcome of the conference and the decisions of the participants, 
the case can return to the Youth Court for further proceedings (Oranga Tamariki Act 1989).  
The FGC procedures are highly delimited within the Oranga Tamariki Act and 
guidelines exist for almost every stage of the conference process. The bulk of these guidelines 
satisfy the considerations that Groenhuijsen (2000), Leverton (2008), and Lee (2011) 
recommend for inclusion in restorative justice legislation. As previously discussed, the Act 
designs the mechanism, identifies the referral points, and locates the FGC within the justice 
process. The Act also accounts for a young offender’s legal rights with regards to obtaining a 
procedurally fair admission of guilt, specifies a right to counsel at all stages leading up to a 
conference, and states that any barrister or solicitor who represents the offender has the right to 
attend the conference (Oranga Tamariki Act 1989). The proceedings of FGCs are designated as 
privileged and the list of who can participate, as well as how that participation should be 
facilitated, is included in the legislation (Oranga Tamariki Act 1989). Finally, agencies are 
required to comply with any decisions, recommendations, or plans made during a conference, 
and the Act asks the court to keep proceedings adjourned until after a conference’s conclusion 
and to take conference outcomes into account during sentencing, thereby outlining what role 
those outcomes can play in further proceedings (Oranga Tamariki Act 1989).  
The Act falls short of the ideal restorative statute, however, in failing to address 
facilitator selection, training, and certification. The Act simply creates the position of Youth 
Justice Coordinator for the purposes of facilitating the conferences and specifies several rules 
that the coordinators must follow without mentioning the criteria for appointment or training 
requirements (Oranga Tamariki Act 1989). Neither does the Act directly address the relationship 
between FGC outcomes and further criminal proceedings. Although the statute specifies the 
scope of the decisions, recommendations, and plans that an FGC can make, the explanation of 
how a case may end up proceeding to the Youth Court and how to respond to failures in 
outcome plans are left to policy directives issued by Oranga Tamariki, the Ministry charged with 
administering FGCs (Oranga Tamariki 2018).  
These statutory characteristics, in addition to fulfilling the above-mentioned, academic 
expectations of how a jurisdiction might legislate for restorative justice, also represent an array of 
policy design tools that may have an impact on restorative implementation. Recall that Ingram 
and Schneider (1990) defined policy tools as motivators of programmatic action while May 
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(1993) explained that provisions aimed at building commitment and capacity can serve as drivers 
of implementation. Within the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, the requirements that other agencies 
legitimize the decisions of FGCs and that the court consider the recommendations of FGCs 
present authoritative commitment-building provisions (May 1993). On top of that, the Act 
mandates that the chief executive give effect to any decisions, recommendations, and plans of 
FGCs and that they provide financial assistance to those processes when necessary, which builds 
both commitment and capacity. At its outset in 1989, the legislation also made the choice to 
create the new position of Youth Justice Coordinator to take on the responsibilities of 
organizing and facilitating conferences rather than distributing those FGC-related 
responsibilities among existing youth justice service providers. This is another commitment-
building provision as it develops a uniquely incentivized and motivated implementation agent 
that is directly connected with the delivery of the service (Ingram and Schneider 1990). Overall, 
the portion of the Oranga Tamariki Act that deals with FGCs affords a high level of statutory 
coherence, with a precise delineation of program aspects and objectives (May 1993).  
These implementation tools are underpinned by the articulation of theories about 
juvenile justice approaches and by the codification of restorative values in the vision for juvenile 
justice. For example, the statute states that in the event a young person commits an offence, “(i) 
They are held accountable, and encouraged to accept responsibility for their behaviour,” an 
objective that includes restorative ideals in the legislation’s primary directives (Children, Young 
Persons, and their Families Act 1989). Other components of this restorative theorizing include 
emphasis on: informal responses to youth crime; the primacy of the family group as an 
important stakeholder in the commission of crime by youth; the need for community responses 
to crime; punishment that is rehabilitative and minimally restrictive; and the needs of victims. 
The Act rolled out these new theories as “principles” designed to guide the juvenile justice 
system’s best practices. In sum, these principles create a theoretical context within the Oranga 
Tamariki Act that is supportive of restorative justice procedures and goals.  
The picture that emerges of the Oranga Tamariki Act is one that matches the label of 
“strong statutes,” as defined by Ingram and Schneider (1990). The design elements exert 
extensive control over the programmatic operation of FGCs and coordinators have minimal 
leeway in how they run a conference. Process objectives, as well as the tools used to meet them, 
are well-delineated and resource allocation is clarified.  
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I move now to a consideration of the statute’s legislative process in an attempt to 
identify van der Heijden’s (2013) process characteristics and to understand the parts of the 
narrative that might provide indicators for Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) measures of political 
and process success. The Oranga Tamariki Act and its restorative elements developed over the 
course of several years as legislators laboured to address growing (and often competing) 
concerns regarding the country’s treatment of at-risk youth, an effort which resulted in extensive 
innovation across many axes of family services and justice practices (Watt 2003; Carruthers 
2012). These reformative impulses originally manifested in a departmental working party that 
was assembled in 1984 by the newly elected Labour Government and tasked with reviewing the 
existing legislation governing youth justice, the Children and Young Persons Act 1974 (Watt 
2003). Although FGCs were not on the drawing board during this early iteration, the working 
party’s report makes it clear that members were already looking for youth justice processes that 
would provide alternatives to conventional proceedings and engage community members, 
criteria that are conducive to the introduction of restorative elements (Manchester 1984). For 
example, their proposal included the creation of “Youth Assessment Panels,” a mechanism that 
was designed to serve as the primary gatekeeper to the courts. Panels were meant to feature 
representatives from the police, from the Department of Social Welfare, and from the young 
offender’s community, and to divert young offenders away from the stigmatization of formal 
court proceedings through the use of tools such as warnings and referrals to community-based 
mediation groups (Manchester 1984).  
 The working party’s recommendations were translated into the Children and Young 
Person’s Bill 1986, but it would take many years, the assembly of a second working party to review 
the proposed legislation, several public forums, and 18 months of work from the Select 
Committee before the 1986 Bill was finally presented for a second reading in April of 1989 and 
passed into law as the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act in November (Watt 
2003; Carruthers 2012). The CYPF Act represented a marked departure from the reformative 
tinkering of the 1986 Bill, opting instead for the development of brand-new policy models aimed 
at original answers to the problem of youth offending. However, the origins of these 
innovations provide some insight into the political intentionality that drove this legislation, 
illuminating how restorative justice goals were not always central to the process. Parliamentary 
discussion indicates that the creation of the FGC was largely motivated by submissions to the 
Select Committee that called for more family involvement and a more culturally sensitive 
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approach to youth justice (New Zealand Hansard Report 20 April 1989). The legislation itself 
never actually mentions the phrase restorative justice; policy designers managed to create a youth 
justice practice that is consistent with restorative thinking, but without any prior agreement that 
restorative justice procedures were the goal (Maxwell and Morris 2006:243). Despite this, the 
FGC meets the criteria of a restorative justice mechanism.  
 Another factor in evaluation of the political process as suggested by Marsh and 
McConnell (2012) is the degree of statutory amendment required. Notably, the central 
regulations for the conferencing process remain largely unchanged. Incremental amendments 
over the years have produced some procedural edits, such as the requirement to invite support 
persons for a participating victim, the requirement to ask a victim whether they’d like to be 
appraised of a young offender’s progress following a conference, and the clarification that a 
conference must assist and encourage a young person’s participation to a degree appropriate for 
their age and level of maturityiii. Although the Act itself received an overhaul in 2017—the New 
Zealand Parliament created Oranga Tamariki, the Ministry for Children, renamed the statute the 
Oranga Tamariki Act, transferred administration of the Act to the new Ministry, and made 
extensive edits to the care and protection portion of the Act—few of these changes had any 
impact on youth justice FGCs, other than raising the age of offender eligibility from seventeen 
to eighteen (Children, Young Persons and their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 
2017).     
The length of time required for the bill’s drafting process and the breadth of iterations of 
juvenile justice reform might have indicated levels of conflict that boded poorly for the statute’s 
success (Marsh and McConnell 2012). However, in examining the parliamentary discussions and 
the reports of the working parties, a more fitting account of the bill’s delay comes from the 
change in government in 1984 and the fact that the bill was attempting a substantial paradigm 
shift among the relevant institutions, a process which required ongoing discussion and 
development. This extensive conversation was fuelled in large part by the fact that the bill 
included reforms of the care and protection sector for New Zealand children. Accordingly, in 
the face of the occasionally heated parliamentary debate, the family group conference as it was 
designed for the youth justice sector was not the primary focus of the MPs’ discussions.  
But there are still telling components of the conversation that illustrate the ways in which 
the New Zealand Parliament was grappling with a new vision for the treatment of youth, 
including young offenders. First was the thoroughness of the bill’s amending period. The Social 
50 
 
Services Committee held three rounds of public consultation, well-beyond the scope of public 
commentary that typically takes place during the amending process, before returning the bill to 
the House floor to vote on a second reading (New Zealand Hansard Report 20 April 1989).  
Second was the principle-based nature of large portions of the debate. The 
parliamentarians were not sniping at each other about minute, procedural details; rather, they 
were grappling with the values that would structure the entire system. These compromises 
included questions such as whether sector experts are the best service providers or are too 
disconnected from the communities they serve, how to empower families without endangering 
children that may face a troubling family situation, and how to create sanctioned edicts for care 
without taking on a paternalistic, “government knows best” attitude that alienates children and 
their caregivers (New Zealand Hansard Report 20 April 1989). Ultimately, it appears as though 
the New Zealand Parliament was able to arrive at a stable consensus, reducing the paramountcy 
of the child to make room for family input while reinforcing the jurisdiction’s buy-in to sector 
expertise through the creation of the Youth Justice Coordinator (Oranga Tamariki Act 2017). 
And the fact that there have been so few amendments through the years and through changes in 
government shows that, for the most part, youth justice in New Zealand is functioning as 
desired and holds broad-based, inter-party support (Marsh and McConnell 2012). It follows that 
the conflict associated with the passage of this Act was not a harbinger of legislative discontent. 
Instead, the attempts to settle philosophic tensions took time and creating a new, consistent 
foundation for New Zealand’s youth services programs was a substantial task that was 
completed with perceived success. 
Based on the development of conferencing in New Zealand, its legislative origins, and 
ongoing institutional buttressing, the Oranga Tamariki Act and the FGC are a prominent 
example of restorative justice operationalization. Embedded in a statute that was designed to 
thoroughly reform the youth justice sector, FGCs were accounted for by legislative strategies 
that granted them the implementation tools, legitimate procedures, and theoretical context that 
would seem to predict policy success. However, it’s also important to note that the FGC, while 
now recognized as a restorative justice process, was not deliberately designed as a restorative 
process, and that fact occasionally reflects itself in the mechanism. The FGC is built around the 
needs of the young offender, rather than an equal consideration of the needs of all stakeholders. 
Although victims are invited to participate and are considered by the legislation, conferences are 
mandated regardless of the victim’s views, which means individual conferences vary in terms of 
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the degree to which they accomplish restorative goals. In this instance, the focus of the statute 
on youth offenders ensures its effective integration into the youth justice system; however, the 
omission of explicit attention to the needs of victims lessens its structural capacity to ensure 
restoration. 
The Sentencing Act 2002 and Adult Pre-Sentence Conferences 
In comparison, restorative justice for adult offenders in New Zealand’s criminal justice system 
has been designed to operate differently from the FGC. Experiments in conferencing and 
mediation with adult offenders began in pockets of the country in the early 1990s and were 
largely envisioned as a tool for victim advocacy (Bowen and Boyack 2003). And it was in the 
hopes of facilitating victim advocacy that Parliament ultimately introduced restorative justice 
into its sentencing reform efforts. The model that rose to top, due in part to its capacity for 
victim centrality, was pre-sentencing restorative justice conferences. 
Entering into effect through a broad, reformative package made up of the Victims’ 
Rights Act 2002, the Parole Act 2002, and the Sentencing Act 2002, this victim-centric model 
operates as a “supplementary modification to” conventional justice (Groenhuijsen 2000:3). The 
Sentencing Act 2002 provides the most explicit, procedural guidelines, suggesting that the court 
adjourn proceedings before the imposition of a sentence to pursue restorative avenues where the 
legislation deemed it appropriate (Sentencing Act 2002). In 2014, this restorative “option” 
became mandatory when an amendment to the Act required that a restorative justice referral be 
made in all eligible cases (Sentencing Amendment Act 2014). The Act also directs the court to 
take restorative outcomes into account once sentencing procedures recommenced. These 
outcomes could include any measure to make amends such as financial reimbursement or service 
work, any other remedying agreement between the victim and the offender, any apology made to 
the victim, and any remedial action taken by the offender (Sentencing Act 2002). The Act asks 
the court to consider the genuineness of the offender’s restorative behaviours and the victim’s 
ultimate view on how well the crime’s harms have been mitigated (Sentencing Act 2002). The 
process is firmly situated within the conventional adjudication procedures; offenders temporarily 
exit the adversarial justice stream to engage in restorative opportunities and are returned to the 
adversarial justice stream afterwards for all final case decisions.  
In terms of incorporating the aspects of the ideal restorative statute that I discussed in 
Chapter 1, the Sentencing Act falls short in several areas. Instead of using a statute as the 
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primary source of process prescription, adult conferencing is governed by a framework of best 
practices published by the Ministry of Justice in 2004 and updated in 2017 (New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice 2017). As a result, the conferencing mechanism that is currently operating in 
New Zealand’s criminal justice system is not a legislative design; it is an administrative policy 
choice made by the Ministry of Justice. Any procedural consistency thus depends on the best 
practices guidelines and the way the Ministry contracts and funds the conferences (New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice 2017). The Act itself does two things: 1) it specifies that restorative justice 
should happen prior to sentencing in the judicial process, and 2) it mandates that judges consider 
restorative justice results once the case returns for sentencing. 
The Act makes no mention of facilitators and how they should be selected, trained, and 
certified; nor does it include the criminal justice equivalent of a Youth Justice Coordinator. 
Instead of creating governmental positions to operate adult restorative justice processes, the 
Ministry of Justice contracts with local restorative justice providers who employ Ministry-
accredited facilitators (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). It is within these contracts that 
the Ministry finds much of its procedural enforcement power, providing funding to local 
organizations only for pre-sentence conferencing services (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 
2017). Finally, because the restorative justice component is included in a larger statute about 
general sentencing practices, there are several clauses that address legal safeguards, but none of 
them refer specifically to the application of those rights to the conferencing process (Sentencing 
Act 2002).   
Due to the sparse inclusion of restorative justice practice details, the Sentencing Act does 
not feature many programmatic policy tools that would appear to enforce or implement a 
restorative policy. One important exception to the absence of enforcement mechanisms is the 
amendment in 2014. Judges are now required to adjourn proceedings in instances where the Act 
has determined that a case is eligible for restorative justice procedures; this change to the Act 
institutes compulsoriness to motivate policy use. But as shown by Casper and Brereton (1984), 
the justice sector workgroup can often avoid mandatory reforms by limiting the number of cases 
that they believe fall under the purview of a new rule.  
The Act does add to its policy tool belt by incorporating theory-based support for 
restorative justice. This theoretical backing is presented in the Act’s eight principles to guide the 
sentencing process, several of which represent restorative values. The relevant principles include 
holding the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and the community, 
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promoting the offender’s sense of responsibility, providing for the interests of victims, providing 
reparation for the harm done by the offending, and reintegrating the offender (Sentencing Act 
2002). The result is a Wilsonian statute that prescribes big picture goals without always 
specifying the parameters of practice and implementation. The Sentencing Act identifies 
restorative justice as an element worth incorporating into the country’s criminal justice system, 
but leaves it to the Ministry of Justice to hammer out the particulars; in turn, the Ministry of 
Justice uses a commitment to the pre-sentencing conference and general best practices 
guidelines to steer portions of the restorative policy, but leaves on the ground operation to local 
organizations that are already embedded in communities.  
Turning now to an assessment of the process that produced this legislation, I begin with 
a brief description of the parliamentary context of the Sentencing Act 2002.  The Act, as 
previously mentioned, was passed along with two other statutes aimed at updating New 
Zealand’s sentencing and parole practices. The reformative impulses behind the Sentencing Act 
2002, the Victims’ Rights Act 2002, and the Parole Act 2002 were partially rooted in a “tough on 
crime” mindset (New Zealand Hansard Report 14 August 2001). A public referendum in 1999 
revealed that 92% of New Zealanders supported mandatory minimum sentencing and harsher 
responses to serious offending, a fact which put substantial pressure on the Labour government 
at the time (Fyers 2018). One can see a reflection of this pressure in the way legislators discussed 
sentencing reforms, citing the paramountcy of society’s protection and the need to pursue a 
“stronger line against recidivist offenders” (New Zealand Hansard Report 14 August 2001). 
Restorative justice was acknowledged as having a “growing importance,” but that importance 
was sourced in the ability to “empower and restore the position of the victim” (New Zealand 
Hansard Report 14 August 2001).  
Prior to the inclusion of restorative justice in the legislative agenda, the Ministry of 
Justice had been making efforts to harness community-based restorative resources, with early 
government funding directed towards community panels that focused on pre-trial diversion for 
adult offenders such as Project Turnaround in Timaru and Te Whanau Awhina, on the Hoani 
Waititi Marae in West Auckland (Maxwell and Anderson 1999). The panel approach involved 
the use of appointed community volunteers to engage in a conversation with the offender about 
the offence and to use that dialogue to develop an action plan. Action plans were meant to 
address the needs of the victim, to hold the offender accountable to the community, and to 
minimize the risk of future offending. However, early evaluations produced concerns that the 
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panel approach was missing some key restorative features in that very few victims were attending 
the meetings, and the action plans were unilaterally imposed rather than consensus-based 
(Maxwell and Anderson 1999).  
Concurrently, the government sought partnerships with community organizations that 
used a conference-based approach in their provision of restorative services, offering grant 
funding to initiatives like the Whanganui Restorative Justice Trust and the Rotorua Second 
Change Restorative Justice Programme in 1999 (Paulin, Kingi, and Huirama 2005, Paulin, Kingi, 
and Lash 2005). In 2001, the Ministry of Justice augmented the process of institutionalization 
with a four-year restorative justice pilot program, implementing court-referred conferencing at 
four district courts (Auckland, Dunedin, Hamilton, and Waitakere) (Triggs 2005). The goal of 
the pilot was to offer standardized training to participating conference facilitators, elicit more 
involvement from judges who would be the primary gatekeepers for the referral process, and 
investigate the effectiveness of the selected conferencing model. From the success of this pilot 
emerged the restorative justice mandate that was introduced into Parliament’s sentencing reform 
bill.  
The centrality of victim support—which drove the earliest efforts at restorative 
conferencing with adult offenders and justified restorative justice’s inclusion in New Zealand’s 
new sentencing practices—remains a feature of the adult conferencing process. As opposed to 
the youth justice sector where FGCs are an offender-activated process, conferencing takes place 
in the criminal justice sector on behalf of the victim (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2017). 
That is not to say that restorative justice providers do not want benefits to accrue for 
participating offenders but, conceptually, they are neither the motivation for nor the focus of the 
process.  
The Sentencing Act thus provides a compelling opportunity to observe what happens in 
restorative justice when the mechanism is loosely introduced.  As we have seen, the Sentencing 
Act requires the use of the conferencing mechanism at the victim’s behest, but the particularities 
of the practice are left to ministerial policy and to local service providers operating as 
independent contractors. This will make its evaluation narrative an interesting point of 
comparison for the heavily prescribed FGC, particularly with regards to the actual amount of use 
that each policy gets. It will also make regional variation an important consideration for adult 
pre-sentencing conferences, with contributing factors being the culture of local district courts 
and the ability of service providers to navigate the justice workgroup in their region. The 
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possibility of these policy disparities contrasts with the consistency of the mechanism’s 
restorative capacity, which is enforced by the mandated participation of victims. This illustrates 
one way in which the fulfilment of restorative expectations can have procedural consequences.   
New South Wales 
The Young Offenders Act1997 and Youth Justice Conferences 
The introduction of restorative justice processes to the New South Wale’s youth justice system 
follows a path markedly similar to New Zealand, in part because the establishment of Youth 
Justice Conferences (YJC) in the territory was inspired by the perceived success of FGCs in New 
Zealand (New South Wales Hansard 21 May 1997). This instance of policy transfer took place 
when New South Wales passed the Young Offenders Act 1997 as the institutionalizing vehicle 
for the YJC.  
The YJC ostensibly operates alongside the conventional justice system, as an alternative 
to adjudication. In New Zealand’s model, the restorative justice mechanism is one step in a 
justice timeline with possibilities of adversarial justice interactions both before and after. In 
contrast, the YJC is a separate intervention stream that, once activated, is intended to arbitrate 
the full extent of relevant proceedings. In cases of procedural breakdown, perhaps because 
participants reveal unproductive mindsets (such as an overly defensive offender) or a young 
offender fails to complete their outcome plan, a case may revert to the conventional justice 
stream. But the YJC process is intended to remain independent from non-restorative 
mechanisms.  
That being said, the YJC can originate from a court referral, as evidenced by Lucas’ case, 
meaning that the young offender has already made an appearance in Children’s Court and can 
have formal, criminal charges lodged against them. This means that in some instances, the YJC 
functions as a sentencing option for the conventional justice track, which makes it a component 
of the juvenile justice system rather than an adjacent process. It also means that it’s not a process 
solely committed to insulating young offenders from formal court proceedings. This illustrates 
some of the ways in which the YJC is a much more restricted and specialized process, meant for 




How well does the Young Offenders Act account for those components that scholars 
claim should be included in restorative justice legislation? The statute offers clarification on the 
functioning of the mechanism, including the referral process, other operative procedures, the 
point of incorporation with juvenile justice system, and the scope of restorative justice’s impact 
on additional proceedings. Further, the rules surrounding participation and eligibility are much 
stricter than those for the New Zealand FGC; accordingly, there is greater explication regarding 
the offences that can and cannot be addressed by YJCs and who can and cannot attend. The 
Young Offenders Act also addresses the legal safeguards in place and how they factor into the 
YJC process, requiring that conveners inform young offenders of their rights during the pre-
conference phase, clarifying that young offenders can revoke their consent to participate at any 
time and stop the conference, and protecting all participants with confidentiality requirements. 
Finally, while the Act specifies the new justice sector agents who will be responsible for the 
administration of YJCs and defines their roles, it does not consider the requirements for 
facilitator training, selection, and certification.  
Now, I review the policy content characteristics and assess the selected policy tools. The 
Young Offenders Act is largely a policy effort meant to build the capacity of the juvenile justice 
system to administer the new processes introduced by the Act. The Act does this by creating 
new actors with highly specified roles such as the SYOs, the conference administrators, and the 
conveners. It also accounts for the funding requirements of the various legislative components, 
including the salaries of the conference conveners. May (1990) identifies these kinds of capacity-
building efforts as potential drivers of implementation.  
The Act also provides for its own oversight and evaluation by creating a Youth Justice 
Advisory Committee (YJAC). The YJAC was tasked with creating conference guidelines, 
defining selection criteria for the appointment of conference conveners, and monitoring the 
administration of the Act, which would at the very least include an evaluative report on the Act’s 
first three years of implementation (Young Offenders Act 1997). The Youth Justice Advisory 
Committee was abolished in 2006 and replaced by the Young Offenders Advisory Council, 
which originated from ministerial directive rather than legislative mandate and had a greatly 
reduced scope for monitoring the Young Offenders Act (Noetic Solutions 2010). Unfortunately, 
it remains unclear to me what prompted the NSW Parliament to remove this policy tool from 
the written legislation. However, it does appear that at the outset of the Act, the NSW 
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Government ostensibly embraced the opportunities for policy learning engendered by evaluation 
requirements.  
In addition to these capacity-building tools, the Young Offenders Act relies heavily on 
explicit, procedural rules to make the YJC a fully formulated and predictable procedure in the 
juvenile justice system. As May (1993) explains, these kinds of rules increase the statutory 
coherence and legislative goal clarity, which should ease the implementation path. The Young 
Offenders Act therefore stands as a clear example of a strong statute (Ingram and Schneider 
1990). The legislative designers specified the full operation of the Act and provided a 
standardized restorative justice model to be uniformly and consistently implemented throughout 
the territory.  
 The final analytical step is a briefing on the design process for the Young Offenders Act. 
Demands for a youth justice overhaul began in the late 1980s. Accompanying those demands, 
there arose several locally sourced models of alternative dispute resolution for young offenders, 
including a conferencing pilot scheme operated by the Wagga Wagga Police and the introduction 
of a Community Aid Panel at the Wyong Local Court (NSW Law Reform Commission 2005). 
The Wagga Wagga scheme was designed in large part by zealous advocates on the local 
Community Consultative Committee who worked with police officials to trial an “effective 
cautioning” program modelled on the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989 
(Moore and Forsythe 1995). The Wagga Wagga model used police as the exclusive gate-keepers 
to the cautioning program which established warnings, cautions, and family group conferences 
as a set of diversionary options for offenders who had admitted guilt and were eligible to avoid 
court proceedings; review of the trial, which ran from 1991-1994, indicated that the program 
produced a significant reduction in the number of formal police interventions, resulted in a 95% 
victim participation rate in conferences, and increased victim satisfaction with the justice process 
(Moore and Forsythe 1995; O’Connell 1993).  
 In an alternative approach, Community Aid Panels spread beyond Wyong and by 1996, 
75 panels were operating throughout New South Wales (NSW Law Reform Commission 2005). 
These were configured to run in conjunction with the typical court process rather than as a 
diversionary tactic. Young offenders who plead guilty could have their court case adjourned for 
three months in order to be referred to a panel of appointed community volunteers; the panel 
would meet with the offender and develop a restorative, educational, and rehabilitative plan; the 
offender would return to court for sentencing and based on reports from the panel and the 
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offender’s successful completion of the plan, the court could offer a mitigated sentence (NSW 
Law Reform Commission 2005).  
Both panels and conferencing gained pockets of support as the New South Wales 
government turned to the project of reforming its youth justice sector. A government-sponsored 
review of the system published a Green Paper in 1993, which advocated for the continued use of 
Community Aid Panels (NSW Law Reform Commission 2005). Meanwhile, the Attorney 
General’s Department, encouraged by the success of the Wagga Wagga trial and by 
recommendations from a 1994 White Paper that argued for “a formal, integrated, consistent, 
accountable, and coordinated [conferencing] framework,” spearheaded a Community Youth 
Conferencing pilot that replaced the Wagga Wagga scheme and built on its approach (NSW Law 
Reform Commission 2005). This pilot program operated in six locations and a final review 
found it to be an effective form of intervention (NSW Law Reform Commission 2005). When 
the time came for Parliament to draft the youth justice reform bill that had long been necessary, 
legislators opted for the conferencing approach over the Community Aid Panels.  
 During the passage of the Young Offenders Act, legislators almost unanimously 
supported the statute, although YJCs were the focus of extensive parliamentary conversation. 
Some of the pockets of debate centred around whether victims needed more support, whether 
the Act needed to more directly address Aboriginal culture and communities, and whether the 
police would be successful gate-keepers to the diversionary process (New South Wales Hansard 
18, 19 July 1997). Overall, Parliamentarians seem to have been pleased with the 
operationalization of restorative justice through YJCs, and have been willing to reinforce and 
improve the conference process with subsequent legislative instruments.  
This policy tinkering appears in the number of legislative regulations and amendment 
acts that have been used in the intervening years to amend the Young Offender’s Act as it 
pertains to YJCs. In 1999, Parliament inserted firmer language meant to require further and 
more frequent consideration of whether a young offender’s case was eligible for diversion 
(Young Offenders Amendment (Offences) Regulation 1999). In 2002, a regulation amendment 
introduced even stricter conferencing protocol in cases of admitted arson or bushfires, requiring 
that outcome plans feature specific elements, such as having young offenders volunteer at a 
burns unit in a hospital, watch an education video about the harmful effects of fire, meet any 
willing victims, and pay reparations or assist with clean-up efforts, in addition to any other 
restorative agreements that conference participants deem necessary (Young Offenders 
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Amendment Regulation 2002). A similarly specific list of considerations was provided for 
admitted cases of graffiti in 2009, which were illustrated in the conferencing process that took 
place for Lucas. To reiterate, outcome plans must account for reparation that would include the 
removal of the graffiti work, community service work comparable to removal, or compensation 
payment to assist with removal, as well as mandated participation in a personal development or 
education program (Young Offenders Amendment (Graffiti Offenders) Regulation 2009). Other 
changes to the Act involved further specifications regarding the keeping and disclosure of 
conference records, raising the upper age of eligibility to 21 (for offences committed before the 
young offender turned 18), and requiring that conference participants consider the 
appropriateness of programs designed to provide counselling, rehabilitation, education, 
treatment, and/or training for an offender.iv 
One would expect a thorough implementation process to result from this legislative 
design. The Young Offenders Act is a strong statute with clear and coherent goals. It devises all 
the instruments—principles, personnel, and procedures—that are needed for the operation of a 
restorative justice conferencing mechanism. It further reinforces these tools by mandating a 
programmatic evaluation, thereby generating the opportunity for policy learning and the 
improvement of these precisely developed instruments. Indeed, the Young Offenders Act has 
featured successive amendments and regulations meant to fine tune the YJC process.  
However, the YJC also features three policy design shortcomings that severely limit its 
applicability. First, the mechanism’s eligibility restrictions create substantial constraints on the 
frequency of its use. Second, it relies on a complicated referral process that makes conference 
activation cumbersome for the involved youth justice professionals. And third, it coexists with 
other diversionary tools such as warnings and cautions that are more familiar to the justice 
workgroup and that require less institutional effort. Therefore, in the absence of additional 
motivators, it would be understandable if the New South Wales youth justice system never 
developed a preference for the YJC model. Accordingly, along the axis of implementation, YJCs 
are a mixed bag, with policy design aspects that both facilitate and impede the mechanism’s 
integration with youth justice. Meanwhile, much like FGCs in New Zealand, the YJC is centred 
on the needs of the young offender and can proceed without input from the victim, meaning 




Criminal Procedure Amendment Regulations and Forum Sentencing Conferences 
Efforts to extend legislation to a restorative justice scheme for adult offenders have followed a 
similarly circumscribed trajectory. The forum sentencing intervention program was intended to 
extend the model that was established by YJCs and explore whether a similar conferencing 
approach would be applicable and effective in responding to offending by older individuals who 
were progressing through the criminal justice system. Forum sentencing has since been 
discontinued, as of a departmental decision handed down in early 2018 but remains an 
interesting case for further exploration.  
In this instance, New South Wales opted for a restorative justice mechanism that 
operates as one component of the conventional justice system. Whereas the YJC can be a 
diversionary option that exists in adjacency, forum sentencing is constrained to be exclusively a 
sentencing option for the courts. Compounding this interdependence with conventional justice 
is the fact that all forum sentencing intervention plans must be approved by the referring court, 
which means that this restorative justice program is receiving continuous oversight from the 
New South Wales court system.   
Much like the case of the Young Offenders Act 1997, parliamentarians managed to 
address the bulk of considerations that Groenhuijsen (2000), Leverton (2008), and Lee (2011) 
recommend for restorative justice legislation. The statute fails to offer details regarding facilitator 
selection, training, and certification. But, it clearly defines the mechanism, offers clarification on 
the referral process, provides timelines for the process, and orients the conferences within the 
existing justice system. The Act also specifies the rules of participation, the legal safeguards for 
both the victim and the offender, the responsibilities of oversight for a reparative agreement, 
and the role that the process outcomes can play in further proceedings.  
In another similarity to YJCs, forum sentencing is reliant on its legislative rules and the 
explicitness of the procedures that the regulation creates. This creates statutory coherence and 
goal clarity that could ease the establishment of the legislative program through the provision of 
a clear road map and the reduction of policy confusion (Ingram and Schneider 1990; May 1993). 
The regulation was particularly explicit when it came to establishing operational objectives for 
forum sentencing. The stated goals for the program were to encourage greater participation in 
the justice process, to increase an offender’s awareness of the consequences of their behaviour, 
to promote the reintegration of offenders, to increase victim satisfaction, to strengthen 
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community confidence in the justice sector, and to provide additional sentencing options 
(Criminal Procedure Amendment (Community Conference Intervention Program) Regulation 
2005). In addition, when the regulation was first introduced, it came with several capacity-
building components, such as the creation of program administrators who were responsible for 
overseeing the case referral and management process. However, the administration of forum 
sentencing was subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice and the role of program 
administrator was subsumed by existing department employees. Ultimately, the implementation 
tool of assigning committed personnel was undermined. Nevertheless, because of the clear 
procedural requirements and the limited amount of process innovation allowed to implementers 
and practitioners, the forum sentencing regulation is easily categorized as a strong statute 
(Ingram and Schneider 1990).   
Finally, I consider the process characteristics that shaped the legislative journey of the 
forum sentencing policy. The enactment of this policy was based on attempts to recreate the 
success of the Young Offenders Act in the criminal justice system, but the drafting of this piece 
of legislation was undertaken in fundamentally different ways. Rather than introduce restorative 
justice practices through amendments to an existing Act, or crafting an entirely new Act to 
reform some of the existing criminal justice procedures, forum sentencing was ratified as a 
regulation. Regulations in New South Wales require less iterative work from the houses of 
Parliament; they’re drafted by MPs, tabled for discussion only by special request, and otherwise, 
enacted by a one-time, majority-wins vote. This demands less consensus-building and eliminates 
the finetuning that happens to bills during the amendment process. It also creates legislative 
componentry that has less mandating power, and regulations can be easily overturned or 
disregarded. Overall, they represent legislative addendums that are both easily ratified and easily 
revoked. 
The regulation was originally passed to create a government-funded, restorative justice 
pilot program in 2005 aimed at offenders aged 18-25 years and operating in two local courts 
(People and Trimboli 2007). Based on these results, the New South Wales Parliament elected in 
2008 to formalize the Community Conference Intervention Program into a jurisdiction-wide 
adult conferencing scheme called forum sentencing (Criminal Procedure Amendment (Forum 
Sentencing Program) Regulation 2008). The scheme made very few procedural changes to the 
piloted process, but it did make certain motor vehicle offences ineligible for conferencing, 
remove the 18-25 age restrictions, and direct that previously imprisoned offenders would not be 
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eligible (although this ineligibility limitation was removed by amendment in 2010) (Criminal 
Procedure Amendment (Forum Sentencing Program) Regulation 2008).  
At its outset, the forum sentencing scheme featured a few substantive differences. First, 
victim participation was not initially mandatory. Second, the program originally created the role 
of program administrators, housed within Corrective Services to manage referrals, monitor 
intervention plans, and generally oversee the program. Amendments in 2010 and 2014 changed 
these two features. In 2010, legislators added the requirement for victim participation, and 
included a timeline extension that gave the facilitators 56 days rather than 28 to hold a 
conference (Criminal Procedure Amendment (Forum Sentencing Program) Regulation 2010). In 
2014, an administrative restructuring shifted program management to an operations team 
housed in the Department of Attorney General and Justice, somewhat undermining the resource 
commitment of having full-time program administrators who were legislatively mandated and 
focused on overseeing forum sentencing (Criminal Procedure Amendment (Forum Sentencing 
Program) Regulation 2014).  In addition, Parliament introduced a substantial change to the 
program’s legislated objectives, adding that the reduction of reoffending would be an official 
conferencing goal (Criminal Procedure Amendment (Forum Sentencing Program) Regulation 
2008).  
Making recidivism an official goal for the forum sentencing program would not 
necessarily strike an observer as a fundamental programmatic shift. Restorative justice’s potential 
capacity to reduce reoffending has been both an implicit and an explicit focus of all the 
previously discussed conferencing schemes, and the effect that conference participation has on 
reoffending rates has been a frequent measure of success. But in the case of New South Wales, 
this legislative directive had a significant impact on the program’s trajectory.  Evaluations 
produced evidence that forum sentencing had no significant effect on the rate of reoffending, 
the time elapsed before reoffending behaviour occurred, or on the seriousness of the reoffence 
(Jones 2009; Poynton 2013). As a result, in March 2018, forum sentencing ceased operation, 
with justice sector officials citing the failure of the program either to reduce recidivism or to 
divert offenders away from custody (Internal Communication 2018). While the forum 
sentencing process produces a regularly restorative conferencing outcome because of required 
victim participation, along the dimension of policy design, the mechanism would appear to have 
been ineffectively crafted. As it stands, this is the only example of practice shrinkage in the 
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current case studies and both the goal content of the statute and its less rigorous legislative 
journey may have explanatory power in accounting for this implementation failure.  
Vermont 
Acts No. 148 and 115, Reparative Probation, and Community Justice Centres 
Restorative justice legislation in Vermont differs markedly from the cases of New Zealand and 
New South Wales, largely because the statutory style follows a Wilsonian model.  Vermont’s 
laws are less prescriptive and local practitioners are granted much greater discretion in the 
interpretation and implementation of restorative justice directives. Also, the primary restorative 
practice in Vermont is not conferencing, as it is in the other two jurisdictions, but rather 
restorative justice panels, housed within Community Justice Centres, of which reparative 
probation is one manifestation. 
The Vermont reparative boards and CJCs remain largely autonomous from the 
conventional justice system. While reparative boards are a component of the state’s probation 
program and perhaps characterized as being in lockstep with conventional justice, the operation 
of restorative justice in Vermont is envisioned as an independent and alternative approach to 
justice. The CJC is housed within the community and operated by community members rather 
than by justice sector experts. Also, these centres direct funding towards restorative operations 
at several justice system entry points, implementing everything from conflict mediation, to 
diversionary restorative justice panels, to post-release accountability circles that assist recent 
parolees with their reintegration into the community. These practices certainly require 
cooperation with the conventional justice sphere, and the particularities of reparative boards may 
result in a justice panel model that is primarily a supplementary modification to existing justice 
sector procedures. But CJCs are in use as a separate justice “shop,” a place for community 
members to explore new approaches to conflict resolution and crime management, and cases 
that are referred to a CJC are often fully adjudicated within the centre rather than being returned 
to court.   
 Both Acts are a bit sparse when it comes to addressing the aspects of what I’ve been 
calling the ideal restorative justice statute. Act No. 148, which introduces reparative boards, 
traffics in more details than Act No. 115, which codifies CJCs. The mechanism of the reparative 
board is never fully elaborated upon, but the statute situates the process within the conventional 
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justice system because it defines the reparative board as a condition of probationary sentencing 
(Act No. 148 2000). The statute also defines some of the principles of this restorative practice 
and delineates the process of appointing board members, of creating board bylaws, and of 
guaranteeing participant safety and confidentiality (Act No. 148 2000). However, it does not 
afford additional procedural details and therefore fails to cover the rules surrounding 
participation, the referral process, and the role that restorative agreements will play in the legal 
process. Meanwhile, the CJCs receive even broader swathes of legislative consideration. Act No. 
115 provides a brief overview of the board structure and summary of the centres’ duties. The 
most specific portion is the list of cases that are not eligible for referral to a CJC. It also cites the 
state and federal confidentiality policies to which the CJCs are bound but does not account for 
tailored confidentiality requirements. Furthermore, the Act makes no mention of facilitator 
selection, training, or certification, it does not give parameters for the CJCs’ incorporation into 
conventional justice, and it does not outline any kind of referral process.    
 Despite the sparseness of restorative specifications, these Acts feature interesting policy 
content characteristics that reflect Vermont’s ultimate implementation approach. The 
combination of the two statutes serves to create several implementation motivators, but not 
necessarily through the provision of statute coherence or policy rules as has been a frequent 
policy design approach in the other cases. Instead, the statutes focus on creating a framework of 
programmatic goals and a diffuse network of individuals with different sources of authority and 
therefore different incentives for goal adherence. Act No. 148 creates oversight positions housed 
within the Department of Corrections that are endeavouring to meet governmental measures of 
success such as numerical data points, financial efficiency, and constituent reach. Meanwhile, Act 
No. 115 codifies locally autonomous CJCs that are spread throughout the state and designed to 
respond at the micro-level to community needs. By creating this overlapping authority, the Act 
has diversified its policy centres, and thus incentivized more active policy participation (May 
1993).  
Other than a handful of procedural requirements regarding the composition of the 
reparative boards and the CJC boards, the statutes’ remaining text focuses on establishing broad, 
program-wide goals. These goals include obtaining probationer accountability, compensating 
victims and the community, increasing a probationer’s awareness of the consequences of their 
actions, identifying ways to help a probationer remain law abiding, educating the public about 
restorative justice, and promoting community support for the program (Act No. 148 2000). In a 
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notable restriction, however, Act No. 115 forbids the CJCs from handling cases that involve 
domestic violence, sexual violence, sexual assault, or stalking, except in the instance of DOC-
authorized offender re-entry programs (Act No. 115 2008). This limitation is likely due to the 
controversy within restorative justice literature regarding the appropriateness of a restorative 
dialogue in these instances. There are several experts who oppose the use of restorative justice in 
cases of domestic and sexual violence, and who believe that a meeting with the perpetrator 
creates too many opportunities for revictimization, manipulation, and a reproduction of 
imbalanced power relations, all of which undermine the effects of restoration (Stubbs 2009).  
This Wilsonian model of setting high-level goals without imposing overbearing local-
level rules finds further reflection in a portion of Act No. 148 that introduced restorative justice 
as a codified state policy.  The relevant policy reads as follows: 
It is the policy of this state that principles of restorative justice be included in 
shaping how the criminal justice system responds to persons charged with or convicted 
of criminal offences. The policy goal is a community response to a person’s wrongdoing 
at its earliest onset, and a type and intensity of sanction tailored to each instance of 
wrongdoing. Policy objectives are to: (1) Resolve conflicts and disputes by means of a 
nonadversarial community process. (2) Repair damage caused by criminal acts to 
communities in which they occur, and to address wrongs inflicted on individual victims. 
(3) Reduce the risk of an offender committing a more serious crime in the future, that 
would require a more intensive and more costly sanction, such as incarceration…It is the 
intent of the general assembly that law enforcement officials develop and employ 
restorative justice approaches whenever feasible and responsive to specific criminal 
acts…It is the further intent of the general assembly that such restorative justice 
programs be designed to encourage participation by local community members, 
including victims, when they so choose, as well as public officials, in holding offenders 
accountable for damage caused to communities and victims, and in restoring offenders 
to the law-abiding community” (Act No. 148 2000). 
This quote highlights the unique extent to which Vermont State Law has been infused with 
explicitly restorative rhetoric, providing for a policy directive that is the most expansive in its 
vision for restorative justice implementation and the most conceptually, academically accurate in 
its application of restorative values. 
As an example of how such a statutory inclusion might influence future mindsets and 
criminal justice reforms, one can turn to a progress report for the Joint Committee on 
Corrections Oversight. Submitted by several restorative justice stakeholders, including 
representatives from the Department of Corrections and the Attorney General’s Office 
(Vermont Association of Court Diversion Programs, et al. 2014), the report stated that 
compliance with Vermont’s statutory policy would require “restorative justice options at all 
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intercept points.” It further suggested structural and procedural reforms that would make room 
for all these restorative options (VADP, et al. 2014). The envisioned model had proposals for 
local law enforcement, the pre-arraignment stage, pre-trial services, the sentencing and 
disposition stage, and the offender re-entry stage (VADP, et al. 2014). The report treated the 
proposed restorative overhaul as a logical outgrowth of the state’s explicit commitment to 
restorative justice values. 
 Finally, I address the ways in which policy process characteristics may have factored into 
this case. The legislation did not serve the purpose of establishing new processes and creating 
new justice sector agents; rather, Vermont’s Acts served to codify community-based programs 
that were already operating throughout the state and to integrate restorative justice with the 
Vermont Statutes. Vermont’s restorative journey began in 1994, when growing prison 
populations throughout the 80s that did not correlate to rising crime rates drove Vermont 
policymakers to seek alternative solutions to crime and punishment (Greene and Doble 2000). 
The Commissioner of Corrections spearheaded several system reviews and market analyses, but 
perhaps the most influential report came from a public opinion survey that demonstrated 
rampant discontent with Vermont’s criminal justice system, and that revealed overwhelming 
support for reparative boards—a community-based offender management process imbued with 
restorative values (Greene and Doble 2000). One of the identified concerns was that the state’s 
sentencing options were not varied enough; imprisonment was seen as too harsh in many cases, 
but the other option of probation was viewed as a “do nothing” approach and often deemed not 
harsh enough (Greene and Doble 2000).  The public opinion survey set out to identify which 
additional, intermediate sentencing tools Vermonters favoured and reparative boards were the 
decisive winner (Greene and Doble 2000).  
 After the public’s explicit approval for such a process, Vermont began operating its first 
boards in 1995 using a grant from the federal government (Greene and Doble 2000). By May 
1999, there were 44 boards located throughout the state, relying on volunteer hours from over 
300 board members (Greene and Doble 2000). At this point, the Vermont legislature felt ready 
to commit to a program that had proven to be resilient and widely implementable. This 
commitment came in the form of funding and additional institutional support; a Capital 
Appropriates and State Bonding bill amended the state code to account for the reparative board 
model in the Department of Corrections institutional map and include reparative boards in the 
state budget (Act No. 148 2000).  
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 Vermont’s restorative vision was further reinforced in 2008 when the legislature passed 
an Act that codified the state’s existing Community Justice Centres. The Vermont legislature 
decided that having the disparate centres operate under the authority of a single statute would 
enhance the provision of services, and aid in collaborative efforts with “law enforcement, state’s 
attorneys, state agencies, social service providers, victim advocacy organizations, and other 
community resources” (Act No. 115 2008).  
From this review, a picture emerges of a state with a community-driven restorative 
justice approach. Vermont traded in the professionalized practitioners and explicit legislative 
guidelines for a general, statutory investment in a municipality’s use of restorative justice 
processes. Based only on the codified principles that uphold the restorative justice mechanism, 
Vermont might be said to be the most successfully restorative jurisdiction, with a stated 
commitment and accompanying justice sector buy-in to the notion that restorative justice can 
influence the criminal justice system at all stages and across all institutions. However, restorative 
justice panels do not require victim participation, and CJCs are not focused solely on restorative 
interventions, committing resources to general rehabilitation and reintegration. This means that 
Vermont is reliant on mechanisms that do not guarantee fully restorative processes. In terms of 
the state’s policy success, their restorative justice legislation features a seemingly effective 
Wilsonian model, with clear goals and dispersed programmatic authority. This indicates that 
Vermont has the potential for robust restorative justice implementation, but that 
implementation will vary from region to region. 
Conclusion 
This analysis of the restorative justice statutes that have been enacted in these three jurisdictions 
reveals compelling distinctions both within and between the jurisdictions. New Zealand has 
taken different approaches in its juvenile and criminal justice systems. In the former, the country 
opts for a strong statute that sets out strict, procedural guidelines for a restorative practice that is 
meant to be automatically and mandatorily employed in any juvenile case that progresses beyond 
police cautioning. In the latter, New Zealand’s legislature provides a generalized sentencing 
guideline through a Wilsonian statute, establishing guidelines for determining the suitability of 
restorative justice in cases with a guilty plea or finding of guilt, and then leaving the process 
specifics to the Ministry of Justice and local service providers. This duality makes the country a 
compelling point of observation.  
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 New South Wales has, in contrast, passed legislative acts and regulations that create 
tightly controlled restorative justice mechanisms at both the juvenile justice and the criminal 
justice level. The territory’s strong statutes designed a highly standardized procedure for use in a 
narrow subgroup of criminal cases, wherein limited eligibility criteria and scripted conferencing 
interactions make for a smaller (in application and in scope), more predictable justice process.  
 The third case of Vermont provides yet another collection of policy design decisions and 
unique legislative oversight. Vermont let federal funding and grassroots organizing jumpstart its 
restorative experiment, and established the reparative board mechanism and the Community 
Justice Centres well before the legislature chose to support and codify the programs. Once state 
legislators did take account of restorative justice, they used Wilsonian-style statutes to establish 
broad goals and to loosely sketch the programmatic structure, relying on local actors to continue 
fleshing out the available restorative practices.  
One can evaluate these statutory schemes from the perspective of how well they align 
with restorative precepts and how effectively they might be implemented. Along the axis of 
“levels of restoration,” Family Group Conferences, adult pre-sentence conferences, Youth 
Justice Conferences, forum sentencing conferences, and restorative justice panels can all be 
characterized as restorative. However, FGCs, YJCs, and restorative justice panels can proceed 
without victim participation, meaning that in practice, these procedures do not always produce a 
fully restorative intervention.  
In terms of “checking the most boxes” when it comes to a comprehensive restorative 
justice statute, the cases of the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 in New Zealand, and the Young 
Offender’s Act 1997 and the Criminal Procedure Amendment Regulation 2005 in New South 
Wales offer the most circumscribed restorative processes.  Because of their fully defined nature, 
these legislative mandates feature heavy-handed policy tools, such as provisions aimed at 
implementation and goal coherence that May (1993) positively associates with greater 
implementation effort. This type of policy design could offer greater guarantees that the 
restorative justice mechanism will receive well-regulated use.  
On the other hand, New Zealand’s Sentencing Act 2002 and Vermont’s General 
Assembly Acts 114 and 128, in using lower levels of precision, create opportunities for flexibility 
in restorative practices, therefore making the associated implementation efforts more responsive 
to local needs even as it generates the possibility of inconsistent or uneven implementation.    
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In the next chapter, I begin an overview of the existing evaluations of these mechanisms 
and compile the current results regarding the efficacy and relative success of each restorative 
justice program.  
End Notes
iii Children, Young Persons, and their Families (Youth Courts Jurisdiction and Orders) 
Amendment Act 2010; Children, Young Persons, and their Families Amendment Act 2014; 
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iv Young Offenders Amendment Regulation 2004; Young Offenders Amendment Regulation 
2008; Courts and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2007; Young Offenders Amendment 
Regulation 2002 
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4. IMPLEMENTING RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:  
A SURVEY OF EXISTING EVALUATIONS 
 
As an initial appraisal of the three jurisdictions’ restorative practices, I begin by providing an 
overview of past evaluative studies conducted in New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont, 
respectively. I use these existing evaluations to survey the measures that have already been used 
to assess these various programs, and to review other conclusions about how well the programs 
have been performing. This collection of findings also expands the data available to me for the 
purposes of my own evaluation. In several instances, information remained unavailable to me, 
either because the data was not public or well-recorded, or because I was limited in the people I 
could interview and the types of questions I could ask. I therefore use the results discussed in 
this chapter to supplement my own conclusions. After addressing the findings produced by 
these evaluations, I also filter this survey of evaluative data through the measures of success that 
I’ve described above for assessing restorative justice in particular and for assessing policy design 
more generally. I discuss this method of review more fully below, and then dive into the 
respective evaluations of each jurisdiction.  
Methodology   
My first step was to collect evaluative studies of the restorative justice mechanisms in question, 
including both peer-reviewed, academic reviews of the restorative justice programs and 
evaluations that were sponsored and published by the government. I did not intend to compile 
an exhaustive collection but instead to offer a brief survey of the most recent and the most 
frequently cited papers that spoke to the efficacy of these restorative practices. I hasten to add, 
however, that no single measure of “efficacy” has been applied across the evaluations I survey; 
researchers used an array of metrics and varying expectations to define programmatic success for 
these restorative justice mechanisms. In summarizing the spread of results, I am focused 
particularly on the moments where the employed metrics align with restorative goals and 
principles. Accordingly, I devote a portion of the discussion to differentiating between the 
evaluative objectives of the studies and identifying the ones most relevant to measuring 
restorative success as I’ve defined it in the context of my own research.  
I focus on interpreting the results through Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) expectations for 
restorative outcomes. These outcomes are divided into three general restorative principles—
repairing harm, stakeholder involvement, and community role transformation—and are 
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embodied in practices that focus on amends-making, relationship-building, victim-offender 
exchange, reintegrative shaming, professional role change, norm affiliation, and skill building 
(Bazemore and Schiff 2005). Recall from the previous chapter that one of my primary inquiries 
about these restorative justice mechanisms is how restorative they are; Bazemore and Schiff’s 
framework provides a well-elaborated set of measures for ascertaining the levels of restorative 
success. 
Despite my agreement with the way Bazemore and Schiff (2005) envision and categorize 
restorative outcomes, I reject one element of their framework for evaluating restorative program 
success or outputs.  My concern stems from their decision to measure the successful delivery of 
reintegrative shaming by the reoffending rates of participating offenders. For many reasons, I do 
not believe that the impact on recidivism should be a primary indicator for the success of a 
restorative justice program. It has not been conclusively shown that maximizing the restorative 
nature of a justice intervention maximizes the effect on recidivism. Some studies have identified 
a significant relationship and others have not, and very few have convincingly isolated the effect 
of restoration on an offender’s post-intervention decisions.   
Efforts to further illuminate this effect are stymied by the compounding and tangled 
causes of reoffending behaviour. To illustrate, criminogenic needs—characters, traits, problems, 
and other personal factors that influence the likelihood that an individual will commit further 
crimes—are various and often unchanging (Latessa and Lowenkamp 2005). There are some 
“dynamic” needs—such as who an offender associates with, their attitude and values, and their 
employment status—that can by altered through the process of restorative justice (Latessa and 
Lowenkamp 2005). But there are also “static” factors that remain constant such as family 
background and an existing criminal record. Restorative justice programs cannot readily change 
static factors and cannot easily influence their impact on future offending behaviour. 
Furthermore, most criminogenic needs would only be fully addressed with an intervention that 
was more than simply restorative. For example, a restorative justice conference could reveal that 
a primary contributor to the offender’s criminal motivations was their unemployment, and the 
outcome plan could ask the offender to seek job training. But, the process of educating, 
certifying, and employing a convicted criminal offender is often a matter of connecting that 
offender to social services that provide offender-focused, rehabilitative programming. In short, 
the phenomenon of criminal reoffending is a little too “messy” to be fully accounted for by a 
single justice intervention, even if it is a restorative one. And the reduction of future offending 
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requires offender-centric care that is better characterized as rehabilitative rather than restorative 
and is, therefore, out of place in the limited context of a restorative justice mechanism. All of 
this makes participant reoffending rates an ill-conceived marker for restorative success.  
 I am also interested in the general policy success of each restorative justice mechanism. 
Therefore, where applicable, I employ Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) framework for success to 
further categorize the collection of evaluative results. Recall that this framework distinguishes 
between programmatic success (measured by operational baselines, outcome baselines, resource 
efficiency, and the amount of public benefit), process success (measured by the legitimacy and 
sustainability of the policy), and political success (measured by the government’s ability to frame 
the policy as a legislative victory or failure) (Marsh and McConnell 2012). By accounting for 
success in more general policy terms, I enable a comparison of both the restorative goals and the 
policy goals of each restorative justice mechanism. In the next chapter, I explore the alignment 
of those two sets of goals and analyse where the implementation successes and failures take 
place, whether that be at the intersections or the diversions of these goals. As in the chapter 
above, I begin with New Zealand, then discuss New South Wales, and conclude with Vermont.  
New Zealand 
Because of the originality and influence of New Zealand’s youth justice FGCs, there have been 
several evaluations of the mechanism. Again, this summary by no means covers the extent of 
existing evaluations, but it presents some of the more significant FGC research that’s been 
conducted. Indeed, as will be evident from the following discussion, most evaluations of youth 
justice FGCs have found that the program is meeting its intended goals. However, it is notable 
that the measures of success only address a handful of Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) itemized 
restorative outcomes and apply inconsistent levels of methodological rigor.  
One of the first, major, and oft cited research studies was a report commissioned by the 
Department of Social Welfare and compiled by the Institute of Criminology at Victoria 
University that was meant to review the entirety of the youth justice system and its operation in 
the wake of the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989 (Maxwell and Morris 
1993). The specific review of Family Group Conferences relied on an analysis of 187 youth 
offending cases that were referred to conferencing by Youth Aid Officers in a three-month 
period from September to November 1990, as well as 211 distinct cases that were assigned to 
coordinators from a mix of Youth Aid and Youth Court referrals (Maxwell and Morris 1993). 
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This evaluation was explicitly concerned with investigating whether the CYPF Act was meeting 
the objectives established within the legislation, listed as diversion, accountability, enhancing 
wellbeing and strengthening families, due process, family participation, victim involvement, 
consensus decision-making, and cultural appropriateness (Maxwell and Morris 1993:xvi).  
The same, primary researchers extended their investigation to perform a longitudinal 
study that was published in 2004 as part of the “Achieving Effective Outcomes in Youth 
Justice” research project funded by the Ministry of Social Development (Maxwell, et al.) The 
study used post-conference interviews with a “prospective sample” of about 100 individuals (i.e. 
youth, facilitators, family members, and victims who had recently participated in an FGC), and a 
“retrospective sample” of around 500 interviewees (previous youth offenders who had an 
offence dealt with by an FGC five years prior) (Maxwell, et al. 2004). In this instance, reviewers 
set out with slightly different goals than in the 1993 study. They remained interested in whether 
FGCs were meeting the objectives of the CYPF Act, but they had additional questions about the 
extent to which the conferences featured critical restorative characteristics given the growing 
international buzz about restorative justice (Maxwell, et al. 2004:5).  
These two studies, in combination, provide the most complete view of how well FGCs 
are producing Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) restorative outcomes. The first group of those 
outcomes relates to the extent to which FGCs can repair harm, quantified by how frequently 
young offenders were asked to make amends and given the opportunity to build relationships. In 
the terms that Maxwell and Morris (1993) use, these outcomes are most closely related with the 
goals of accountability and high participation levels. Along those lines, Maxwell and Morris 
(1993) found that almost every single conference from the examined period featured an agreed 
upon outcome plan that imposed some sort of penalty on the young offender; 70 per cent of 
these outcome plans included an apology, about 60 per cent included community work, and 
about 30 per cent included reparation (Maxwell and Morris 1993). It follows that the 
conferences were managing on a regular basis to hold the young offender accountable and 
demand that they make amends. Considering participation rates in this sample of conferences, 
the young person attended in 96 per cent of cases, parents or caregivers attended in 98 per cent 
of cases, and extended family attended in almost 40 per cent of cases (Maxwell and Morris 
1993:75). Clearly, young offenders and their familial network are regularly involved in the 
process. When performing this analysis again in 2004 with an eye to a more specifically 
restorative vision, Maxwell, et al. once again found that the bulk of conferencing experiences 
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were demanding that offenders acknowledge responsibility and repair harms, and that 
coordinators were organizing and facilitating appropriate participation from young offenders and 
their families. However, looking more closely at the quality of participation, the 1993 study 
found that family members felt involved about 60 per cent of the time and young offenders felt 
involved only 30 per cent of the time (Maxwell and Morris 1993). This finding creates concerns 
that some opportunities for engagement are being missed within FGCs.  
These studies found additional trends in conference outcomes that undermine the 
processes of amends-making and relationship-building. One was the prevalence of restrictive 
sanctioning in the FGC outcome plans, which was found in three-fifths of cases (Maxwell, et al. 
2004:22). While curfews and supervised residence are perhaps helpful tools for monitoring 
young offenders, they are not rooted in a restorative understanding of justice. Having a young 
offender report home at a certain time every night does not address the harms caused by the 
criminal incident, nor does it engage additional stakeholders, nor does it transform communities; 
instead, it is a conventional justice mechanism wielded by the state to control offenders. A 
second shortcoming is that only about half of conferences in the sample were able to build 
relationships in a way that addressed effective offender reintegration and enhanced a young 
offender’s wellbeing. Young people were connected to education and training programs, and 
employment opportunities in 30 per cent of cases, and outcome plans featured rehabilitative 
elements in even fewer instances (Maxwell, et al. 2004:22-23).   
The second group of restorative outcomes relates to the extent to which FGCs feature 
substantive stakeholder involvement, which can be measured by the levels of victim-offender 
exchange and reintegrative shaming. Maxwell and Morris (1993) reported that 46 per cent of 
cases featured victim involvement. There were many reasons for a victim’s absence, including 
being too busy, being disinterested in the process, being afraid, and failing to see the value 
(Maxwell and Morris 1993). However, a compelling finding with ramifications for the 
implementation of FGCs was that in one-third of cases, victims had not even been contacted or 
invited to the conference (Maxwell and Morris 1993). It is perhaps unrealistic to envision FGCs 
having 100 per cent victim participation given that the mandatory and widespread use.  The 
more cases that proceed to an FGC, the more likely that coordinators will encounter wary 
victims, or cases with no direct victims at all. However, the inconsistency with which 
coordinators were issuing an invitation to victims in 1993 indicates that victim-offender 
exchange was, at that point, an under-prioritized restorative outcome.  
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The 2004 study did not speak directly to the rates of victim participation, but the 
longitudinal nature of the study did allow the researchers to more precisely investigate the 
relationship between FGC participation and reoffending. Recall that reduced recidivism rates are 
cited as a potential outcome of effective reintegrative shaming (Bazemore and Schiff 2005). 
Accordingly, Maxwell, et al.’s (2004) methodology included a multivariate analysis of the life 
outcomes of the retrospective sample to determine that conferences were playing a small but 
statistically significant role in reducing recidivism, and isolated certain conference outcomes 
(such as a young person feeling genuine remorse, feeling supported and understood by 
participants, and feeling prepared for and included in the process) as having the power to reduce 
the likelihood of future offending.  
The third group of outcomes relates to the extent to which FGCs promote community 
role transformation, which is captured by professional role change, norm affirmation, and skill 
building. As may be apparent from the goals that Maxwell and Morris (1993) identified as the 
primary objectives of the CYPF Act (diversion, accountability, enhancing wellbeing and 
strengthening families, due process, family participation, victim involvement, consensus 
decision-making, and cultural appropriateness), community-based outcomes were not a central 
concern of the research. This reflects, in part, the reduced amount of attention that community-
based issues receive from the actual Oranga Tamariki Act 1989; the Act is generally much more 
concerned with offenders and their families. Where community-related findings were available, 
however, they mostly illustrated shortcomings in the capacity of the FGC to produce 
professional role change. These shortcomings included the persistent and influencing 
participation of justice sector professionals and the lack of innovation in conference timing and 
location. For the first issue, Maxwell and Morris (1993) found that families and young offenders 
reported that social workers, coordinators, or Youth Advocates were primary decision makers in 
almost 20 per cent of cases, which directly undercuts the restorative dimension of professional 
role transformation. For the latter issue, Maxwell and Morris (1993) found that 76 per cent of 
cases were held before 4 pm and 66 per cent of cases were held at DSW offices. While having a 
conference at 10 am in the morning at departmental facilities is not inherently anti-restorative, 
the story that these numbers tell is of a process that is being scheduled for the convenience of 
the justice professionals rather than for the convenience of the community stakeholders. 
Potential participants may be unable to get off work to attend a conference during the day or 
may not feel comfortable in seemingly “official” government offices.  
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This same set of studies is the best source of information for the transition from a 
discussion of restorative-specific goals to an assessment of what can be said about the general 
policy success of the FGC. Using Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) distinctions, I examine what 
these reports illuminate about the programmatic success, the process success, and the political 
success of FGCs. First, at the programmatic level, Maxwell and Morris (1993) provide a nuanced 
discussion of the ways in which the present implementation of the FGC meets the goals that 
they identified for the CYPF Act. In the end, they found that FGCs were meeting their intended 
objectives. Even areas discussed above as not meeting their restorative potential are tallied by 
researchers as fulfilling legislative expectations. For example, Maxwell and Morris (1993:184) 
explain that the overall level of victim participation in the juvenile justice system is higher now 
that FGCs are an option. Therefore, FGCs are meeting their baseline with regard to increasing 
victim involvement. This is why it is important, as Marsh and McConnell (2012) point out, to 
know where success is declared along the spectrum of policy results. 
Second, at the process level, Maxwell and Morris (1993:188) find some inherent 
contradictions in the CYPF Act and the justice mechanism it creates, which potentially 
undermines the legislative sustainability of the policy. Most notable is the issue of attempting to 
create a culturally appropriate, community-inclusive, restorative process while still having state-
sanctioned, justice sector professionals wield the mechanism on behalf of the state. Nessa Lynch 
(2007) also investigated the procedural legitimacy of the FGC by focusing on one of the typical 
concerns that justice sector experts have about restorative justice—its capacity to provide ample 
legal protections for participants—and examined the robustness of legal rights for young FGC 
participants. She found that while the process was designed to protect a young offender’s right 
to due process and their right to an attorney, and that those aspects were engrained in the 
legislation, there remained three areas of concern. Young offenders may not have equal and 
consistent access to legal advice and representation in advance of their conference; FGCs did 
not always establish the facts of the offence which is necessary for a procedurally legal admission 
of guilt; and conference outcomes produced irregular and under-monitored penalties for young 
people (Lynch 2007).  
Another, more recent review of FGC practice provides compelling insight into the 
mechanism because of the perspective from which it produced its findings. Researchers 
commissioned by the Department of Child, Youth and Family used interviews with Youth 
Justice Coordinators as the primary methodological tool, exploring FGCs through the lens of 
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expert voices (Slater, Lambie, and McDowell 2015).  The study aimed to explore the 
development of conference practice and the differences in coordinator approaches throughout 
the country. Discussions with active coordinators revealed a handful of consistent themes. First, 
coordinators stated that they supported the concepts introduced by the CYPF Act such as family 
empowerment, and unanimously believed that FGCs were an effective youth justice tool (Slater, 
et al. 2015). Second, coordinators reported that there were six process variables that contributed 
to optimal conference performance: “functional relationships with Police, quality preparation, 
tailoring the process to the young person, linking the young person with their local community, 
victim input into the process, and the qualities of individual coordinators” (Slater, et al. 
2015:628). Third, coordinators provided insight on programmatic shortcomings such as: lack of 
police buy-in; high conference volumes; lack of quality pre-conference information about the 
offence, the offender, and the victim; poor monitoring of plans; and institutional inability to 
prioritize victim engagement as the primary issues (Slater, et al. 2015). 
With regards to whether FGCs experience political success as defined by Marsh and 
McConnell’s (2012) framework, none of these evaluations made many contributions to 
understanding the policy’s popularity. However, along the metrics where information was 
available, there are clearly moments of success from a restorative viewpoint and from a general 
policy stance, and there remain opportunities for growth at both levels as well.  
Adult pre-sentence conferencing has not experienced nearly as much academic 
investigation as has the FGC. The comparative absence of research means that the evaluations 
that do exist are expectedly less diverse and less thorough in their consideration of potential 
outcome measures. However, even with lowered expectations, the existing reviews are 
astonishingly limited in scope and only evaluate this mechanism along two restorative 
dimensions: the reduction of reoffending, which can be a measure of effective reintegrative 
shaming, and victim satisfaction, which can be a measure of effective victim-offender exchange 
(Bazemore and Schiff 2005).  
The Ministry of Justice has conducted three, multi-year studies that investigate whether 
participation in a restorative justice conference can have a statistically significant effect on the 
reduction of reoffending (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2011a, 2014, 2016a). All three studies 
found evidence that conferences could lead to some reduction in reoffending, particularly within 
the first 12 months after proceedings adjourned (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2011a, 2014, 
2016a). The most recent study concluded that conferenced offenders had a 15 per cent lower 
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reoffending rate in the first year of observation (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2016a). 
However, this effect became less substantial over longer follow-up periods, and five years after 
an offence both conference participants and offenders from the control group had similar 
reoffending rates (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2016a).  
The other evaluative offerings come from two surveys of victim satisfaction, one 
published in 2011 and one in 2016 (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2011b, 2016b). The latter 
of these surveys found that 84 per cent of victims were satisfied with their conferencing 
experience, 93 per cent felt well-prepared for the meeting, 60 per cent had more positive views 
of the criminal justice system following their participation, and 80 per cent would recommend 
the process to others (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2016b). These statistically significant 
successes, coupled with generally positive perceptions of restorative justice’s philosophy and 
potential, have encouraged further investment in conferencing and requests for expanded 
practice in the criminal justice sector (Hughes 2016; Fox 2015).  
Taken together, these results offer a limited picture of pre-sentence restorative justice 
conferencing. The possible impact on reoffending rates indicates that pre-sentence restorative 
justice conferencing may be producing an intervention moment of effective reintegrative 
shaming wherein there is a lasting impression left with the offender. And, the reports of 
generally positive victim experiences provide a sense that these conferences are regularly 
facilitating mutual, productive, and respectful victim-offender exchanges. Recall that victim 
participation is mandatory in order for this type of adult pre-sentencing conference to take place, 
and the increased victim engagement is therefore inherent in the structure of this justice 
mechanism.  
In trying to piece together an image of general policy success, it is important to note that 
at the programmatic level, adult restorative justice conferencing had few objectives embedded 
directly into its legislative mandate. There are, therefore, fewer baselines available for 
determining whether these results spell programmatic success for the conferencing process; 
however, the reduction in reoffending and the levels of victim satisfaction can certainly be 
clocked as public benefits. At the process and political levels of policy success, these evaluations 
once again paint a vague picture. But the call for further investment and the support for the 
positive program results indicate some legislative sustainability that reinforces a narrative of 
process-based success.  
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New South Wales 
In similar fashion to the FGC in New Zealand, the impulse to assess the youth justice system 
has kept a spotlight on the Youth Justice Conference in New South Wales. As such, there are 
several reports that have examined various aspects and efficacies of YJCs. While certainly 
offering some information about the restorative success of the mechanism and 
recommendations for how to improve the conferencing process, most of these evaluations are 
focused on supporting the youth justice concepts that were institutionalized with the passage of 
the Young Offenders Act and measuring the conferences against those legislatively sourced 
objectives. This means that the available statistical evidence speaks mostly to whether the New 
South Wales conferencing process is achieving its policy baselines, rather than how effectively 
restorative the mechanism is.  
Examining these evaluations more closely, they are in large part helmed by the Bureau of 
Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), an agency in the New South Wales Department of 
Justice. The BOCSAR studies have covered a range of procedural components using several 
outcome measures, including the effect of conferencing on reoffending, the type of outcome 
plans and their rates of success, the experiences of conference participants, the cost efficiency of 
conferencing, and the levels of public support for conferencing. Again, I will sort some of these 
findings according to their related, restorative outcome.  
First, I consider the amount of amends-making and relationship-building taking place. A 
BOCSAR study surveyed the conference characteristics and resulting outcome plans of 1,894 
YJCs that took place in 2010 (Taussig 2012:3). In this instance, researchers found that apologies 
were a component of outcome tasks in almost 80 per cent of cases, meaning that conferences 
were seeking resolutions with an eye towards the offender making amends. However, 
community work was only included in 28 per cent of plans (compared with 60 per cent of FGC 
plans) and financial reparation was only included in 8 per cent of plans (compared with 30 per 
cent of FGC plans) (Taussig 2012:4, Maxwell and Morris 1993). This means that while amends-
making may be a focus of the YJC, it is not being actioned in multiple ways, relying instead on 
an apology as the primary tool for this restorative component. The more limited application of 
amends-making contrasts with the YJC’s more robust use of relationship-building opportunities. 
Personal development was a component of almost 70 per cent of outcome plans (compared 
with under 50 per cent of FGCs), and YJCs were able to connect young offenders to 
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behavioural programs, educational programs, and work options in most cases (Taussig 2012, 
Maxwell, et al. 2004).  
 Second, I consider the amount of victim-offender exchange and reintegrative shaming 
that features in the YJC. In New South Wales, victims attend conferences in just over 40 per 
cent of cases, making it comparable to the level of victim involvement in FGCs in New Zealand 
(Taussig 2012). The victims that do participate were satisfied with the handling of the case in 86 
per cent of cases (Wagland, Blanch, and Moore 2013). However, BOCSAR performed the most 
longitudinal investigation of victim experiences, interviewing participating victims immediately 
after the conference and again four months later. This second, follow-up conversation revealed a 
drop-off in victim satisfaction, with participants reporting that they remained pleased with the 
outcome in only 73 per cent of cases (Wagland, et al. 2013). The reasons they gave for their 
adjusted answers were: feeling as though the process ultimately had no impact on the offender; 
learning that the offender had not complied with the outcome plan; and being frustrated with 
the lack of communication from facilitators in the aftermath of the conference (Wagland, et al. 
2013).  
Using reoffending rates as an indicator of the mechanism’s efficacy and the level of 
reintegrative shaming that occurs, BOCSAR produced moderately promising results in a 2002 
study where researchers found a slight reduction in reoffending (Luke and Lind 2002). However, 
attempts to replicate these findings with a more rigorous methodology revealed that researchers 
could not locate any significant relationship between participation in an FGC and a reduced 
proclivity towards recidivism (Smith and Weatherburn 2012).  
Third, I consider the amount of skill building, norm affirmation, and professional role 
change that is happening in YJCs. Again, outcomes that relate to community transformation are 
infrequently employed in the existing evaluations. BOCSAR did investigate the level of police 
buy-in into the YJC process by tallying the number of conference referrals as compared to other 
police actions against young offenders (Moore 2011). The results indicated that police were 
rather less likely to pass the case onto a YJC; if the offence was not serious enough for the 
Children’s Court, officers would simply opt for a caution and if the offence seemed too severe 
for cautioning to be appropriate, police would send the case onto the court (Moore 2011). This 
lends a sense that some juvenile justice actors, in this case the police, have not experienced levels 
of professional role change that allow them to freely embrace and engage with the existing 
conferencing mechanism.  
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Shifting gears to a discussion of general policy outcomes, YJCs certainly experience 
programmatic success. The principles undergirding the Young Offenders Act are a young 
offender’s acceptance of responsibility, the strengthening of the family, the provision of 
development and support services to prevent future reoffending, to enhance the rights of 
victims, and to be culturally appropriate. As can be seen from the discussion above, most of 
these principles are facilitated by the YJC’s restorative outcomes, meaning that the conferences 
largely meet their legislative objectives. BOCSAR also completed a cost-benefit analysis of the 
YJC, comparing the process to cases that are handled by the Children’s Court (Webber 2012). 
This review found that the average cost of a YJC is 18 per cent less than the average cost of a 
comparable Children’s Court matter, leading researchers to conclude that the YJC scheme is 
more cost-effective than court (Webber 2012). This resource efficiency reinforces the 
programmatic success of the YJCs. 
Finally, process success and political success are less explicitly evaluated, but BOCSAR 
did find evidence of widespread public support for the YJC process, via 2,530 telephone 
interviews with New South Wales residents (Moore 2012). Over 85 per cent of respondents 
agreed that community work should be a feature of criminal sentences and over 87 per cent of 
respondents believed that victims should have an opportunity to confront the offender with the 
harms caused by their behaviour (Moore 2012). While respondents suggested that restorative 
justice outcomes such as “making amends” and “working in the community” were less effective 
as crime prevention measures when compared to other options like “better mental health care” 
and “better supervision of young people,” respondents did agree that “receiving a prison 
sentence” was less effective than restorative approaches in addressing future offending (Moore 
2012:1). Public support for the scheme is a good indicator that legislators will continue to 
support the policy as well.  
This diversity of evaluative measures is once again abandoned when it comes to reviews 
of the forum sentencing intervention program. Despite still being managed by BOCSAR, the 
studies in this case are reduced to unidimensional explorations of the potential impact on 
recidivism, apart from an initial evaluation of the efficacy and applicability of the pilot program 
that was published in 2007. This early evaluation aimed to investigate four outcome-related 
concerns: whether conference participants were satisfied with the process, whether participating 
offenders were accepting responsibility for their behaviour, whether key stakeholders supported 
the program, and whether the program was having any impact on the rate of reoffending 
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(People and Trimboli 2007). Aligning these outcomes with their restorative counterpart 
according to Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) categorizations, responsibility acceptance is related to 
amends-making, participant satisfaction is related to victim-offender exchange, and reoffending 
rates are once again used to measure the effectiveness of reintegrative shaming. The multi-
dimensional review found that the “vast majority” of participants “were satisfied with the 
various stages of their conference,” that offenders felt held accountable by the conferencing 
process (although victims did not always agree with that assessment), and that not enough time 
had passed for accurate observation of reoffending but that initial rates were low and promising 
(People and Trimboli 2007).  
Considering general policy success measures, the central outcomes that were used in this 
study do not offer a complete picture of all three components. At the programmatic level, 
having offenders accept responsibility for their behaviour and reducing reoffending are both 
legislative objectives, meaning that there is some early evidence that forum sentencing 
conferences were meeting those baselines. At the process level, investigating the amount of 
support of key stakeholders speaks to the legitimacy of the policy and its level of coalition 
support. Given that key stakeholders were largely in favour of the program and believed the 
conferences met their objectives, this evaluation would indicate that forum sentencing enjoys 
some process success as well (People and Trimboli 2007). At the political level, this evaluation 
does not provide insight into the level of policy popularity. On top of these findings, the review 
produced a few recommendations, largely concerned with how to best expand the program, 
broaden eligibility criteria, improve guidelines for victim participation, and direct magistrates in 
the use of program referrals (People and Trimboli 2007).  
Since then, BOCSAR has looked exclusively at the relationship between forum 
sentencing and the reduction of reoffending. Despite the existence of six other objectives within 
the legislation against which to measure conferencing success, BOCSAR conducted two reviews 
of forum sentencing’s impact on reoffending rates (Jones 2009; Poynton 2013). In both 
instances, researchers found no correlation between participation in the forum sentencing 
program and reduced future recidivism. However, both reports also acknowledged that there is 
nothing to suggest that the program was not meeting its other objectives.   
This singular dimension of evaluation limits attempts to understand forum sentencing’s 
restorative and policy success. First, as discussed above, the reduction of reoffending, despite its 
centrality to governmental justice aspirations, is a flawed tool for measuring restorative success. 
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Therefore, other than the data from the pilot program that suggested that forum sentencing 
facilitated amends-making and effective victim-offender exchange, there is limited evaluative 
information about how well forum sentencing was producing restorative outcomes. Second, 
there are other legislative objectives established in the regulation that have been left out of the 
narrative. The 2007 findings uphold the following regulation goals: greater participation in the 
justice process, increased offender awareness of their actions, increased victim satisfaction, and 
the provision of additional sentencing options. It follows that forum sentencing might have been 
a source for both restorative and programmatic-level success, but recent BOCSAR evaluations 
failed to effectively test for that. And despite the possibility that forum sentencing was 
experiencing some pockets of success, the closure of the program remains an obvious area of 
process-level failure.  
Vermont 
Although CJCs are a cornerstone of Vermont’s restorative justice model, as well as a relevant 
piece of the state’s legislative context, they are difficult to monitor at the state-wide level due to 
their localized services and because they do not always systematically record their offender 
management. Perhaps this is why rigorous, academic reviews of the CJC network were not 
available. However, there has been substantive evaluation of the reparative probation program, 
and reports have produced largely positive findings that speak to the capacity for restorative 
outcomes and general policy-based success.  
Considering the first group of restorative outcomes—repairing harm, encapsulated by 
amends-making and relationship-building—there are several studies that provide relevant 
insight. One initial study was based on a content analysis of 52 reparative board meetings that 
were captured on film. The goal was to determine the restorative extent of this sample of 
meetings, using an evaluative method derived from “thick” and “thin” definitions of restorative 
justice (Karp 2001). In thin restoration, an offender engages in “any positive act” that benefits a 
crime victim or an affected community; in thick restoration, that “positive act” must directly link 
to the identified harm caused by the specific offence under discussion (Karp 2001). For example, 
thin restoration would be achieved if an offender performed community service in the same 
town where they committed the offence, while thick restoration would require a more direct 
community service order such as a proven graffitist having to remove their work (Karp 2001). 
Based on these characterizations, and coding for common restorative elements in a reparative 
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agreement (apologies, restitution, community service), the authors found that 44 out of the 52 
meetings demonstrated substantive restoration but only 10 of those met the standards for thick 
restoration (Karp 2001). Although Karp (2001) is using different language, “thick” and “thin” 
restoration are related to the prevalence of amends-making in the restorative outcomes and, as 
stated above, Karp found that amends were present in a clear majority of panels. Although this 
outcome pointed to the potential of reparative boards to be amply restorative, there were a few 
“red flags” in which typical restorative tools became more akin to retributive sanctions. The 
concerns arose due to the arbitrary application of consequences in some reparative agreements, 
leading researchers to call for a more thorough training process that would emphasize the 
importance of linking the imposed agreement to the crime’s harms (Karp 2001). 
A second study by Karp, Sprayregen, and Drakulich (2002) employed an extensive, 
outcome-based evaluation by identifying four dimensions of desired program goals and 
assessing, along each dimension, several related program outputs (Karp, et al. 2002). The four 
dimensions and their assigned measures were: community involvement, measured by the level of 
decision-making authority the boards had, the number of total board members, and contributed 
board hours; victims’ needs, measured by length of time to case termination, victim satisfaction, 
amount of restitution ordered, number of restitution orders that were fully paid, and victims’ 
desires to have the program continue; community restoration, measured by community service 
requirements, community service site satisfaction with participating offenders, board member 
satisfaction, and board members’ sense of membership in their community; and finally, 
responsible offenders, measured by the prevalence of impact learning tasks (i.e. requiring a 
probationer to write an essay about the harm caused by their crime, or attend a victim impact 
panel), the prevalence of competency tasks (i.e. treatment, counselling, drug or alcohol 
screening, and other education programs), the proportion of cases with successful reparative 
agreement completion, the amount of probation violations, and the number of offenders 
rearrested within one year of a board meeting (Karp, et al. 2002).  
The final two dimensions of community restoration and offender responsibility also 
relate to amends-making and relationship-building. Karp, et al. (2002) found that 65 per cent of 
offenders were assigned community service and of those service assignments, 92 per cent of 
them took place in the town where the crime took place. This result indicates that the reparative 
boards ask the offender to engage meaningfully with the affected community when working to 
make amends. A further finding that spoke to the process of relationship-building was that 78 
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per cent of offenders felt that their participation in reparative probation increased their sense of 
membership in the community (Karp, et al. 2002).  
Considering the second and third groups of restorative outcomes—stakeholder 
involvement and community role transformation—I examine the first two dimensions discussed 
in Karp, et al.’s 2002 study. Addressing victim needs is one way to strengthen victim-offender 
exchange, and while the Vermont Department of Corrections is committed to soliciting more 
victim participation and increasing training around issues of victim engagement, the fact remains 
that only 9 per cent of panels featured victim participation (Karp, et al. 2002). Despite being a 
small population, participating victims were satisfied in 82 per cent of cases and felt supported 
by the board in 99 per cent of cases, suggesting that reparative panels effectively support victims 
once the victims are involved in the process (Karp, et al. 2002). Community involvement is a 
component of professional role change. Reparative probation boards are operated by 
community volunteers rather than justice sector professionals, and Karp, et al. (2002) found that 
these boards have a high level of decision-making authority and increasing numbers of 
volunteers. This has positive implications for the transference of control of the restorative 
justice mechanism from the criminal justice system to community members.  
Finally, researchers conducted interviews with active board members to determine the 
role and attitudes of the program’s practitioners (Karp, Bazemore, and Drakulich 2004). 
Responses from these individuals were used to provide insight into the level of engagement with 
victims, offenders, and communities. Interviewees reported that the meeting can be a significant 
turning point in the life of a participating offender, and that there is great value in shoring up 
justice processes with volunteer involvement because offenders may respond better to 
intervenors who perform their job without a monetary incentive (Karp, et al. 2004).The board 
members revealed that they value victim participation, feel confident in their ability to provide 
successful and safe restorative services to victims, and would like to see more victim 
involvement (Karp, et al. 2004). And finally, board members feel more connected to their 
community because of their involvement in the process, find that citizen involvement produces 
a more democratic approach to criminal justice, and experience the reparative boards as 
significant opportunities for offenders to rebuild a community’s trust (Karp, et al. 2004). These 
results reiterate the themes discussed above: that Vermont’s reparative boards provide 
compelling opportunities for amends-making, relationship-building, victim-offender exchange 
(despite the infrequency of victim participation), and professional role change.   
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Shifting the conversation to address the policy success of Vermont’s reparative 
probation program does not require a substantial reformulation of the mandating goal content 
and evaluative measures. Recall from Chapter 3 that Vermont’s legislature implemented a 
complete restorative vision as the guiding impetus for its criminal justice system. This means that 
if Vermont’s justice mechanisms are producing restorative outcomes, then they’re experiencing 
programmatic success because the legislative objectives are effectively restorative objectives. 
Accordingly, Vermont’s reparative boards appear to be, from the existing results, satisfactorily 
restorative and therefore satisfactorily successful at the program-level. Once again, the 
evaluations address process and political success in much less explicit terms, but a 2014 report 
from justice sector stakeholders emphasizing the need for strengthened restorative justice 
processes indicates a baseline of coalition support for the policy.   
Conclusion 
Based on the above evaluation results, the performance of each restorative justice mechanism is 
becoming clearer. In New Zealand, FGCs certainly experience levels of both restorative success 
and policy success. However, those two axes of performance are not always in sync. FGCs do 
not require victim participation, and so while some evaluations consider it a policy victory that 
conferencing has managed to increase victim inclusion in youth justice, Daly’s (2016) description 
of restorative justice states that a mechanism must feature a meeting between a victim and an 
offender to be restorative. Meanwhile, the outcome plans that are being produced by FGCs, 
with the prevalence of apologies, community service, and reparation, indicate that amends-
making is a consistent area of restorative success. But the professionalization of Youth Justice 
Coordinators and the standardization of the FGC process—two goals of the Oranga Tamariki 
Act 1989—come at the cost of how well the FGC can create community role transformation. 
This constrained capacity is illustrated by the frequency with which young offenders and their 
families reported that they had little say in the process, or that they simply adopted an outcome 
plan because it was suggested by the facilitator. 
 Adult pre-sentence conferencing was subjected to fewer reviews, making it harder to 
pinpoint where it stands along the spectrums of restorative success and policy success. On the 
one hand, the very design of the process means that when a conference does happen, the victim-
centric approach makes it one of the mechanisms that is more intrinsically restorative and 
consistently producing stakeholder involvement. The high rates of victim satisfaction reinforce 
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this finding. However, the only other program measure that was tested was the ability of pre-
sentence conferencing to reduce recidivism among participating offenders. As discussed, I am 
sceptical that this is an effective measure for restorative success. However, the limited finding 
that conferencing may contribute to less reoffending can speak to how well the mechanism is 
assisting with general, criminal justice policy aspirations. Outside of the areas of victim-offender 
exchange and potential reductions in reoffending, the available evaluations do not have much to 
say about the capacity of pre-sentence conferencing to meet its restorative and legislative goals.   
 In New South Wales, Youth Justice Conferences face points of contention between 
restorative goals and legislative goals that are similar to those faced by FGCs. The mechanism is 
intended to be restorative, and has restorative expectations written into the Young Offenders 
Act 1997 such as respecting the desires of victims and holding young offenders accountable. But 
the mechanism also focuses, by legislative design, on a standardized (and in this case scripted) 
process that centres the needs of the young offender, shifting some of the program outputs away 
from being restorative and towards being rehabilitative. As in the case of FGCs, victims 
participate less than half of the time, meaning the mechanism only qualifies as restorative in less 
than half of its iterations. However, YJCs move even further in the direction of rehabilitation 
than FGCs. The results above showed that YJC outcome plans featured lower rates of mandated 
community service and restitution payments, two options that contribute to amends-making, 
while including more personal development opportunities for the young offender such as job 
training and education programs. Interestingly, evaluations of the YJC did produce more insight 
into other elements of the mechanism’s policy success, given the assessments of public opinion 
and cost efficiency. Again, the generally favourable views of the policy and the fact that YJCs are 
less expensive than Children’s Court demonstrate that the mechanism is a relatively successful 
policy endeavour, even as it falls short according to some restorative metrics.  
 Forum sentencing conferences are hard to classify as anything other than a policy failure. 
The program’s closure demonstrates that, regardless of whether its perceived programmatic 
failings were accurate, it was unable to boast enough policy success to withstand the lack of 
support from the criminal justice sector. On the restorative side, there are not many evaluative 
results with which to assess levels of restorative success. Early reviews of the pilot program 
indicated some restorative potential, but recent studies only addressed the effect of forum 
sentencing on participant recidivism. The intervention program’s inability to have an impact on 
reoffending rates does not, in my opinion, have any bearing on its restorative success.  
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 In Vermont, reparative probation represents the best example of restorative success 
along the dimension of community role transformation. The restorative justice panels that 
handle reparative probation cases are staffed by community volunteers with relatively high levels 
of authority and both offenders and panel members have self-reported feeling more involved in 
the community following a panel experience. However, reparative probation clearly falls short in 
its capacity to produce successful victim-offender exchange and restorative justice panels have 
the lowest rate of victim participation. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are situated to produce 
outcomes that still repair harms, even without victim input. The rate at which reparative plans 
order that community service work take place in the town where the crime was convicted 
indicate that these panels are asking offenders to work with the community that was affected by 
the crime. Finally, the fact that restorative success and policy success are so closely interwoven in 
Vermont bodes well for the state’s future investment in restorative justice. 
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5. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF  
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS 
In this chapter, I discuss my own evaluation of restorative justice practices in New Zealand, 
New South Wales, and Vermont. This evaluation relies on two sources of data. The first is a 
quantitative set of statistical indicators from the various restorative justice programs, gathered 
from the bevy of data collected and collated on behalf of the relevant criminal justice systems. 
The second is the qualitative reporting of restorative justice practitioners from New Zealand and 
Vermont, collected through interviews that I conducted. The mix of top-down, statistical 
information and bottom-up, individualized accounts of restorative justice practices offers 
multiple angles for analysing and assessing the realities and successes of the restorative justice 
programs in these three jurisdictions. First, I describe how and why I assembled certain numeric 
variables; then, I explain my interview methodology; finally, I present the results from both 
datasets and discuss what those results say about the use of restorative justice in various 
legislative contexts.  
Methodology    
The goal of the quantitative assessment was to enable a longitudinal evaluation of the criminal 
justice systems in all three jurisdictions. The practitioners that I spoke with, depending on how 
long they had worked in their position, had some long-term insights regarding the development 
of restorative justice. But those qualitative accounts were largely designed to create a present-day 
snapshot of these restorative justice practices. Accordingly, I wanted to determine whether 
multi-year, numerical data could uncover additional narratives along a lengthier timeline. For 
example, I wanted to know if I could chart the robustness of restorative justice practices since 
their introduction or correlate the inflection points of systemic indicators with changes in 
restorative practices. For this purpose, I collected jurisdiction-wide information for several 
outcome measures, as informed by policy design expectations and by restorative justice 
expectations. Below, I reiterate the theoretical frameworks for outcome expectations; then, I 
discuss the measures that were identified and created, and the justification for using them during 
this evaluation. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, Marsh and McConnell (2012) suggest three categories of 
success that can be used to measure a policy’s ultimate outcome. Those categories are 
programmatic success (measured against operational outcomes and objective achievement), 
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process success (measured by the legitimacy of ratification and the sustainability of the 
legislation), and political success (measured the popularity accrued for a government and the 
legislative act). Based on these three categories, I was able to develop several variables to provide 
insight into restorative justice policy success. However, as Marsh and McConnell (2012) caution, 
success can be a highly subjective measure. Therefore, I also employ May’s (1993) research 
design and explore levels of implementation effort as a potentially indicative outcome. Not all 
the variables that I drafted were ones for which I was able to collect complete data, so I will now 
list my aspirations for a complete set of statistical information and describe the limitations and 
ultimate usability of the variables.  
 Starting with indicators of implementation efforts, I sought information about usage 
frequency.  I wanted to know both the total number of cases that were referred to restorative 
justice and the total number of cases that progressed through the restorative mechanism. While 
some of this data was available in each jurisdiction, I wanted to know these numbers for every 
year from the passage of the legislation to the present. In New Zealand, I was able to compile 
the total number of referrals and the total number of Family Group Conferences for the years 
2006-2017 (Response to Official Information Act Request), and the number of adult restorative 
justice conferences for the years 2011-2017 (Response to OIA Request). In New South Wales, I 
was able to compile the total number of referrals and the total number of Youth Justice 
Conferences for the years 1999-2016 (Juvenile Justice NSW Annual Reports) and the total 
number of forum sentencing conferences for the years 2009-2016 (Corrective Services NSW 
Annual Reports). In Vermont, I was able to compile the total number of referrals and the total 
number of reparative probation panels for the years 1995-2015 (Vermont Department of 
Corrections Annual Reports).  
 To a similar end, I wanted to know the number of administrators and facilitators 
employed for the administration of the restorative justice mechanism. Again, this information 
was partially available. In New Zealand, I collected the number of Youth Justice Coordinators 
and Youth Justice Managers for the years 2007-2018 and was unable to find information about 
the total number of conference facilitators for adult restorative justice (Response to OIA 
Request). In New South Wales, I collected the number of program administrators and 
conference conveners for the years 1999-2007 but was unable to find information about the 
total number of conference facilitators for forum sentencing (Juvenile Justice NSW Annual 
Reports). In Vermont, the data took a slightly different shape and I was able to collect the total 
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number of restorative justice boards in the state and the total number of community volunteers 
staffing those boards for the years 2000-2017 (Vermont Department of Corrections Annual 
Reports).  
 Another identified indicator of both implementation efforts and programmatic success is 
resource allocation to the restorative justice program. Accordingly, I tried to collect budgetary 
information regarding all three jurisdictions’ investments in restorative justice, as well as 
complementary budgetary spending on other justice system efforts to provide points of 
comparison. Unfortunately, accurate budgetary data was difficult to obtain, and I was only able 
to gather multi-year spending reports for FGCs in New Zealand and YJCs in New South Wales. 
And even in those cases, it was difficult to put the dollar amounts into context and to 
understand the relative scale of the restorative justice budget. In the end, I was forced to drop 
spending considerations from my final analysis.  
  There are additional gauges of programmatic success, measured by the capacity of 
restorative justice processes to achieve their operational objectives. However, as discussed 
previously, these restorative justice programs can be evaluated against both restorative objectives 
and legislative objectives. Academics have already developed several measures of restorative 
procedural success. Recall from Chapter 1 that rates of restitution, rates of outcome plan 
compliance, rates of offered apologies, perceived fairness and adequacy of outcome plans, 
satisfaction levels of participants, and recidivism rates were all suggested variables for 
determining the effectiveness of restorative justice (Presser and Van Voorhis 2002, Poulson 
2003, Latimer, et al. 2005). However, usable data is not readily available for all these restorative 
indicators; as was also discussed in Chapter 1, evaluating researchers often must perform their 
own surveys or peruse local level records to collate this type of information. This was certainly 
the reality in New Zealand, New South Wales, and Vermont, where restorative outputs were 
inconsistently recorded and unevenly obtainable. 
Furthermore, there remains room to innovate regarding how one might quantify 
restorative success. For example, none of the current measures do a good job of probing levels 
of what Bazemore and Schiff (2005) call community role transformation, even though 
community members represent central stakeholders in restorative practices. The frequency and 
robustness measures that I mentioned above, such as how many cases proceed through the 
restorative justice mechanism and how many restorative justice facilitators there are, might speak 
to the amount of restorative skill building that is taking place, as they indicate how many 
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individuals are gaining experience with restorative justice. But, jurisdictions might consider 
tracking the total number of restorative participants in a fiscal year to truly understand how 
many people are actively engaging with restorative justice. Presser and Van Voorhis (2002) also 
suggested using measures of community well-being—amount of volunteerism, crime levels, and 
feelings of safety—as potential indicators of community role transformation and how well 
communities are incorporating restorative values.  
Ultimately, I was not able to seek new datapoints regarding restorative success, nor 
collect new information on a longitudinal and jurisdiction-wide basis. Therefore, the variables 
regarding restorative success that I was able to compile were related to the number of reparative 
plans that were agreed to and the rate of successful completion of those plans. In New Zealand, 
the number of reparative agreements produced by Family Group Conferences were available for 
the years 2008-2017 (Response to OIA Request), while the number produced by adult pre-
sentence conferencing was available for the years 2016-2017 (Response to OIA Request). There 
were no data available on successful completion of those reparative plans. In New South Wales, 
the number of reparative agreements produced by Youth Justice Conferences and the number of 
successfully completed agreements were available for the years 2002-2016 (Juvenile Justice NSW 
Annual Reports). There was no comparable information available for forum sentencing 
conferences. Similarly, Vermont did not have readily accessible statistics reflecting the number of 
reparative probation plans and their rate of successful completion. I had also hoped to collect 
information regarding participants satisfaction levels, but none of the jurisdictions were tracking 
or publishing this data on a regular basis. Therefore, I used the existing survey results discussed 
in the previous chapter. These results are certainly a suitable stand-in, and participant 
perceptions are examined intermittently enough that one can almost piece together a 
longitudinal evaluation. But, best practice would be for these jurisdictions to request and record 
feedback from every restorative justice program participant, such that participant perceptions 
can be continually aggregated and used to interrogate the performance of the program.   
 Another empirical touchstone for restorative justice, favoured by several evaluating 
researchers and mentioned in the list of existing measures above, is based on the reoffending 
behaviour of participants. Academics have identified the most rigorous and statistically accurate 
method for tracking the recidivism rates of participating offenders and measuring the relative 
impact of restorative justice on those rates. This method entails the long-term tracking of 
participating offenders in comparison with a control group of non-participating offenders, with 
93 
 
efforts made to match offence type and other criminological factors (Latimer, et al. 2005, Strang, 
et al. 2013). I could not perform this type of analysis myself, and the three jurisdictions were not 
tracking or publishing the reoffending rates of restorative justice participants, and so I am reliant 
on an aggregation of existing accounts of the statistical impact on recidivism. However, as 
introduced in the last chapter, I am hesitant to embrace fluctuations in reoffending behaviour as 
a decisive statistical indicator of restorative justice efficacy. Recidivist behaviour finds its cause in 
overlapping criminogenic needs; to address all those needs is beyond the scope of a single 
restorative justice intervention, especially considering that the restorative interaction is meant to 
be as equally focused on victims and the community as it is on offenders. 
 For similar reasons, it is unlikely that restorative justice will have a macro-level impact on 
the criminal and youth justice system where it has been implemented. As William Wood (2015) 
explains, crime rates and incarceration rates are a complex, social reality that fluctuate in 
response to several factors. Only a handful of those factors are dependent on the specific justice 
intervention strategy; meanwhile, socio-political and economic trends such as unemployment 
rates and average incomes have powerful, correlative relationships with offending while being 
unaffected by justice system responses (Wood 2015). It follows that the impact of restorative 
justice on the criminal justice system would be negligent at the macro-level, despite being a 
potential influencer at the individual, micro-level.  
However, the relevant statutes in these three jurisdictions introduce legislative goals that 
are related to wider criminal justice and youth justice practices, indicating that the policy was 
designed to have broad, reformative impact. These more expansive legislative objectives include 
minimizing the severity and invasiveness of justice interventions, rehabilitating and reintegrating 
criminal offenders, protecting the rights of offenders, and reducing the risk of future reoffending 
and the need for incarceration. While I did not necessarily anticipate that these bigger picture 
changes could have a measurable impact on the overall incarceration rate, I did want to know 
whether these reformative legislative packages, with their restorative justice componentry, could 
produce any cultural changes in the justice system. There are ways in which a justice system can 
become more restorative, even when using mechanisms that do not fall squarely under the 
definition of restorative justice. Examples of these “restorative adjacent” options would be 
increased restitution payments to victims of crime, or increased use of community service 
orders. These options do not necessarily constitute a restorative justice mechanism in full, nor 
do they undermine or divert from conventional justice. An offender can be subjected to a 
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punitive and lengthy prison sentence in the same breath that they are ordered to pay restitution 
to a victim of their crime. However, I wanted to investigate whether these indicators could be 
used to measure a shift to a more restorative culture within the justice system. Therefore, I also 
sought information about the number of community service sentences issued in each 
jurisdiction, as well as the number of offenders ordered to pay restitution and the number of 
victims receiving restitution payments.  
It is possible that these efforts at a numerical assessment would produce more robust 
results if applied in the context of a large-n study. This type of expansive review is an important 
direction for future research. Maximizing the number of restorative statutes under investigation 
would strengthen the capacity for quantitatively based conclusions and allow for reiterative 
assessment (looking at similar statutes across several jurisdictional contexts). Furthermore, a 
larger sample size would enable the use of a control group—comparative examples of restorative 
justice efforts that are unlegislated—to isolate and determine the effect of legislation on 
restorative justice practices. However, as shown by the amount of missing data in my evaluation, 
the current data landscape of restorative justice precludes these methodological options. Until 
restorative justice programs do a better job of consistently recording and publishing a more 
nuanced account of their procedural output, studies will be confined to smaller sample sizes. 
Despite the narrowed nature of my numerical assessment, I also performed a qualitative 
analysis, giving me another source of information with which to address restorative and policy 
success. I made the decision to use the voices of restorative justice practitioners as my primary 
source of qualitative data because of their unique position as the restorative justice actors most 
directly responsible for interpreting jurisdictional directives and implementing practices. I used a 
partially open interviewing style wherein I had a general template of questions and had certain 
closed inquiries and topics that I had to address, but also allowed interviewees to direct the 
conversation according to their interests and their perspective. The set of questions that I used 
are listed in Appendix 1. Unfortunately, New South Wales had tighter restrictions when it came 
to conducting independent research within its youth justice and criminal justice sectors and 
denied my requests to contact and interview conference facilitators and conveners who managed 
Youth Justice Conferences and forum sentencing conferences. Ultimately, in New Zealand I was 
able to speak with two Youth Justice Coordinators, one Youth Justice Manager, five adult 
conferencing facilitators, one adult conferencing coordinator, and one police prosecutor. In 
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Vermont, I interviewed five employees of Community Justice Centres throughout the state and 
the current Department of Corrections Director of Community and Restorative Justice.  
What follows is a series of results taken from both the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, with a discussion of their relation to my primary research questions. In determining 
how the relevant statutes affect the practice of restorative justice in each jurisdiction, and the 
ultimate success of those practices, I focus on four themes. First, I address the robustness of the 
restorative practice, or how frequently the restorative justice mechanism is used. Second, I test 
whether the introduction of restorative justice can cause cultural changes in the justice system. 
Third, I investigate the extent to which the criminal justice system supports and promotes the 
use of restorative justice. Fourth, and finally, I use conclusions about the relative success of each 
mechanism to discuss some of my general findings regarding the relationship between those 
successes and the mandating legislation.  
Results    
Robustness of Practice 
As explained above, I measured the robustness of the various restorative justice practices by 
tracking the number of referrals, the number of completed restorative procedures, and the 
number of administrators and facilitators employed to manage the mechanism. Then, to give 
further context to what proportion of criminal cases are being handled by restorative justice, I 
compare the number of referrals to the total number of cases passing through the system in 
general.  
 In the case of Family Group Conferences in New Zealand, the number of referrals to 
conferencing has declined steadily between the years of 2008 and 2017, dropping from 9,253 to 
5,648. Logically, this has led to a similar drop in actual conferences held, with 9,196 conferences 
taking place in 2008 and 4,957 taking place in 2017. However, this change in conferencing 
frequency is likely due to New Zealand’s concerted efforts to divert young offenders and reduce 
their contact with the justice system.  As proof, the 9,253 conferencing referrals in 2008 
accounted for just over 25 per cent of the 35,311 young offenders identified by law enforcement 
that year; in 2017, the 5,648 conferencing referrals accounted for almost 42 per cent of the 
13,459 young offenders identified by law enforcement.  
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In a correlated development, the number of Youth Justice Coordinators and Youth 
Justice Managers has shrunk given the lower demand for conferences. However, amendments to 
the Oranga Tamariki Act in 2017 now mean that 18-year old young offenders are eligible for 
conferencing. The expectation is that this will create a surge of conferences and a renewed 
demand for administrators, and the Youth Justice Coordinators that I interviewed described 
their efforts to prepare accordingly with new hires and newly designed and standardized training 
programs. These expected increases will likely be captured in future fiscal year reports. 
 In the case of adult pre-sentence conferencing in New Zealand, the number of referrals 
has grown drastically, with 2,252 cases being referred in 2011 and 12,867 cases being referred in 
2017. The cases that have progressed to a conference have also followed an upward trend, but 
with a steadier growth rate, increasing from 1,360 conferences in 2011 to 2,401 in 2017. The 
spike in referrals dates to the Sentencing Act amendments in 2014 that required judges to refer all 
eligible cases to restorative justice options prior to sentencing. New Zealand practitioners 
indicated that this change has frontloaded the administrative work, rather than creating more 
conferencing opportunities. Coordinators receive more referrals from the courts, but after initial 
reviews and conversations with both the victim and the offender, they find that there is a plateau 
in how many cases are appropriate for conferencing. Remember that adult pre-sentencing 
conferencing in New Zealand is reliant on the victim’s willingness to participate, and 
coordinators find that victim interest is the limiting factor in converting more referrals to 
conferences. Interestingly, this means that any further increase in the robustness of this 
restorative justice mechanism would rely on cultural changes and shifts in the attitudes of crime 
victims rather than legislative or programmatic adjustments.   
 In New South Wales, the number of referrals to Youth Justice Conferences has 
fluctuated over the years rather than following one, singular trendline, but is currently at a 




Figure 1. Youth Justice Conferences in New South Wales. The number of referrals to Youth Justice Conferences 
and the number of conferences held, 1999-2016.  
This could be considered a successful aspect of New South Wales’ attempts to deescalate the 
actions taken against young offenders, or it could be considered an inability to fully integrate 
restorative justice into the jurisdiction’s diversionary toolbelt. Looking at Figure 2 below, the 
youth justice system has successfully transitioned to a greater reliance on non-court procedures 
in the way it deals with young offenders.  
 
Figure 2. Young Offenders proceeded against by court action versus non-court action in New South Wales, 
2001-2016. 
 
Because Youth Justice Conferences in this jurisdiction are a diversionary option, they should be 
captured in the growth of non-court actions. However, the number of YJCs has been decreasing 
in recent years, indicating that even as non-court interventions proliferate, YJCs have not 
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from the previous chapter, which indicated that police officers preferred to refer an offence to 
the Children’s Court once it was too serious for cautioning. Therefore, New South Wales may be 
making inroads in operating a less punitive youth justice system, but seems to be falling short 
when it comes to creating a robust restorative justice mechanism. 
Meanwhile, the number of forum sentencing conferences encountered similar 
fluctuations, but the highest number held in a year was 535 conferences in 2012. For a criminal 
justice sector that processed 745,590 criminal offenders that same year, it’s evident how sparsely 
forum sentencing was applied while it was still in operation.   
 Finally, in the case of Vermont, the number of referrals to reparative probation have 
remained relatively stable, fluctuating between 1,300 and 1,800 referrals per year, for the last 
fifteen years. These numbers indicate that the restorative manifestation of reparative probation is 
maxing out at less than twenty percent of the total probation population in Vermont, which 
typically averages at over 5,000 offenders in a fiscal year. But it is important to remember that 
reparative probation is only one portion of the restorative work that is happening at Community 
Justice Centres. The CJCs are of varying sizes, and manage very differently proportioned 
caseloads, but there are currently twenty spread throughout the state and, at the higher capacity 
centres, administrators reported that they process about fifty new cases every month. That 
means that one CJC may be handling as many as 600 cases per year and that restorative practices 
are likely being applied to more than the 1,800 individuals who qualify for reparative probation.  
 Interestingly, the services that exist beyond reparative probation lend both a robustness 
in numbers and a robustness in local restorative energy. The CJC administrators that I spoke 
with were much more interested in the community initiatives that they had a hand in organizing. 
These included projects such as treatment programs for drug-related crimes and other, 
homegrown court-diversion programs. Administrators considered reparative probation a service 
option that they had to provide to get the necessary funding from the Department of 
Corrections, but the other restorative justice projects clearly inspired much more passion. This 
illustrates one of the upsides to granting greater discretion to local-level implementers; even 
though legislating bodies have less control over the final product, the capacity for innovation 





The Creation of a Restorative Culture 
Another element of macro-level impact that I wanted to investigate was whether the 
introduction of restorative justice into a jurisdiction might be accompanied by a more restorative 
culture within the justice system. Wood (2015) explained why several system-wide indicators 
may not respond to criminal justice reforms because complex and interwoven social factors are 
drivers of these statistics as much as jurisdictional practices. Yet, I wanted to know whether the 
practice of restorative justice might produce different procedural preferences and greater interest 
in mechanisms that I call “restorative adjacent,” such as community service orders and 
restitution payments to victims.  
 In New Zealand, the results are split. There are fewer community service orders (CSO), 
with youth sentences dropping from 423 CSOs in 2000 to 114 CSOs in 2017. Similarly, there 
were 24,291 CSOs for adults in 2003 and 20,229 in 2017. For youth justice, the decrease is likely 
due, once again, to the overall decrease in young offenders receiving official sentences. However, 
for adult offenders, there are some sentencing options that are on the rise, including community-
based sentences like supervision and home detention, as well as incarcerating sentences. This 
means that the reduction in community service orders is not simply explained by across-the-
board reductions in court-ordered sentences; rather, the justice system is experiencing shifts in 
sentencing preferences and CSOs do not appear to be an increasingly valued option. On the 
other hand, New Zealand has demonstrated increasing interest in restitution payments for 
victims of crime. The amount of money distributed for victim restitution increased from $21 
million in 2008 to $26 million in 2017.  
 New South Wales has experienced very similar trends. The number of young offenders 
sentenced to community service has decreased from 625 in 2000 to 177 in 2016. Although, I 
would, again, attribute this change to the shrinking number of youths who proceed to court. 
However, there is also a reduction in the number of CSOs issued to adult offenders, with 5,673 
in 2000 and 3,532 in 2016. This decline cannot be attributed to generally shrinking court 
sentences and may indicate reduced judicial interest in community service as a punitive measure. 
That being said, New South Wales sentenced 112,125 criminal offenders in 2000, meaning that 
CSOs, even then, only constituted 5 per cent of criminal sentences and were never an 
excessively used sentencing option (in 2016, CSOs were 2 per cent of criminal sentences). 
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Looking instead at victim reparation, much like in New Zealand, the annual distribution of 
restitution payments increased from $56 million in 2000 to $77 million in 2014.  
 The use of restorative adjacent practices in Vermont also does not piece together into a 
straightforward narrative. The total numbers of hours that offenders worked under a community 
service order increased steadily from the mid-90s until 2010 but has tapered off in more recent 
years. Similarly, restitution payments increased from $2.3 million in 1990 to $8.7 million in 2004. 
But in 2004, the Vermont legislature established the Restitution Special Fund which generates 
revenue through a fifteen percent surcharge on criminal and traffic fines and created the 
Restitution Unit to enforce and collect court-ordered restitution, removing the responsibility 
from the Department of Corrections. While the institutionalization of a separate governmental 
agency devoted to victim restitution highlights a jurisdictional commitment to victim reparation, 
I was unable to find the Restitution Unit’s payment records, meaning that I do not have 
evidence to show whether this institutionalization has also resulted in better monetary support 
for victims.  
 Taken together, it’s difficult to draw a firm conclusion about whether restorative justice 
mechanisms can create a generally restorative culture. Certainly, all three of these jurisdictions 
have demonstrated a strengthening commitment to appropriate compensation and support for 
victims of crime. This is a step in the right direction for creating a justice sector culture that 
acknowledges the needs of victims as important stakeholders in the resolution of crime and 
conflict. However, there is limited evidence that these jurisdictions are similarly interested in 
sentencing options that are less punitive and more restorative. It could be argued that 
community service orders are not actually a restorative adjacent sentencing tool. There is 
concern within movements for criminal justice reform that community service can be used to 
publicly shame offenders who must perform tasks like highway clean-up, and that it continues 
the legacy of using criminal offenders for unpaid labour (Bazemore and Maloney 1994). The 
alternative argument is that community service orders can engage an offender with their 
community, creating more opportunities for reintegration, and that service work is a more 
productive and reparative use of the offender’s time (Bazemore and Maloney 1994). Regardless, 
the trends in these three jurisdictions do not indicate that community service orders have 
become a preferred sentencing practice, meaning that there is no evidence at present that 
restorative justice mechanisms produce a sentencing culture that values community service, even 
though community service is often a common feature of restorative outcome plans.  
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While my tests were not particularly conclusive, this is a line of questioning that should 
be further pursued in the study of restorative justice. Does the introduction of restorative justice 
into a jurisdiction via legislative mandate change the overall culture of the justice system? This 
question could be answered with more extensive data and a larger sample size, and answers 
could be further supplemented through interviews with more of the justice sector gatekeepers, 
including judges, police officers, and prosecutors.    
Systemic Support for Restorative Justice 
As Chapter 1 explained, justice sector workgroup theory identifies a set of challenges for 
effective criminal justice reform. Recall that workgroup theory holds that justice professionals 
behave as repeat actors in a system with recurring procedures. These workgroups reward 
patterned behaviour and create an engrained culture that can be resistant to change. As a result, 
it is interesting to investigate the ways in which restorative justice practice is influenced by the 
existing workgroups. I wanted to interrogate the possibility that the legislative mandates that 
were enacted in these jurisdictions helped to overcome some of the workgroup reticence to 
restorative justice. This set of results is based on my interviews with practitioners.   
 In all three jurisdictions, and across all the relevant restorative justice mechanisms, the 
level of systemic support was regionally various, and the interviewed practitioners did not have 
one, coherent narrative to report. The Youth Justice Coordinators in Dunedin, New Zealand 
acknowledged that they had a good rapport with local police and that they had built strong 
relationships with local service providers. These local service providers helped when crafting 
effective outcome plans because they enabled coordinators to connect young offenders and their 
families to rehabilitative and educational programs. However, these practitioners also admitted 
that they were lucky to be working in the Otago region and that other areas of New Zealand did 
not have as many social services at their disposal.  
 The possibility that these relationships are not as well-formed elsewhere in the country is 
reinforced by the findings of Slater, et al. (2015), which were introduced in the previous chapter. 
Based on interviews with Youth Justice Coordinators, Slater, et al. (2015) identified several 
problem areas that impeded effective FGC practice. Many of these issues were related to 
shortcomings in systemic support, including lack of police buy-in and a flawed flow of 
information from the police and the courts. Coordinators identified instances where police had 
deterred victims from attending FGCs, illustrating how reticence from law enforcement can 
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impede the restorative capacity of the conferencing mechanism. Coordinators also discussed the 
occasions during which police officers and Youth Court judges were unable to provide necessary 
information in a timely and accurate fashion, showing that the youth justice system still struggles 
to consistently enable best conferencing practices.    
 Similarly, facilitators for adult pre-sentence conferences, almost across the board, felt 
that they did not have much buy-in from local police. Because referrals for this mechanism come 
from the court, and because investigating officers are not encouraged to attend the conference 
the way they are for FGCs, this lack of police commitment does not necessarily constrain the 
operation of these pre-sentence conferences. But it does reinforce the notion that restorative 
justice may be regarded with scepticism by other justice system professionals. Interestingly, the 
police prosecutor that I interviewed contradicted the story about unsupportive police officers, 
insisting that the police force viewed restorative interventions favourably. He did admit that 
there was a widely held view that many offenders, especially recidivist offenders who were 
familiar with the system, would agree to restorative justice conferencing just to get sentencing 
reductions.  But he maintained that this occurrence did not undermine the value of restorative 
justice or its capacity to be an effective justice intervention.  
What produces this disconnect in the beliefs of practitioners and police and why do 
practitioners assume that police officers are unconvinced about the usefulness of restorative 
justice? One possible explanation is that the police prosecutor was inaccurately reporting the 
opinions of the police force because current social and political directives dictate that police be 
more open-minded to system reforms, including restorative justice initiatives. He may have also 
edited his answers in front of me because he believed that I was a sympathetic to the restorative 
justice movement. Alternatively, it seems possible that facilitators have unfairly attributed a 
reticent mindset to police because they have their own biases about the roles and attitudes of law 
enforcement.  
 As a further contribution to this discussion of the police-practitioner relationship, CJC 
administrators in Vermont described their efforts to engender productive interactions with local 
police agencies. In each of these interviews, administrators described a unique and personal 
process in which they had to craft a special working relationship with a police chief, or hone 
appropriate police cooperation over the course of repeated exchanges. As such, it becomes 
apparent that police buy-in to restorative justice is not manufactured by a legislative mandate. 
Rather, the law enforcement workgroup is brought on board through ongoing interactions with 
103 
 
the restorative justice mechanism. This might explain the miscommunication between facilitators 
and police in New Zealand; because adult pre-sentence conferences do not require practitioners 
and investigating officers to work together closely, there is no opportunity to develop the 
relationships that produce shared visions and symbiotic restorative justice efforts.  
However, a facilitator and coordinator for adult pre-sentence conferences who worked 
in the Auckland area remained doubtful that the criminal justice system in New Zealand could 
ever generate appropriate support for restorative justice. She operates in an area of New Zealand 
that creates unique challenges, namely that she had a self-reported caseload wherein over 80 per 
cent of the offenders she was working with were non-white. The majority were Māori or Pacific 
Islander, and she also dealt with many non-white immigrants. Already, she’s working in a justice 
context that is vastly different from those that exist elsewhere in the country, navigating 
communities that do not match the country’s general demographic breakdown and taking 
referrals from a court system that is over-policing, over-arresting, and over-prosecuting 
individuals from those communities. Even with higher Māori representation in the Auckland 
area, there is no scenario in which non-white offenders should constitute over 80 percent of the 
caseload. Understandably, this facilitator was much more sceptical of New Zealand’s 
commitment to criminal justice reform. She felt that restorative justice conferencing was a 
Western extension of a Western justice system, designed to control Māori communities and 
impede the creation of Māori-centric justice processes. This speaks to the concern introduced in 
Chapter 1, that the standardization of restorative justice disqualifies indigenous innovators from 
the process. This practitioner verified this fear, critiquing the facilitator training process and the 
way it excluded esteemed community members from their natural roles as mediators of conflict 
resolution. She experienced all justice sector professionals—judges, police officers, and 
attorneys—as antithetical to her goals for community empowerment and victim-offender 
restoration.  
 One final, compelling aspect of systemic support comes not from justice sector 
professionals, but from governing political parties. This issue was raised by a conferencing 
facilitator from Dunedin, New Zealand who felt that any improvements to restorative justice 
and any further establishment of a restorative culture would require back-to-back terms of a 
Labour government. Specifically, she believed that restorative progress required the nurturing of 
communities and care for others over self, which would manifest in public support for and the 
enactment of progressive, socialist policies. The particularities of this belief may be personal, but 
104 
 
the truism that they represent—that policy inculcation requires continued, governmental 
investment—is valid, and supported by Marsh and McConnell’s (2012) representation of the 
political aspects of policy success.   
General Discussion 
Finally, I deduce four primary discussion points from my assessment of each restorative justice 
mechanism. These findings are based on the results of the evaluation discussed above, including 
the results from the survey of existing assessments, from the collection of longitudinal justice 
statistics, and from the interviews with practitioners. Ultimately, this is a discussion of trade-offs: 
how the design of any restorative justice mechanism requires a choice about which of the three 
restorative dimensions—harm repair, stakeholder involvement, and community role 
transformation—a jurisdiction is going to prioritize. There are no examples in this case study 
where a mechanism is successful along all three dimensions, and it is unclear how well a 
jurisdiction can fulfil all these disparate expectations while still producing a restorative justice 
mechanism that the justice system is both capable of and interested in wielding. As such, I 
believe that these mechanisms and their establishing legislation represent jurisdictional 
compromise in the design and practice of restorative justice. 
 The Family Group Conference is a well-integrated justice mechanism and as a policy 
component of the youth justice system has been quite successful; however, the mechanism 
fluctuates in its restorative capacity and often falls short along the dimensions of stakeholder 
involvement and community role transformation. Adult pre-sentence conferences offer the best 
example of effective delivery of stakeholder involvement, given the focus on victim 
participation, but that focus also limits the scope of the mechanism and make it a less central 
policy for the New Zealand criminal justice system. The Youth Justice Conferences, despite its 
procedural similarities to FGCs, is falling short as both a restorative mechanism and a youth 
justice policy. Its restorative success is constrained by the increasing focus on the personal 
development of young offenders, at the cost of the conference’s ability to repair harms, involve 
stakeholders, or transform communities; its policy success is constrained by the complicated 
referral system, restricted eligibility, and the lack of committed use by the police force, leading to 
the conference’s ebbing vitality as a diversionary tool. The closure of the forum sentencing 
intervention program makes that mechanism the clearest example of policy failure, while the lack 
of data about forum sentencing conferences makes it difficult to characterize the mechanism’s 
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restorative success. Community Justice Centres and the restorative services they provide, 
including restorative justice panels, stand as the most compelling examples of success along the 
dimension of community role transformation. However, this success comes at the cost of victim 
involvement and effective victim-offender exchange. Meanwhile, CJCs are also a unique example 
of policy success because Vermont chose to align its legislative goals with restorative goals, 
making it an official policy of the jurisdiction’s criminal justice system to have accessible, 
effective, and robust restorative services. Using these final assessments, I now consider how the 
compromises in each jurisdiction have produced these restorative justice landscapes. 
 The first site of compromise is the level of control that the jurisdiction cedes to its local 
communities. This is exemplified in the difference between the strong statutory directives 
favoured by New Zealand and New South Wales, and the Wilsonian model that was 
implemented in Vermont with high level goals and local discretion in how to meet those goals. 
In New Zealand, for both youth and adult offenders, control of the restorative justice 
mechanism remains firmly in the hands of the conventional criminal justice institutions and the 
professionalized justice sector. For the FGC, this control is exerted by the procedural specificity 
of the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, which tightly demarcates the conference process and enables 
careful administration. Youth Justice Coordinators were the most likely of the various 
practitioners to cite the authoritative legislation when discussing their facilitation efforts, and the 
Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 was described as existing at the centre of their restorative practice. 
For adult pre-sentence conferencing, this control is exerted by allowing judges to retain 
discretion over final sentences, and by using Ministerial practice guides to direct facilitator 
behaviour. The conference offers a brief respite from the conventional justice system, and 
conference facilitators are granted a bit more leeway than their counterparts in youth justice, but 
offenders are still having their cases fully adjudicated by conventional justice. The offender’s 
interactions with the restorative justice mechanism can be used as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing, but the mechanism has no independent control over the trajectory of the offender’s 
case. In both cases, this level of jurisdictional control guarantees a procedural uniformity and 
makes the criminal justice system very willing to use the mechanisms, but it also impedes the 
extent to which a nuanced and restorative dialogue between all stakeholders can influence the 
justice outcome. 
 New South Wales attempts to find a middle ground in which the jurisdiction wields even 
more intense control over the activation process of the restorative justice mechanism but then 
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lets the mechanism take over and fully adjudicate the case. This is true for both YJCs and forum 
sentencing. Strict eligibility requirements and complicated referral processes create a bottleneck 
that allows New South Wales to closely vet the cases that proceed to restorative justice. 
However, that bottleneck ends up being too tight; forum sentencing never experienced a large 
case load and YJCs are being overlooked in favour of other justice mechanisms like cautioning.  
 On the other end of the spectrum, Vermont relinquishes substantial control to its local 
Community Justice Centres which are empowered to innovate in their provision of restorative 
services, who are granted real autonomy in the management of cases, and who rely on volunteers 
from the community rather than justice professionals. The state expects CJCs to provide certain 
services in accordance with DOC initiatives, such as reparative probation, and reparative 
probations is overseen by the sentencing court. But implementers are encouraged to pursue 
other, localized programs, simply with the expectation that those efforts align with the broader, 
restorative vision issued by the state. As discussed above, this discretion spurs passion among 
CJC administrators for their personal restorative projects and innovation in the centre’s available 
justice responses. It also accounts for why CJCs and restorative justice panels provide the best 
example of effective community role transformation because Vermont allows restorative justice 
to move out of the formal, professionalized context of conventional criminal justice and into a 
space where community members wield the mechanism. Of course, this has consequences for 
how well the state can track each CJC, making it hard to know the full scope of restorative 
justice in the jurisdiction.   
 The second site of compromise is how much the jurisdiction is willing to constrain the 
mechanism for the purposes of prioritizing victim participation. On one end of the spectrum is 
adult pre-sentence conferencing, which guarantees victim involvement and arguably does the 
best job of balancing the needs of victims and offenders. On the other end are FGCs, YJCs, and 
restorative justice panels, all of which allow the restorative justice mechanism to proceed without 
victim input. Adult pre-sentence conferencing achieves effective victim-offender exchange 
because the procedure was designed to be victim-centric. This raises the question: does a 
restorative justice mechanism need to be built for victims to produce practices that adequately 
manage this balance between victim and offender? Offenders are the catalyst for the entire 
process, and they are always going to be on the receiving end of systemic support as the justice 
sector works to address crime and its causes. Therefore, it is possible that the only way to 
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counter this naturally-occurring focus on offenders is to manufacture an extensive, procedural 
focus on victims if the resulting exchange is to be equal.  
However, prioritizing victim participation comes at the cost of the applicability of the 
restorative justice mechanism. Adult pre-sentence conferences and forum sentencing 
conferences (before they were discontinued) are both limited components of their respective 
justice systems. As evidenced by the incremental growth of pre-sentence conferences even in the 
face of added referrals, it is very possible that the number of cases that are appropriate for victim 
participation and have victims willing to participate has a natural plateau. Perhaps the mechanism 
cannot grow into a primary justice response without substantial cultural changes in how victims 
view their role in the justice process. Meanwhile, on the other side of the spectrum, FGCs, YJCs, 
and restorative justice panels experience much more extensive use.  
On top of that, these mechanisms allow for the participation of offenders who are not 
entirely repentant; this was illustrated by the events that took place at the hypothetical restorative 
justice panel that Eric attended in Chapter 2. Eric began the panel meeting by blaming the car 
salesman for not having a guardrail around the parking lot, which would have been 
inappropriate if the car salesman was in the room. Eric’s attitude might have disqualified him 
from participation in New Zealand and New South Wales. But, Vermont’s more flexible 
mechanism, despite not being fully restorative, meant that Eric still got to benefit from a 
restorative-minded intervention, and the panel successfully shifted his perception of the incident. 
It follows that criminal justice systems may want graduated, restorative options—a mechanism 
that can invite victim input in its maximally restorative moments but still enjoy the upsides to 
broader offender participation in its less restorative iterations.  
 The third site of compromise is the extent to which the jurisdiction wants the restorative 
procedure and its outcomes to be predictable. This compromise is related to the first question of 
how much discretion is granted to local practitioners, as the creation of localized practices is one 
way a jurisdiction can lose control of a mechanism’s predictability. In general, any capacity for 
innovation and procedural responsiveness is going to result in less consistent outcomes. This 
represents a substantial point of conflict for restorative justice and harkens back to the fears of 
academics that were discussed in Chapter 1, namely how much of a mechanism’s restorative 
nature is sacrificed during the regulation and standardization process. This question is best 
embodied in the design of the FGC. The FGC represents an extensively managed process, born 
from a statute that powerfully institutionalizes the conferencing procedure and professionalizes 
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the facilitator role. This management is part of what enables the mechanism’s easy integration 
with the youth justice system, allowing for the level of quality control and procedural legitimacy 
required of modern criminal justice tools.  
 However, the routinization of the FGC raises questions about whether the mechanism is 
producing its outcomes in a restorative manner. Chapter 4 also showed that despite the 
prevalence of amends-making efforts in FGC outcome plans, young offenders and their families 
often felt uninvolved in the decision-making process and adopted plans because they had been 
suggested by the Youth Justice Coordinator rather than produced by participant dialogue. This 
means that FGCs are making young offenders say the right thing (70 per cent have to apologize) 
and do the right thing (60 per cent have to perform community service), but this might 
occasionally be the result of apologies, restitution, and community service being inserted into 
outcome plans without true dialogue and without genuinely addressing the harms in need of 
repair. 
 As other examples of how jurisdictions ensure predictability, New South Wales relies on 
its scripted conferencing interactions for both YJCs and forum sentencing conferences. New 
Zealand manages adult pre-sentence conferences by ultimately disposing of cases with the 
familiarity of conventional justice. However, Vermont does not rely as strongly on a need for 
predictable outcomes. Instead, it prioritizes local autonomy and innovation, and makes its peace 
with regional variation in restorative practice. But, the dispersed training and reliance on non-
professionals mean that Vermont’s criminal justice system may not be able to guarantee the 
same level of quality control and consistency within its restorative justice mechanisms.  
 The fourth and final site of compromise is whether the jurisdiction is willing to invest 
appropriately in the restorative justice mechanism. The jurisdiction that has struggled with this 
compromise the most is New South Wales, and the decision to close the forum sentencing 
program reflects the jurisdiction’s reticence to invest in this mechanism. However, all three 
jurisdictions face decisions in this area. CJC administrators in Vermont reported that the DOC 
faced budget cuts and was forced to reduce the size of the grants they issued to the centres. The 
administrators said the ability to pursue additional funding was a potential stopgap measure, but 
that they did not have the resources to engage in regular grant writing or aggressive fundraising. 
On the other hand, New Zealand has shown a willingness to expand its investment in FGCs, 
given the new training modules, the added hires, and the growth of the program to include 
eighteen-year old offenders. This discussion of investment also comes with a jurisdictional 
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expectation that restorative justice may be cheaper in the long term than other conventional 
justice mechanism, as evidenced by the finding in New South Wales regarding YJC’s cost 
efficiency.  
 The picture that emerges from this analysis is that the legislative design of these 
restorative justice mechanisms features several decision points, and most of those important 
decisions are characterized by procedural compromise. Jurisdictions are still learning how to 
navigate the unique expectations of a restorative process and effectively incorporate the process 
into the existing criminal justice institutions. In the end, it remains an ongoing negotiation 
regarding how best to control a restorative justice mechanism, how best to include victims and 
communities in productive ways, how to balance predictability and innovation, and how to 







This thesis set out to explore the growth and effectiveness of restorative justice 
practices, particularly as a potential supplement to or replacement of conventional crime 
responses. More specifically, the thesis asks whether the creation of a legislative mandate for 
restorative justice affected the implementation and operation of a restorative justice mechanism. 
To that end, I investigated restorative justice mechanisms in three locations—New Zealand, 
New South Wales, and Vermont—where local legislatures had passed a comprehensive statutory 
framework that directed and regulated the use of restorative justice. These mechanisms were: 
New Zealand’s Family Group Conferences, enacted by the Oranga Tamariki Act and adult pre-
sentence conferencing, enabled by the Sentencing Act 2002; New South Wales’ Youth Justice 
Conferences, introduced by the Young Offender Act 1997 and forum sentencing conferences, 
established by a 2005 regulation to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986; and Vermont’s reparative 
probation and Community Justice Centres, codified by House Acts No. 115 2000 and No. 128 
2008 respectively.  
I aimed to answer this primary research question by determining how well these 
mechanisms were working, acknowledging that any such determinations were subjective and 
dependent on which measures of success were employed. Ultimately, I chose to evaluate the 
relevant restorative justice mechanisms against the axis of how restorative they were (relying 
primarily on Bazemore and Schiff’s (2005) understanding of restorative outcomes) and against 
the axis of how effectively the policy was enacted (relying primarily on Marsh and McConnell’s 
(2012) framework for policy success). I added to my expectations for restorative success with a 
discussion of how academics perceive attempts to regulate restorative justice, the available 
options for how restorative justice can be integrated with criminal justice systems, and what 
components should be included in restorative justice legislation. I outlined my expectations for 
policy success with a discussion of policy design, including how particular policy tools and rules 
can contribute to implementation, and how mandating statues can be categorized according to 
the discretion that is granted to policy implementers.  
Overall, it is evident that the decisions of the legislature can have a major bearing on the 
restorative nature and the policy success of the justice mechanism in use. First, the statutes 
represent a choice regarding the type of restorative justice mechanism. As shown by New 
Zealand’s Oranga Tamariki Act 1989, a fully delineated conferencing procedure, accompanied by 
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the creation of a professionalized group of Youth Justice Coordinators, make for a justice 
mechanism that is well-administrated with predictable conferencing outcomes, enabling the 
young offender to repair harms in consistent ways. However, the offender-centric design, the 
fact that the conference does not rely on victim participation, and the standardization of the 
process impede the ability of the FGC to produce stakeholder involvement and community role 
transformation.  
New South Wales’ Young Offenders Act 1997 and the 2005 regulation for the forum 
sentencing intervention program illustrate how this routinization, if taken further, can lead to 
trade-offs with the mechanisms’ overall restorative capacity. Responsible parties rely on scripted 
conferencing interactions and predetermined outcome plan options to ensure that both Youth 
Justice Conferences and forum sentencing conferences comply with legislative standards. For 
any restorative justice mechanism, standardization may improve the procedural legitimacy, 
simplify implementation, and create programmatic consistency. Yet such routinization also 
impedes the capacity for innovation, flexibility, and restorative dialogue. Furthermore, the way in 
which the Young Offenders Act conceives of the YJC routines pushes the conferencing 
outcomes into a rehabilitative justice space rather than a restorative one. This means that in 
addition to creating a mechanism that shares the shortcomings of the FGC along the dimensions 
of stakeholder involvement and community role transformation, the focus of the YJC on 
personal development opportunities for young offenders also adds questions about how well the 
conferences are repairing harms. Prior to the program’s cessation, forum sentencing conferences 
required that victims be willing to attend, which might have created more victim-offender 
exchange but also restrained the mechanism’s applicability.  
Meanwhile, adult pre-sentence conferences in New Zealand and restorative justice panels 
in Vermont were designed with different restorative focuses. In New Zealand, victim needs were 
the driving consideration of the mechanism, and so these conferences excel along the dimension 
of stakeholder involvement. In Vermont, ceding control of justice responses to local 
communities was a primary goal. Vermont’s panel approach thus provides the best example of 
effective community role transformation. However, both examples illustrate how certain 
decisions in one area can have substantive ramifications for the mechanism’s success in other 
areas. Vermont may offer a compelling illustration of community role transformation, but its 
mechanisms produce the lowest corresponding levels of victim involvement.  On the other 
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hand, in New Zealand, the requirement of victim participation limits the scope of restorative 
possibilities and results in adult conferencing playing a modest role in the criminal justice system.  
Second, legislative design decisions played a critical role in the way restorative justice 
mechanisms were ultimately integrated into the criminal justice system. The flexible application 
of the Family Group Conference at any stage of the justice process has made for a well-
integrated and robust justice intervention. It also allows for restoration to take place in several 
different iterations, from diverting a young offender to informing their Youth Court sentence. 
This stands in contrast to the case of Youth Justice Conferences, which are located within the 
youth justice process as a highly constrained diversionary tool for the proportion of young 
offenders who have committed a summary offence that is too serious for cautioning but still 
moderate enough to qualify for diversion from the Children’s Court. This design aspect means 
that YJCs are limited in their applicability and their vitality, perhaps explaining their failure to 
emerge as a preference of local law enforcement and their inability to contribute to the policy 
success of the Young Offenders Act 1997. Yet the legislative design also means that when a YJC 
takes place, it can be fully adjudicated by the restorative process.  
Forum sentencing was also designed to be an endpoint in the justice process as a distinct 
sentencing mechanism for adult offenders. This meant that successful completion of a 
conference and an outcome plan would constitute an offender’s full criminal sentence. But, once 
again, the start-to-finish restorative process did not save forum sentencing from the same 
integration problems that YJCs have. A complicated referral system and rigid eligibility 
restrictions made it difficult to determine the level of case-seriousness needed to trigger the 
mechanism’s applicability.  As a result, the forum-sentencing mechanism proved in practice to 
be too difficult to activate and was abandoned by policymakers.  
The Sentencing Act 2002 creates a justice system role that eases the activation of adult 
pre-sentence conferencing by forcing judges to use the mechanism but limits the impact of the 
conferences by maintaining a reliance on conventional adjudication. The Act mandates that the 
courts pause proceedings for a restorative justice referral, then allows courts to impose further 
criminal sentences while using the completion of a restorative justice conference as a mitigating 
factor. The fact that the mechanism forces offenders to step back into the conventional justice 
stream and lets judges retain control of the final sentence has competing policy implications. 
While judicial control of final outcomes retains predictability and consistency in justice sector 
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outcomes, such control also restricts the extent to which the crime response mechanism can be 
characterized as fully restorative. 
 The last example is CJCs, which are encouraged to develop restorative justice services to 
be used at all stages of the justice process. Once the CJC gains control over a referred case, the 
centre wields substantial authority over the trajectory and the final disposition of the case. 
However, it is difficult to track just how many cases are being managed by CJCs and how 
successful their efforts are. Accordingly, while the latitude for innovation in and integration of 
restorative services makes it easy to imagine an expansive restorative justice mechanism, it is 
difficult to know the precise shape of restorative justice’s role in Vermont.  
Third, there is the extent to which the jurisdiction allows legislative goals to align with or 
conflict with restorative goals. Vermont made the unique decision in this area to enact a statute 
that dictated restorative justice as the official policy of the state, meaning that jurisdiction’s 
legislative goals overlap closely with restorative goals. However, there are points of tension in 
the other jurisdictions that can impair the restorative capacity of the relevant mechanism. Both 
YJCs and forum sentencing conferences are monitored in accordance with the legislative goal 
that they reduce recidivism among participants. As was discussed in both Chapters 4 and 5, this 
is a potentially unrealistic expectation for restorative justice. Nevertheless, the forum sentencing 
intervention program was discontinued, in part because it was unable to produce results in this 
area, illustrating how legislative goals can affect the operation of a restorative justice mechanism.  
 Similarly, New Zealand claims that it wants to create culturally appropriate and 
community-inclusive restorative processes, in both their youth justice and criminal justice 
systems. However, the legislation, in both instances, has designed a state-sanctioned mechanism 
that remains reliant on justice sector professionals, uses conventional justice institutions, and is 
prescriptively designed and closely monitored. As evidenced by the experience of the facilitator 
in the Auckland area, this greatly impairs the capacity of the New Zealand justice systems to 
truly meet the needs of its communities and engage in innovative ways of doing justice.  
Fourth, there is the level of discretion that the statute grants to local implementers, 
which categorizes the law in accordance with Ingram and Schneider’s (1990) typology. One can 
best illustrate the discretion issue by contrasting the strong statutory directives in New Zealand 
and New South Wales with the Wilsonian approach in Vermont. There, as we have seen, the 
Vermont legislature issued broad legislative goals and then allowed local implementors discretion 
to meet those goals in their own way. The explicit natures of the statutory directives that 
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governed FGCs, YJCs, and forum sentencing allow for mechanisms that can be predictably 
implemented, closely monitored, and consistently applied. On the other hand, Vermont’s 
willingness to cede control to its local CJC administrators and community volunteers creates a 
mechanism that can be responsive to the needs of communities and innovate within the context 
of the state’s comprehensive restorative visions.  
Questions remain for further research. The study of restorative justice around the world 
would benefit from more complete data about the various practices that are occurring and from 
better jurisdictional reporting about restorative justice mechanisms. Better data would enable a 
large-n study and allow for more statistically driven assessments of how legislation can affect 
various measures of restorative and policy success.  
Further, the three jurisdictions that I investigated feature demographic elements and 
socio-political characteristics that limit the applicability of these conclusions. For example, I 
present evidence for why Vermont’s community-driven approach and willingness to be more 
hands-off with its restorative justice mechanism produces some positive, restorative 
developments. But Vermont is also an incredibly small and homogenous jurisdiction that is 
wealthier than other states in the USA. Decisions that Vermont has made about restorative 
justice may not be easily implemented in more populous or more diverse locations. Additionally, 
as was discussed in Chapter 2, the type of legislation that gets passed in a jurisdiction is 
constrained by the number of veto players that play a role in the law-making process. It makes 
sense that the New Zealand Parliament, a relatively efficient law-making body with few veto 
players, was able to enact such an elaborate overhaul of its youth justice system. Regardless of 
what one ultimately concludes about the success of that overhaul, it is likely true that the Oranga 
Tamariki Act 1989 is not a universally transferrable statute, making the lessons learned from its 
procedural specificity similarly non-transferrable.  
While much work remains, we can draw tentative conclusions from the research reported 
in this thesis. Legislative frameworks seem capable of establishing effective and moderately well-
resourced programs of restorative justice. So long as restorative justice offers a relatively cost-
effective method of closing criminal cases, policymakers will continue to harness restorative 
impulses to aid in justice reform. If advocates of restorative justice want those state-sanctioned 
inclusions to be maximally restorative and genuinely successful along restorative dimensions, 
then there is continued effort required to understand how jurisdictions should best 
operationalize, enact, and implement restorative justice mechanisms. The offender-centric focus 
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of much criminal law can make it difficult for legislatures to structure models that ensure full 
victim participation as part of the restorative process. Effective programs will require substantial 
buy-in from adjacent workgroups. And even where workgroups all share a common purpose, 
restorative justice initiatives may have difficulty bridging the gaps between the elites who fashion 
and administer the programs and the indigenous peoples who inevitably find themselves on the 
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APPENDIX 1: TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Introduction 
Briefly describe your role within the restorative justice process. What drew you to the position? 
Alternatively, what trajectory did your career follow and how did you arrive at this role?  
Personal Goals 
What do you think of as your primary goals when you consider your provision of restorative 
justice services? How do you measure your success? Where do you feel you are most successful 
and where do you feel you can improve?  
Systemic Support 
What challenges currently obstruct your restorative justice services? Who are the other 
individuals who have a direct effect on your ability to do your job? Please describe how they 
affect your practice. Do these other actors have the same goals and measures of success that you 
do? In what ways are they similar and in what ways do they differ? What would improve your 
ability to deliver restorative justice services?   
Role of Restorative Justice 
Thinking about the entirety of the criminal justice system and the role that restorative justice is 
currently playing, how do you feel about the extent to which RJ has become part of the system? 
Would you like to see that role expand? How so? What systemic reforms do you think are 
needed? What would the perfect system look like? 
Practice Details 
What types of restorative justice services do you offer? How are cases referred to you? What is 
the evaluation process for accepting cases? What’s the typical caseload in a month-long period? 
What do you do before the process? What do you do during the process? What do you do after 
the process? What are your responsibilities for reporting those events to either your organization 
or the justice system? What kind of follow-up do you do with participants? What were the 
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training requirements for this role? How do you provide quality control for the restorative 
process? How are you funded?  
Comparing Actions to Legislative Goals 
How do your efforts play a role in the reduction of reoffending? How do your efforts play a role 
in offender rehabilitation? How do your efforts play a role in victim reparation? How do your 
efforts play a role in community engagement?  
Comparing Actions to Restorative Goals 
How do your efforts encourage offenders to repair the harms caused by their crime? How do 
your efforts empower victims to confront their offenders and describe those harms? How do 
your efforts create an opportunity for productive dialogue between offenders and victims? How 
do your efforts restore control of crime and conflict resolution into the hands of the affected 
community? 
 
 
